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Preface

Declarations

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution.

In accordance with the Department of Sociology guidelines, this thesis does not exceed 80,000 words (without bibliography, footnotes, and references).

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This dissertation compares the contentious responses to austerity in Portugal and Spain in the context of the Eurozone crisis and the Great Recession between 2008 and 2015. Despite many similarities in the origins and socio-economic effects of the crisis, the dynamics of contention in each country differed in terms of number, rhythm and actors. While Portugal and Spain experienced parallel protest dynamics until 2011, after that point the former falls into a pattern of “stop-and-go” with sporadic large events by social movements. In contrast, in Spain mobilisation and confrontation levels rose into a sustained wave that lasted until late 2013 and leading to the emergence of new political parties.

The dissertation aims at explaining these different trajectories and outcomes arguing that they are connected to the nature and configurations of the actors in the process, which come to shape the kinds and forms of claim-making involved. Rather than focusing solely on social movements, the dissertation looks at a plurality of actors and claims. Following a cycle-based approach, the focus of the analysis falls on the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors in reshaping the political sphere in each country.

The research design is based on process tracing and paired comparison, combining a protest event analysis with interviews. Analytically, I consider the following dimensions: time and space, actors, networks and alliances; organization, repertoires and strategies; claims and frameworks.

The empirical chapters reveal contrasting dynamics at work in each country. In Portugal, even if social movements emerged, austerity was mainly challenged within the borders of the existing institutional framework, both through the control of protest movements by parties and trade unions and through an internal recomposition of the left leading to a new system of alliances. Rather than a disruptive discourse, the dominant actors wanted to conserve the status-quo of the welfare state in Portugal against austerity. In Spain, social movements developed as a disruptive force that questioned both austerity and political institutions. Relatively stronger and autonomous than in Portugal, the Spanish movements were able to collaborate on a more equal footing with institutional actors, constituting overlapping protest dynamics that sustained mobilisation. In contrast to Portugal, this resulted in a variety of discourses and conceptions of citizenship expressing the different interests in the field.

This dissertation shows that cycles of contention are shaped by the way the contentious field is organized and that the types of relations between institutional and non-institutional actors play a fundamental role in the way such cycles unfold.

Tiago Miguel Lopes Carvalho
## Table of Contents

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 12
   1.1. Great Recession, European Crisis, and Democratic Capitalism ..................................... 13
   1.2. Austerity in Southern Europe ......................................................................................... 19
   1.3. Contesting Austerity in Southern Europe ................................................................. 22
   1.4. Structure of the Dissertation ......................................................................................... 27

2. Crisis and Contentious Politics: An Analytical Framework .................................................. 30
   2.1. Mapping the Field .......................................................................................................... 30
      2.1.1. Actors and Claims .................................................................................................. 30
      2.1.2. Between National and Globalised Contestation .................................................... 32
      2.1.3. Between Idealist and Materialist Explanations ...................................................... 34
      2.1.4. Summary ............................................................................................................... 38
   2.2. Contentious Politics ....................................................................................................... 38
      2.2.1. A Cycle-Based Approach ....................................................................................... 39
      2.2.2. Institutional and Non-institutional Actors: a Multi-Actor Perspective .................... 43
      2.2.3. Repertoires, Discourses and Claim-Making ........................................................... 48
   2.3. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 53

3. Methods .................................................................................................................................. 55
   3.2. From Conceptualisation to Data Collection .................................................................... 60
      3.2.1. Protest Event Analysis: Actors and Protest in the Public Sphere ............................. 61
      3.2.2. Interviews and Fieldwork Strategy: Underlying Structure of Mobilisation ............. 67
   3.3. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 69

4. Preludes to Mobilisation: from Transitions to Democracy to Anti-Austerity Protests .......... 71
   4.1. Dynamics of Contention in the 1980s and 1990s in Portugal and Spain ......................... 72
   4.2. The Global Justice Movement in the Iberian Peninsula ................................................. 80
   4.3. Precursor Mobilisations (2005-2011) ........................................................................... 86
   4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 92

5. Turning Points: between a Stuttering Start and a “Trigger of Energy Spilling” ................. 94
   5.1. Networks and Actors: Going Beyond the Core ............................................................. 95
      5.1.1. Turning Points in Portugal ....................................................................................... 97
      5.1.2. Turning Points in Spain ......................................................................................... 101
      5.1.3. Going Beyond the Core: a Summary ...................................................................... 103
   5.2. Between Democracy, Precarity and Austerity: Movement Culture and Frames ........... 106
   5.3. Networks of Resistance: Building a Connective Structure ........................................... 112
Acronyms

ECB - European Central Bank
EEC - European Economic Community
EMU - European Monetary Union
EU - European Union
GJM - Global Justice Movement
IMF - International Monetary Fund
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PASOK - Panhellenic Socialist Movement
SEC - Southern European Countries

Portugal
15O - Plataforma 15 de Outubro
BE - Bloco de Esquerda
CDA - Congresso Democrático das Alternativas
CDS-PP - Centro Democrático Social - Partido Popular
CGTP - Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores Portugueses
FP25 - Forças Populares 25 de Abril
FSP - Fórum Social Português
GaR - Geração à Rasca
JSD - Juventude Social Democrata
M12M - Movimento 12 de Março
MAS - Movimento Alternativa Socialista
MPT - Movimento Partido da Terra
PCP - Partido Comunista Português
PEV - Partido Ecologista os Verdes
PI - Precários Inflexíveis
PREC - Período Revolucionário em Curso
PS - Partido Socialista
PSD - Partido Social Democrata
PSR - Partido Socialista Revolucionário
PXXI - Política XXI
QSLT - Que se Lixe a Troika
RC - Renovação Comunista
RDA69 - Regueirão dos Anjos 69
Ruptura-FER - Ruptura - Frente Revolucionária de Esquerda
UDP - União Democrática Popular
UGT - União Geral de Trabalhadores

Spain
AM - Ahora Madrid
BC - Barcelona en Comú
CCOO - Comisiones Obreras
CGT - Confederación General del Trabajo
DRY! - Democracia Real, Ya!
ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
IA - Izquierda Anticapitalista
ICV - Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds
IU - Izquierda Unida
LOMCE - Ley Orgánica para la Mejora de la Calidad Educativa
PAH - Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca
PCE - Partido Comunista Español
PP - Partido Popular
PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español
UGT - Unión General de Trabajadores
UPyD - Unión Progreso y Democracia
List of Tables

Table 2. 1 Grammars of Claim-Making and Citizenship.................................................................53

Table 3. 1 Dimensions and Variables of the Protest Event Analysis..............................................64

Table 4. 1 Actors, Practices and Discourses in Portugal and Spain since the 1970s .........................93

Table 7. 1 Electoral Results - European Elections (%) and Number of MP in Portugal ................177
Table 7. 2 Electoral Results - General Elections (%) and Number of MP in Portugal ....................178

List of Figures

Figure 1. 1 Unemployment Rate (%) in EU (28 Countries), Greece, Portugal, and Spain (2006–2017) ...........................................................................................................................................21
Figure 1. 2 Annual Immigration in Portugal, Spain and Greece (2007-2016) ................................21

Figure 4. 1 Protest Actions (Per 1000 people) in Portugal and Spain per year (1980-1995) .............73
Figure 4. 2 Contentious Actors (%) in Portugal (1980-1995) ............................................................74
Figure 4. 3 Contentious Actors (%) in Spain (1980-1995) .................................................................75
Figure 4. 4 Union Density (Per Active population) in Portugal and Spain (1977-2015)..................76
Figure 4. 5 Repertoires (%) in Portugal (1980-1995) .......................................................................77
Figure 4. 6 Repertoires (%) in Spain (1980-1995) ...........................................................................78

Figure 5. 1 Number of Protest Events per Month in Portugal and Spain (2009-2015) .................96
Figure 5. 2 Number of Protests (per half-year) by type of Actor in Portugal (2009-2015) ............101
Figure 5. 3 Number of Protests (per half-Year) by type of Actor in Spain (2009-2015) .............102
Figure 5. 4 Taken Part in Lawful Public Protest in the last 12 months (%) (2002-2016) .................104
Figure 5. 5 Feel Close to a Party and Participated in Lawful Protest (%) in Portugal (2002-2016) ...104
Figure 5. 6 Feel Close to a Party and Participated in Lawful Protest (%) in Spain (2002-2016) .......105
Figure 5. 7 Protest with Demands about Representation and Participation (%) ...............................111

Figure 6. 1 Protest events Organised by Political Parties, Trade Unions and Civil Society Actors (%) in Spain (2009-2015) ..................................................................................................................124
Figure 6. 2 Protest events Organised by Political Parties, Trade Unions and Civil Society Actors (%) in Portugal (2009-2015) ............................................................................................................124
Figure 6. 3 Claim-making in Spain (%) (2009-2015) .....................................................................125
Figure 6. 4 Claim-making in Portugal (%) (2009-2015) .................................................................125
Figure 6. 5 Number and type of Political Claims per year in Spain (2009-2015) .......................126
Figure 6. 6 Type of Actors (%) in Social Claims per year in Spain (2009-2015) .........................127
Figure 6. 7 Type of Actors (%) in Social Claims per year in Portugal (2009-2015) ....................127
Figure 6. 8 Type of Social Claims (%) per Three Months in Spain (2009-2015) .....................128
Figure 6. 9 Type of Social Claims (%) per Three Months in Portugal (2009-2015) ...................128
Figure 6. 10 Actor (%) by Types of Social Claims in Spain (2009-2015) .................................131
Figure 6. 11 Type of Social Rights Claims by Economic, Political and Cultural Claims in Spain (2009-2015) .........................................................................................................................131
Figure 6. 12 Number of Social Claims by Actors per Three Months in Spain (2009-2015) ..........133
Figure 6. 13 Repertoires in Social Claims by types of Actors in Spain (2009-2015) .........................133
Figure 6. 14 Number of Housing Repertoires per Three Months (2009-2015) ..............................137
Figure 6. 15 Type of Economic Claims: Austerity and Labour in Spain (2009-2015) ......................140
Figure 6. 16 Type of Economic Claims: Austerity and Work claims in Portugal (2009-2015) .........148

Figure 7. 1 Long-term interest rates (monthly data) for Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and the European Union ........................................................................................................................................157
Figure 7. 2 Voting Intentions in Spain (2010-2016) ........................................................................168
Figure 7. 3 Electoral Results in Spain (2014-2016) ........................................................................170
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Electioneering

I will stop
I will stop at nothing
Say the right things
When electioneering
I trust I can rely on your vote

When I go forwards you go backwards and somewhere we will meet

Riot shields
Voodoo economics
It's just business
Cattle prods and the IMF
I trust I can rely on your vote

Radiohead, *Ok, Computer*, 1997
1. Introduction

The shape of the future will depend not on how violent or widespread contention has become, but on how it relates to states, capitalism and the international system.

Tarrow, 2011, p. 37

This dissertation compares the contentious responses to the implementation of austerity and market liberalisation in Portugal and Spain in the context of the Great Recession between 2008 and 2015. Taking each country as a context for an episode of contention, it analyses the relations between different sets of actors, their evolution over time, and their political outcomes.

This study has three guiding questions. What were the contentious responses to austerity in Portugal and Spain between 2008 and 2015? Why did these contentious responses to austerity and their political outcomes differ? More specifically, what is the process that leads to the emergence of a new political subject such as Podemos in Spain and a reconfiguration of the party alliances in the Portuguese case?

These cases are situated at the intersection of the transnational and cross-country waves of contention that swept the world after the 2007/8 financial collapse. From the Arab Spring to Occupy, to the emergence of populist political parties, both on the left and on the right, this wave of contention has introduced new political dynamics. Despite the apparent novelty of this wave of contention over the last 40 years, there have been similar processes in other parts of the world. Published in 1997, the lyrics in the epigraph remark a specific political situation involving the interrelation between institutional politics and protests against internationally-led austerity measures (Riot shields/ Voodoo economics/ It’s just business/ Cattle prods and the IMF). The structural adjustment programmes implemented by the IMF around the world since the 1980s seem to have produced similar political backlashes to austerity, provoking a crisis of legitimacy, intense protest waves, and populism (Roberts, 2012). The Eurozone crisis should be seen, to a certain extent, as part of this broader historical dynamic, which can be traced to the shift from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism, producing political changes at both the national and the global level.

In this scenario the cases of Portugal and Spain present divergent outcomes regarding both the nature and intensity of protest and the reconfiguration of the party-system, a focus on which should help us to understand that the so-called anti-austerity protests cannot be treated as a single phenomenon despite their commonalities and linkages. When observing the political consequences of the Great Recession and austerity, we find different protest responses and
outcomes in Portugal and Spain. One might expect the similar historical backgrounds of these countries – both semi-peripheral European countries who underwent a rapid socio-economic transformation in the second half of the twentieth century, and a transition to democracy followed by integration into European institutions from the 1970s – to produce similar outcomes. Arguably, even if in a broader macro-historical perspective, a certain parallel can still be observed, since both have gone through a crisis embedded in European dynamics, an in-depth analysis of the anti-austerity cycle reveals different trajectories. As I will show in the empirical chapters of this thesis, the shape of the cycle of protest was different in each case, and the lack of successful new political parties in Portugal contrasts with the plurality of electoral actors that emerged in Spain.

Following a contentious politics approach, I will argue that the grievances stemming from increasing deprivation and inequalities can only partially account for some aspects of protest as the type of grievance alone cannot explain the different nature and trajectory of protest seen in these two countries. Instead, to understand these, it is necessary to focus on “variations in political structure and in the workings of the political process” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 26). Accordingly, rather than analysing fixed structural and cultural arrangements, this dissertation will “examine the relational dynamics of complex episodes of contention” (Tarrow, 2015, p. 99) and their outcomes. I will examine the cycle in a processual and relational way, highlighting how the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors worked to reshape the political sphere. Thus, the main focus of this dissertation is an examination of contentious responses to the crisis within specific national contexts.

In this introduction, my objective is to delimit the scope and specify the objectives of this dissertation by clarifying its research questions and outlining its overarching structure. Furthermore, my aim is to contextualise and explore the nature and consequences, both economic and political, of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, and particularly in the Southern European Countries. This will lay the groundwork for a review of the relevant research literature, and an introduction to the chapters to come.

1.1. Great Recession, European Crisis, and Democratic Capitalism

Let us begin with a contextualization of the crisis in Europe, which is necessary for understanding the source of the contentious responses and political transformations that will constitute this dissertation’s central subject. Such contextualization requires situating the crisis in a broader economic shift that has been taking place since the 1970s. In this section, I will
argue that austerity measures are best understood as sharing similar processes of market liberalisation, external intervention and structural reform – which go on to generate contentious responses and political change, as seen, for example, in Latin America (Almeida, 2007; Roberts, 2008, 2012, 2017). This paradigm shift in political-economic policy has taken place not only because of the growing importance of International Financial Institutions, but also because of the influence of ideas closely related to those of the Washington consensus¹ and neoliberalism (understood here simply as policies that intend to diminish the role of states and boost the role of markets), where debt crises played an important role in transforming policy architectures (Babb & Kentikelenis, 2016; Hall, 2012; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, & King, 2016).

Emerging in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, and rapidly expanding to other sectors of the economy, the Great Recession is considered, within much of the literature on political economy, as a consequence of broader historical dynamics affecting the nature of democratic capitalism since the 1970s. From this perspective, two major topics frame the discussion: on the one hand, the changing relationship between political and economic institutions over the last 40 years, and, on the other, the implications this carries for the Eurozone, which has prompted an analysis of the structural imbalances inside the Eurozone, the sovereign debt crisis and the impacts of these on political institutions.

On this view, the current crisis is connected to a gradual shift from embedded liberalism to neoliberal policies from the 1970s onwards (Anderson, 2000; Mann, 2013; Streeck, 2012, 2013). Accordingly, various authors claim that there is a tension between capitalism and democracy, very much exacerbated in the neoliberal period (Barber, 2000; Fitoussi & Saraceno, 2013; Mann, 2013; Offe, 2013a; Streeck, 2012). Since the 1970s, several significant trends are observable, such as the retrenchment of the welfare state, the rise of unregulated financial markets, and rising inequalities. This ‘triple crisis’ of banks, public finance and the ‘real’ economy is the result of the financial expansion of unregulated shadow banks, global imbalances and the private debt produced by privatised Keynesianism: stagnant real wages leading to dependence on credit for consumption as a means to retain living standards in a period of welfare retrenchment (Mann, 2013).

In other words, as Streeck has observed, post-war democratic capitalism involves a tension between the interests of markets and voters:

¹ Or in a different version the ‘Brussels-Washington consensus’ - this refers to a term coined in 1989 that points out to a list of market liberalizing policies developed in this city.
“a tension that had been successively displaced by an unsustainable process of ‘borrowing from the future’, decade by decade: from the inflation of the 1970s, through the public debt of the 1980s, to the private debt of 1990s and early 2000s, finally exploding with the financial crisis of 2008. Since then, the dialectic of democracy and capitalism has been unfolding at breathtaking speed” (Streeck, 2012, p. 64).

As a result, market requirements make democratic institutions less responsive to their citizens as states have primarily to fulfill the desires of markets, which results in a limited view of citizenship, reduced to an elitist and electoral perspective, ignoring social rights (Della Porta et al., 2016; Roberts, 2008; Schäfer & Streeck, 2013).

In recent years, in terms of policy, this tension has translated into what has been termed austerity. As Blyth (2015) shows, austerity is not a new phenomenon. It has had different manifestations throughout history, such as structural reforms, liquidation, and so forth. More than a precise concept, it is, in essence, a buzzword, or a discourse, used to disguise liberalisation and class politics under the veil of morality, simplicity and virtue (e.g. live within our means, compensate hard-working people, etc.) (Blyth, 2015). It is a discourse used to justify ‘TINA’: that there is no alternative to retrenchment and privatisation policies, which are viewed as a unique and mandatory solution in order to regain market trust (Reis, 2013). As a policy regime, then, austerity involves the reduction of the state’s budget, which entails a combination of welfare retrenchment, privatisation, a roll-back of universal social policies, and labour market protection. Austerity thus incorporates the ideas of extending market competition while limiting state activity, leading to such outcomes as diminishing labour costs and increasing capital accumulation.

But austerity seems not only to have economic consequences, such as rising unemployment, low growth, and economic stagnation. It also has political ones: electoral volatility, resentment, and discontent, leading to protests against mainstream political parties and technocratic governments. As it derails social rights, it brings back the social question (Judt, 1997). Class politics reemerges, creating a crisis of legitimacy and the emergence of extra-institutional actors that contest these policies. It becomes visible in the progressive decrease in electoral turnout, rising political disaffection, detachment and the emergence of populist parties (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2006; Schäfer & Streeck, 2013). Policies that are detrimental to most of the population result in growing inequality and tensions between the national and global arena, diminishing the capacity of those with fewer economic resources to make use of state power to implement change (Mann, 2013). Simultaneously, responses outside
the institutional sphere emerge in the form of alternative political movements and counter-
movements, with subsequent effects on the institutional sphere (Della Porta et al., 2016; Flesher
Fominaya, 2017).

The European financial crisis that emerged from 2009 is embedded within this
paradigm shift and the resultant tensions described above. It is the most severe political and
economic crisis since the creation of the EU and it questions both the nature and future of
European integration. It is not a simple extension of the global financial crisis, even if it follows
from it, but rather an unusual financial crisis that develops within a supranational monetary
union among developed countries.

The way the national crises evolved was deeply embedded in European dynamics.
Three major phases can be identified, involving the interplay between markets, the EU
institutions, and the countries’ responses, particularly of those most affected by the crisis. In
the aftermath of the 2008 crash, the main measures of a first phase concerned the bailout of
banks to protect the financial system. These expansionary policies were followed by a second
phase of what has been called a brief neo-Keynesian moment at the inception of the crisis, that
lasted until the beginning of 2010: EU countries were incentivized to pass expansionist policies
that pushed for public investment to prevent recession (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter, 2016;

Nevertheless, at the end of 2009, the Greek debt crisis erupted. After the 2009 general
elections, the new Greek government revealed that their budget deficit was higher than
predicted. This third phase triggered a reorientation of policy at the European level and at the
national level, as market pressures started to mount. As the risk of contagion increased, the
weakest links of the Eurozone – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland – shadowed by the EU,
followed a “budget consolidation” strategy to reduce their debts and deficits to “gain market
trust”. The austerity phase thus began (Reis, 2013), with these countries adopting programmes,
either imposed or self-implemented, to pursue these objectives.

2 This dissertation is only a small part of a wider and as yet incomplete story, as the processes that I
have sought to situate in this chapter are still unfolding. Over the last ten years, within the broader
context of the 2008 financial crash, three different crises have pressured the European Union and that
contribute to a great extent to its architecture: (1) the referendum of 2016 in the United Kingdom that
is predicted to lead to the exit of this member state from the EU; (2) the development of illiberal
tendencies in multiple countries of the Eastern bloc; and (3) the monetary crisis affecting the Southern
European countries. In this context, and answering to these dynamics, a sort of new normal has emerged
in the form of not only protests, but electoral volatility and new political parties that challenge the ways
the EU is managed.

3 See Appendix I for a full chronology of the events considered key in the literature for the development
of the European Crisis.
Then, in 2010, two countries were bailed-out (i.e. being given an official credit line) under the auspices of the so-called Troika.\(^4\) The first bailout was granted to Greece in mid-2010; after this came Ireland, at the end of the year. In 2011, Portugal would join the club. Finally, in 2012, Cyprus and Spain requested assistance for their banking systems. And although Italy was never officially under assistance, since it was deemed “too big to bail” (Perez & Matsaganis, 2018), the country undertook emergency measures driven by a technocratic government supported by a broad coalition.\(^5\) By 2013–14 a post-austerity phase began, with all the countries’ assistance programs coming to an end, and the re-start of economic growth, even whilst all the restrictions of the Eurozone were maintained. Within this story, Greece would continue to be the outlier; in 2012 it would receive a second bailout and haircut, and in 2015, after tense negotiations with the European institutions and a referendum led by SYRIZA, it would receive its third bailout.

Almost all the costs of this crisis were imposed on individual countries. However, there were also measures taken at European level to facilitate the conditions under which the bailouts operated at the national level (even if these can be the subject of many criticisms for not being the best solution or for favouring particularly the financial sector). Most notably, this included the creation of the European Financial Stability facility (May 2010), the ECB’s decision to buy sovereign debt on secondary markets, the establishment of a permanent crisis resolution mechanism (December 2010) by the European Council, and the beginning of quantitative easing (January 2015). Most importantly, there was the declaration of the ECB president, Mario Draghi, in July 2012, that the ECB would do “whatever it takes to preserve the Euro”.

Overall, the crisis in Europe was a result of a combination of imbalances within the currency area, allied to deficiencies in the design of the EMU that were known since its inception, such as: (1) macroeconomic divergence, resulting from imbalances between zones with different economic structures being an incentive for the cash-strapped half of the union to borrow from the other half, reinforcing differences; (2) lack of fiscal policy coordination; and

\(^4\) The Troika refers to the joint action decision group comprising the IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB).

\(^5\) It should be noted that a variety of bailouts and technocratic governments existed in each country. For instance, even whilst Portugal never had a technocratic government, the finance minister Vitor Gaspar (2011-2013) had no party affiliation and held credentials with several of the international institutions (today he holds a post in the IMF). In the same vein, in Spain the PP government elected in 2011 had Luis de Guindos, an independent, overseeing the treasury and economy. For about six months Greece had Lukas Papademos as prime minister leading an independent government with the parliamentary support of the major political parties in the country (November 2011 to May 2012); previously he had been vice president of the ECB.
Different forms of economic organisation stand out within the Eurozone, which would be reinforced by the common currency. If the northern countries have export-led economies, the southern ones have domestic demand-driven economies (Hall, 2014). Nevertheless, most of these countries, with the possible exception of Greece, displayed good economic performance indicators and reasonable budget deficits in the years preceding the crisis. Still, data show that the crisis and the consequent liberalisation measures taken under austerity came to reinforce a pre-existing liberalisation trend (e.g. levels of employment protection dropped more in these countries than in others). This crisis in Europe may therefore be said to have exposed the frailties and asymmetries within the Eurozone that were there from the beginning, especially trade deficits in the periphery and surpluses in the core. The asymmetric integration at the European level led to continuous trade deficits in the south and after that to debt. What the affected countries, that is, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland had in common before the crisis was their growing trade deficits, not public sector debts (Blankenburg, King, Konzelmann, & Wilkinson, 2013; Reis & Rodrigues, 2012). The fiscal imbalance was thus a symptom, not a cause, of the crisis.

In sum, an economic crisis with weak and uncoordinated responses led to a political crisis, one that is, as many argue, multidimensional (Wieviorka, 2012). This is not only because the institutional responses were political, but also because they generated contentious responses that need to be considered. In Della Porta’s (Della Porta et al., 2016) view, rather than a typical crisis of scarcity or inflation, it was a crisis of redistribution, featuring state retreat from social service provision and the erosion of social rights, leading to an undermining of consent, with concomitant declines in the levels of trust in institutions. Sánchez-Cuenca (2014b) called this a top-down approach, whereby non-elected institutions imposed economic policies on national governments – in his terms, an expression of “powerlessness democracy”. Rather than an institutional crisis at the national level, per se, we are looking at the incapacity of the political system to answer the international pressures and constraints posed by non-elected technocratic institutions. This implicated different but interconnected analytical levels, such as the national context and broader European dynamics.

Offe (2013b) identified a spectrum of reactions to the crisis, entailing both protests and changes in the party system. On the one hand, there was a collapse of the party system and a

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6 Translation of Impotencia Democrática.
reinforcement of both the far-right and far-left. On the other hand, there was an emergence of protest movements alongside “ephemeral eruptions of mass violence” among the excluded. Nonetheless, rather than viewing these reactions in isolation, I will suggest later that they should be interpreted as part of a longer contentious process, taking into account the interaction between institutional and non-institutional actors.

Even if research reveals similar patterns of political change and reaction, more scholarship is needed to understand the nature of the overall processes of contention. Were these transformations solely the result of the Great Recession, or do institutions in each country mediate this process? And if so, how? In the next section, the Southern European countries (SEC) will be analyzed closely.

1.2. Austerity in Southern European

As seen in the previous section, the Eurozone crisis affected mostly the Southern European Countries (SEC) and Ireland. Nevertheless, the impact was different because, despite economic resemblances, the political institutions, civil societies, and history of each country diverges.

As Malefakis (1992; 1995) observes, the SEC were noticed by the scientific community because of their common path towards modernisation and democratic politics since about the 1970s. The SEC can be conceived mainly as a sociopolitical and historical entity, due to the remarkable historical parallelisms between the countries, which came to spur a specific field of study during the 1980s. As a semiperiphery (Arrighi, 1985), the SEC are distinguishable from other European peripheries, like the Eastern countries, due to their social and economic heterogeneity, rather than ethnic and linguistic conflicts, with only Spain displaying such conflicts (Miley, 2013, 2014). The SEC combined a mix of rural, urban and industrial classes until the 1970s following the emergence of democratic regimes and the welfare state, after which education levels rose, and the class structure changed: while the rural classes declined, professionals and employees grew with the importance of the service sector and the welfare state. Even so, previous social dualities did not vanish; instead, they were transformed: though a change can be perceived, these continue to be the most unequal countries in Europe (Carmo, 2010).

The transition to democracy, in the mid-1970s, is considered for Portugal, Spain and Greece to be a turning point (Fishman, 1990; Gunther, Diamandouros, & Sotiropoulos, 2006). Gunther, Diamandourous and Sotiropoulos (2006) argue that democratisation, socioeconomic modernisation, and Europeanisation led these countries to approximate more closely Western
politics and social patterns – a certain leapfrogging occurred, both in economics and politics. Despite convergence with the centre, European integration nevertheless led to an asymmetric modernisation, due to the specificity of these countries’ integration and position in the EU, leading to the current crisis (López & Rodríguez, 2011; Reis & Rodrigues, 2012).

Regarding the Euro crisis, Hall (2012, 2014) contends that if there was a concerted response by the EU, it was still slow and insufficient, with the majority of the costs being imposed on these countries to reduce their budget deficits. Furthermore, the EU demanded an acceleration of previous structural reforms to the SEC: the focus was mainly on internal devaluation by reducing labour costs to restore international competitiveness (Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). With that said, even if these countries are demand-driven, that does not explain the differences between their austerity policies. Greece and Portugal were tied to programs dictated by the Troika, while Italy and Spain, due to the size of their economies in the EU context, had more leverage to implement their own responses (Della Porta et al., 2016; Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). Yet the government in Spain implemented a harsher program than in Portugal.

Embedded in the European Crisis dynamics, both in Portugal and in Spain, budget cuts were announced in the public sector throughout 2009 and 2010 (later extending to the private sector through taxation and labour reforms) (Reis & Rodrigues, 2012; Salmon, 2017), particularly after the Greek debacle at the end of 2009. These measures were undertaken by centre-left parties (PS - Partido Socialista and PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español) who happened to be in government until the election in 2011 of conservative/right-wing governments in both countries. The new conservative governments delivered similar plans to those formulated by the previous governments, as these were in line with their ideology and influenced by the markets and the European institutions (Moury & Standring, 2017; Salmon, 2017). These measures included labour reforms in both countries in the beginning of 2012, and the privatisation of strategic sectors but also the bailout of banks.

At the same time, there were important differences. Apart from the external intervention, unlike Portugal Spain had a housing bubble. In addition, as will be shown, in Spain there were policies aimed at privatising parts of the health and education sectors. Despite the labour cuts in these sectors in Portugal, such measures were never seriously attempted. Also, Portugal’s Constitutional Court blocked some of the measures undertaken by the government. By 2014, in contrast to Greece, as external constraints began to ease and the economic situation improved in both countries.
In this way, a crisis that was initially both economic and political became social, as austerity entailed a retrenchment of the welfare state. The impact on the labour market entailed declining income, rising unemployment and underemployment, and a general erosion of social rights. In both countries, unemployment rose: in Spain more than doubling, as shown in Figure 1.1. Furthermore, the labour devaluation measures led to a sustained wave of emigration from these countries to those of Europe’s core (Figure 1.2). Perez and Matsaganis (2018) show that

7 In the empirical chapters, I develop in more detail some of the measures taken.
the policies of internal devaluation had distributive consequences, in that inequalities did not rise in Portugal, despite the consolidation measures. In this sense, in comparative terms, the crisis and austerity had a stronger impact in Spain.

As such, although the imbalances contributed to the crisis within the Eurozone, the responses to it were aimed at national political institutions and hence varied across national contexts. The result was not only a decline in satisfaction with democracy, the economy, national governments and the EU, but also an increase in levels of discontent, disaffection and delegitimisation among citizens (Molino & Quaranta, 2016). These reactions were directed particularly towards national institutions, such as political parties and governments, in countries which were already distinguished by political disaffection (Magalhães, 2005; Montero, Gunther, & Torcal, 1997).

Given these findings, a comparison between Portugal and Spain becomes especially fruitful due to the similar political scenarios in a time of crisis, with no electoral instability until the 2015 elections, and with socialist governments being followed by conservative majorities. At the same time, in relation to protest dynamics, in Spain new actors emerged, creating disruptive dynamics, while in Portugal traditional actors were dominant. In fact, as I will go on to show, these countries displayed differences in both the frequency and nature of their protests (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Della Porta et al., 2016; Portos, 2017). As for the transition to democracy in Portugal and Spain (Fishman, 1990), during the most recent crisis, though the semi-peripheral context of these countries (i.e., their positioning vis-à-vis Europe) certainly contributed to the paths followed, their political trajectories did not follow a “unified logic”. Attention thus needs to be paid not only to features related to the socio-economic crisis, but also to the political reactions to it, regarding opportunities, threats and political cultures in each country (Della Porta et al., 2016).

1.3. Contesting Austerity in Southern Europe

A sustained wave of protest emerged in all of the SEC (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Della Porta et al., 2016; Portos, 2017; Quaranta, 2015). Although initial research on this topic tended to homogenise the features of these waves, later on, more nuanced perspectives emerged. As with other processes of market liberalisation, there was a plurality of contentious responses, involving multiple actors (Roberts, 2008), based on the overlapping grievances of the affected precarious youth, public workers and blue-collar workers (Della Porta et al., 2016). In contrast to the anti-globalisation movement, these waves of protest were nationally grounded. They
made wide use of internet technologies as a means of mobilisation, maintained a horizontal character, and proved capable of expanding their bases beyond activists, incorporating new people into broad protests (Castells, 2012; Della Porta et al., 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2017). In the course of this wave of contention, a transnational, shared frame emerged and thereafter diffused, one based on the idea of “citizenship”, and which developed not against democracy, but instead, demanded its renewal. But are these groups really new, or made up of old actors articulating a new sets of ideas, at least in certain national contexts and junctures (Kanellopoulos, Kostopoulos, Papanikolopoulos, & Rongas, 2017)? This is a question to which I will frequently return throughout this thesis.

Depending on the national context, contentious responses to austerity presented of different configurations. In Spain, in mid-2011, the 15M movement emerged, occupying squares in cities all over the country, which led to the creation of local grassroots assemblies and movements in defence of public healthcare and education among others (Castells, 2012; Della Porta et al., 2016; Hughes, 2011; Portos, 2016). Forging links between parties and social movements was difficult, because of both the mistrust of the parties, particularly Izquierda Unida (IU), towards the movements, and also because of anti-party and anti-union sentiment in the movement (Castells, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2007, 2014a; Ramiro & Verge, 2013). These links developed, but only at a later stage, and under the banners of the movements (Romanos, 2016; Portos, 2017).

However, from 2014 onwards, Podemos, a new political party, took advantage of this political opportunity structure to make several breakthroughs, particularly after electing five MEPs in May 2014 (Martín, 2015; Miley, 2017; Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel, Barrio, & Barberà, 2016; Sola & Rendueles, 2018). At the local and regional levels, new political forces such as Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú, closer to the activists, also emerged. The ongoing crisis of legitimacy created the opportunity structure for these forces to penetrate the state at different levels and thus introduce new political dynamics. As such, the link between movements and parties seems to come only later on in the cycle, with new parties adopting, or at least feigning to adopt, the horizontal practices of the movements from which they were born (Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki, & Mosca, 2017).

By contrast, in Portugal, even though different social movements also arose between 2011 and 2013, no new political party was electorally successful. Instead, ‘old’ actors dominated the landscape. Baumgarten (2013) divides the 2011 protests in Portugal into union-led demonstrations and general strikes; independent protest events; and social movement platforms or occupations of public spaces. Throughout the cycle of protest, various links
developed between institutional and non-institutional actors. The Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP), the dominant trade union in the protests, is directly linked to the Partido Comunista Português (PCP).

During the first phase of protest, these two actors avoided inorganic protest, but later on, as their messages evolved, collaborations emerged, though more disruptive actors remained sidelined (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). The Bloco de Esquerda (BE) was a major player from the beginning, developing close connections with activists (Lisi, 2013). As Soeiro (2014) observes, poli-membership, or belonging to various groups, prevailed throughout the cycle. Actors remained very close to each other, as the networks were small and with groups such as Que se Lixe a Troika being organically very close to the political parties. In fact, the occupation of public spaces and the creation of public assemblies around Lisbon were merely momentary episodes (Carvalho, 2014b). Autonomist and libertarian groups formed the basis of these assemblies, and even though they participated in protests, they never led any campaign successfully and were not able to reach the same level of success as comparable groups in Spain or Greece.

Directly stemming from this different wave of protests, between 2009 and 2015, a range of transformation took place in the party system, in different degrees, with the emergence of new political parties and alliances, especially in the form of movement-parties (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017). Most notably, a wave of populism emerged with parties such as SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement replicating, at least discursively, the idea of direct democracy that was advocated by the movements. As a consequence, by 2015 in all of these countries the parties that held majorities for several decades lost their hegemony (Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Rodríguez Teruel & Barrio, 2016; Vidal, 2018).

Adding to this, it is possible to distinguish among more stable and less stable countries vis-à-vis their institutional and electoral processes. On the one hand we have Portugal and Spain, which from the electoral cycle of 2010-11 (Bosco & Verney, 2012; Verney & Bosco, 2013) up until the 2015 elections, did not change government. Then on the other hand are Italy and Greece, which had different governments during this period, some of them of a technocratic bent.

However, these cases diverged after the 2015 elections. In Spain, Podemos and Ciudadanos (Miley, 2017; Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Vidal, 2018) emerged, deepening the ongoing constitutional crisis in a parliament with no clear majorities, with the PP remaining in power after a second general election in June 2016 (Miley,
In Portugal, by contrast, an unprecedented shift in terms of party alliances led to a parliamentary pact between the PCP, BE, PEV and Partido Socialista (PS). For the first time in history, a minority PS government was supported by the an alliance of the left parties (Lisi, 2016). Finally, in Greece, SYRIZA formed a government, replacing PASOK as the main force on the left of the political spectrum (Tsakatika, 2016).

As it can be seen, contestation to austerity involved various types of actor. It ranged from contestation in the streets, both by traditional actors such as trade unions and newly formed social movements, to new political parties. In her cross-country processual comparison, Della Porta (Della Porta et al., 2016) points to a combination of institutional and non-institutional factors driving the contentious cycle such as the political conditions amidst the crisis, the way left-wing parties absorbed and managed its fallout, the declining trust in institutions (both national and European, the opportunities and threats resulting from the crisis, and the different sorts of protest that emerged). In line with this perspective and transporting the framework applied in Latin America to Europe, Roberts argues in a similar vein that it is “essential to think beyond the short-term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer-term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis-induced policy reforms” (Roberts, 2017, abstract).

When considering these cases and scenarios, two sets of competing hypotheses are plausible. On the one hand, a more classic model would view these divergent reactions and outcomes as the consequence of the different austerity measures implemented, specifically the unique set of grievances they generate. On the other hand, a second set of hypotheses focuses directly upon national-level political institutions and political processes to propose even if the crisis and its impact can be said to explain at least some aspects of contention, nevertheless the way that institutions and actors manage the crisis remains key. Within this category of hypothesis, a first approach highlights the way austerity and the crisis are managed by institutional actors and representative institutions (political parties, parliaments, etc.) and, in a second step, their responsiveness and openness to protest grievances: because institutions and actors are responsive to protest grievances and demands, they end up channeling discontent that leads to demobilisation. Therefore, in this perspective, to give an example, the lower number of protests in Portugal when compared to its Southern European counterparts, rather than reflecting a less severe crisis impact, reveals not only the capacity of institutions to absorb and manage austerity to mitigate its harm, but also the capacity of existing left-wing parties in parliament to channel is content.
In line with this, Fishman proposes in several writings that this difference is linked to the nature of democratic practice resulting from the divergent paths taken in the transition to democracy (Fishman, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2017; Fishman & Cabral, 2016; Fishman & Everson, 2016; Fishman & Lizardo, 2013). In the case of Spain, though protest was essential in shifting the public agenda and in influencing institutional actors, Fishman suggests that the potency of the protests was the result of the exclusion and delegitimation that institutional actors imposed on protesters. According to this perspective, as a consequence of the lack of institutional openness to citizens’ demands and grievances, protest is the only remaining channel. Portugal, in this view, presents a contrasting scenario where the openness and inclusiveness of the institutions result in deeper collaboration and engagement among actors. As such, in Spain, movements must resort more frequently to disruption to attain their objectives, whereas in Portugal, institutional and non-institutional actors engage in a conversation, as institutions are more open due to the institutional legacy of the revolution (Fishman & Everson, 2016).

Adding to this perspective, building on Fishman, Tiago Fernandes (2016) highlights the importance of the specific political context – one that provided allies, voice, and resources for social movements – for explaining the singularity of Portuguese protest dynamics in times of recession. Another critical aspect lies in the institutional settings that moderated the impact of the crisis. In particular, Fernandes refers to the existence of a strong network of state–civil society partnerships for policy-delivery to the poor, as well as the Constitutional Court action that overturned many of the harshest austerity measures. In other words, the Portuguese institutions were more inclusive, since the institutional left comprising political parties and trade unions were more receptive to hear and articulate the demands of those protesting in the streets. Moreover, a variety of factors are important, such as the country size (both in terms of population and area), the intensity of the austerity programs taken and how they were managed, and especially the nature and quality of the political institutions that emerged with democracy. In Portugal, although there was a specific program of austerity under the auspices of the Troika, the program was not only less austere than in Spain, but there were also measures to accommodate those in the lower strata of the population (Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). Therefore, the distributional impact was, in comparative terms, less harsh, resulting in a smaller growth of inequality and unemployment – and thus, fewer protests (Fernandes, 2016).

Building on his transitional and culturalist argument, Fishman points out that in a typical conversation the demonstrations end up at the doorsteps of Parliament, and that protestors are invited to the Parliament during demonstrations.
In contrast with these approaches, but not taking precedence over the elements already specified, there is a processual-based approach that examines power dynamics within political regimes. As the authors of the contentious politics approach propose, democratic regimes do not diminish the role of protest and social movements but have a crucial role in its expansion, because they are paramount in shaping and redefining the political sphere. Therefore, even if both the economic crisis and institutions can account for an explanation of different forms of contention, it remains necessary to consider the inner workings of the political process and the detailed power relations between actors. Even if perspectives look to the way that different national political settings mediate the effects of the Eurozone crisis regarding its contentious responses, rather than a more static approach, this last one considers the internal power dynamics of the contention cycle, where agency plays a crucial role. In the next chapter, I will develop into the analytical framework that guides the analysis of this dissertation.

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation

Building upon the considerations outlined in this introduction, chapter two will present the analytical framework deployed in my empirical analysis. By following a reformulated version of the contentious politics approach, I will explore conceptually the plurality of claims and actors that develop throughout a cycle of protest and which come to re-shape the political sphere. In chapter three, I present this investigation’s research design and methodology. This will be based on a paired comparison and process tracing which underlines the idea of “thick description” and involved a detailed reconstruction of the case countries’ respective contentious dynamics. The methods used provide the fullest scholarly picture to date of the mobilisations throughout each of their different stages.

Guided by a process-tracing approach, the empirical chapters are ordered chronologically. In accordance with the questions and analytical framework of this dissertation, chapter four, *Preludes to Mobilisation*, aims at situating and reconstructing the dynamics and structures of mobilisation in Portugal and Spain from the transition to democracy to the austerity years. My objective here will be to identify continuities and ruptures within the two countries. I will show that, rather than spontaneous reactions to political and economic crises, many of the features identified in the following chapters were present previously and helped to shape the configuration of discourses and actors throughout the austerity years. On this, there is a clear contrast between the two countries. In Portugal, the conflict was centred around labour issues with protest dynamics dominated by trade unions. Movement actors remain small in
number, closed and conflictual, with a strong presence of political parties among them, with small, reactive and more disruptive local movements emerging in response to changes in the welfare state. In Spain, the autonomy of social movements in relation to political parties and trade unions led to more open and horizontal repertoires, in which movements, in addition to focusing on labour precarity, also developed a critique of democratic institutions, later transferred to the 15M.

Chapters five and six deal with different aspects of mobilisations under and against austerity. These comprise two moments, involving different actors and discourses, between 2010 and 2014. In the first phase, denominated Turning Points (for the year 2011), we see a redefinition of the contentious field, with the emergence of social movements contesting austerity. These brought new dynamics and claims into the political sphere of both countries. Nevertheless, after this turning point, the two countries follow different paths: in Spain there was a crescendo of mobilisations, with social movements becoming dominant, while in Portugal, the social movements never became leading actors and, only emerged within particular political opportunity structures. I will argue that this reflected the capacity of social movements in Spain to go beyond the core of activists, while in Portugal the movements proved much less capable of doing so. The explanation for this divergence has to do not only with different conjunctural and contextual opportunities, but also the different capacities of emergent movements to establish an open and broad discursive repertoires and effective structures of mobilisation, penetrated to varying degrees by established institutional actors.

However, such divergence does not exhaust the anti-austerity dynamics in the two countries. To account for the full cycle, other mobilisations must be taken into consideration. Thus, chapter seven, From Representation to Redistribution, deals mainly with protest dynamics between 2012 and the end of 2013, during which new actors and claims materialised. In Spain, multiple and overlapping dynamics would develop, whereby social rights for education and health triggered an alliance between social movements and trade unions, with, parallel to this, housing becoming one of the main contentious issues. In Portugal, by contrast, trade unions and political parties dominated street mobilisations. Indeed, trade unions were the main actor, and the reemergence of social movements entailed a strategic alliance and co-optation of these movements by political parties. Rather than developing a discourse that was critical of the regime, as occurred in Spain, mobilisations in Portugal were characterised by demands for the defence of the legacy of the 1974 revolution. Together these chapters advance a critique of the sole focus on social movement dynamics. The cycle of contention was more complex, and the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors were at its core.
Lastly, Chapter 7, *Fragile Realignments*, focuses on the dynamics within party systems, and specifically in relation to the left-wing parties, as an outcome of the contentious cycle during the electoral period of 2014–5. If research so far has focused on the influence of the 15M mobilisations on the constitution of *Podemos* in Spain and the lack of a new party in Portugal, I endeavoured to go further, to show that these transformations do not result solely from the challenges introduced by the movements, but also from the internal dynamics of the left. In this way, *Podemos* results from the combination of both social movements and internal struggles within the pre-existing party *Izquierda Unida*, while in Portugal, with the social movements domesticated and at the backstage, the whole debate in various forums was around the question of the unity of the left against austerity.

To conclude, many seem to analyse the current epoch from an “end of history” perspective, whereby contention is disruptive of liberal democracies. But contention is no abnormality. Rather, it is at the very heart of processes of political change. Contentious politics is the process through which a range of actors struggle to define meaning in the political sphere. The ‘turbulence’ of the current period thus provides the analyst with the valuable opportunity to study the dynamics of contention. By offering a longitudinal cycle-based approach to analyse the dynamic configurations and reconfigurations of the political field, I hope to contribute to our understanding of the intricate process of political change in the Iberian Peninsula during the peak of the austerity years. But first, it will be necessary establish an analytical framework that is fit to analyse these preoccupations. That is the purpose of the following chapter.
2. Crisis and Contentious Politics: An Analytical Framework

That is why a symbiotic relationship exists between and social movements and democracy or democratizing politics: Democracy gives scope to the conventional and disruptive activities of social movements and their characteristic properties - broad, alliance-building and consensus-building - expand the range of democratic politics.

Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p.167

In this chapter, I aim to present the conceptual framework that will resolve the research questions established in the introduction. For this, I will situate the development of anti-austerity dynamics within national forms of resistance to market liberalisation, suggesting that to fully understand these dynamics, there is a need for a cycle-based approach which considers a plurality of actors and claims. In fact, to understand the contentious responses to austerity and its political transformations we need to examine both the way the political process unfolds as well as the configurations of actors throughout the process. I will start by reviewing the approaches to the movements of the crisis that have developed as a consequence of the Great Recession by looking at distinct aspects such as actors, claims, levels of analysis, types of explanations and their shortcomings.

2.1. Mapping the Field

The initial literature on the movements of the crisis was characterised by an over-simplistic, mostly descriptive analysis of the phenomena. For the most part, it failed to consider the structures facilitating why and how movements emerged, focusing instead only on its immediate causes. In many cases, the literature emphasised the break with previous movements, and stressed the relative homogeneity across countries, ignoring historical context, national and transnational networks of actors, as well as specific cultures and repertoires of protest. As such, the following subsections will consider these three overarching issues: the first relates to the types of claims and actors, the second to the levels of analysis and the last examines the types of explanations given. It should be clarified that this will not give a unified approach but rather will explore trends in the field to contrast with what I propose afterwards.

2.1.1. Actors and Claims

Overall, when considering actors contesting austerity from the various branches of literature, the focus has been placed almost entirely on spontaneous social movements with claims on
representation. Part of the literature advanced a culturalist, idealist and technophile perspective, stressing the role of new technologies, as well as attitudes towards democracy, and emphasizing the precariat as the social base or core constituency for the wave of protest. (Castells, 2012; Kaldor & Selchow, 2013). The outbreak of protest was interpreted as a “bubbling up” of subterranean politics, and as a form of emancipatory activism that emerged from the crisis. According to these groups, neoliberal policies resulted from a crisis of democratic representation and as such their objective was recovering the political sphere for citizens. To a certain extent, this crisis of democracy expresses itself through displays of indignation: “all these poignant manifestations of an unjust society and of an undemocratic polity were present in the protests. But it was primarily the humiliation provoked by the cynicism and arrogance of those in power, be it financial, political or cultural, that brought together those who turned fear into outrage, and outrage into hope for a better humanity” (Castells, 2012, pp. 2-3).

From this perspective, the social media allows autonomous communication and connects groups around the world (Castells, 2012). Still, even if formed on the web, it is through occupying the public space that these movements manifest and become levers of social and political change. Even though the role of the web cannot be denied, the spontaneity of the movement was only a matter of appearance. Rather than spontaneous, the contentious responses to the Great Recession reflected previously existing structures of mobilisation and frames (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a).

In this sense, most approaches focus almost exclusively on the study of social movements’ reactions to the crisis (i.e., new actors, without considering old actors such as trade unions or political parties). However, to fully understand how the political processes have unfolded, one must consider that the anti-austerity mobilisations were wider than social movements and included a variety of actors and alliances. Moreover, the interactions between these various actors throughout the process also helped shape reactions and outcomes found at the end of the cycle. For instance, Flesher Fominaya (2017) points out that reaction to the crisis in Europe came from both the institutional left and autonomous movements. Despite this, she does not consider the interactions between these two groups as fundamental to how the field is structured. Departing from contentious politics, the interaction between non-institutional and institutional actors will be considered in the following sections and throughout the empirical chapters as shaping the cycle of protest.
2.1.2. Between National and Globalised Contestation.

Longitudinal approaches that consider past experiences allow for the detection of resemblances to past mobilisations like the transnational Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the late 1990s and 2000s. If one takes a genealogical perspective accounting for national and contextual particularities, it is easy to see important continuities regarding “actors, social movements, activist networks, master frames, ideological influences and participatory repertoires of deliberation between the two” (Flesher Fominaya, 2017, p. 7).

However, whereas the anti-globalisation movement developed from a local and national basis to a transnational one, the direction was now reversed, shifting from transnational to national mobilisations (Della Porta, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). The level of transnational coordination was lower, even though throughout the cycle there were some events with transnational features. Concurrently, there was a shift in the framing and targets of protest: in contrast to the broader, more diffuse anti-corporate, anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalism of the GJM, linking apparent local and disperse problems to global patterns, the wave of contention that emerged during the Great Recession was centered on the nation-state. Even if both waves tended to focus on democracy (“another democracy is possible” or “they called democracy, but it is not”), the emphasis was on a different level. Overall, there is a shift to the discourse of citizenism (Gerbaudo, 2017): the repercussions of the Great Recession at the national level, channelled through the austerity measures of national governments, even if internationally guided, meant a move towards national politics. In this sense, the move to country-based protests arguably expanded the possibilities of mobilisation beyond elite activists and small groups to appeal to broader swathes of the general population, including those affected directly by the cuts. As Della Porta puts it:

“Differently from the global justice movement, which had presented itself as an alliance of minorities in search of a broad constituency, the anti-austerity movements have constructed a broad definition of the self, as a large majority (contrasted with the network of minorities of the global justice movement) of the citizens. Backward looking, the anti-austerity protests called for the restoration of lost rights, vehemently denouncing the corruption of democracy. However, they also looked forward, combining concerns for social rights with hopes for cultural inclusivity.” (Della Porta et al., 2016, p. 27)

Adding to this, despite the visibility and media impact of the GJM mobilisations these were only a small percentage of the overall protests. Counting the number of protest and participants between 1990 and 2005 in Western Europe, Hutter demonstrates that “nearly 80
percent of all coded events are purely domestic protests, and these events involve around 70 percent of all reported participants” (Hutter, 2014b, p. 75). As such, the locus of conflict was situated predominantly at the national level, as is the case for the anti-austerity protests.

Moreover, there is still the need to consider the relations between these two dynamics closely. The aforementioned discontinuity neglects similar processes in other regions of the globe. As with austerity, the so-called structural adjustment programmes led by the IMF in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s led to protest mobilisations and political transformations (Ortiz & Béjar, 2013; Roberts, 2008, 2012). There is thus the need to consider the relationship between neoliberal globalisation and its counter-currents in a different way. Rather than focusing on the continuities between different waves, we should focus on the different levels in which market liberalisation happens and to what kind of resistance is it conducive to.

When considering such processes of market liberalisation and political transformation, and how they operate at different scales of governance, one should consider Polanyi’s proposal. As Buroway observes:

“Polanyi’s account of different national responses to the self-regulating market can be seen as a movement from local, to national, to international levels. The market revolution first took root in England where the response was a spontaneous reactive growth of society that especially protected labor against commodification. The responses were rooted in the local although they could combine into a national movement. The second response to the self-regulating market took place later in the nineteenth century, preeminently on the Continent of Europe. This was state regulation not only through welfare legislation but also tariffs and land laws that protected agrarian classes. The third response, triggered by the gold standard that was wreaking havoc with national economies, was withdrawal from the international economic system in favor of economic autarky. There are some signs of a similar resurgence of national protectionism today but nothing of the scale of 1930s reassertion of state regulation and planning, whether based on social democracy, state socialism, or fascism. Instead, one can detect a return to Polanyi’s first market reaction, namely, spontaneous self-defense of society. Only now the self-defense is of a transnational character, linking together nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), environmental movements, women’s movements, labor networks—a veritable transnational public designed to protect constituencies against market devastation.” (Burawoy, 2003, p. 240)

Despite the plurality of groups within transnational movements highlighted by Buroway and the emergence of the so-called new social movements and identity politics since 1968,
market liberalisation at the national and transnational level continues to be a transversal aspect of contentious mobilisations. Anti-austerity mobilisations and anti-globalisation movements can be seen as reactions at different levels to similar issues. Repertoires, strategies and discourses appear to be continuous over time, transferable and adaptable, depending on the locus and phase of the conflict. National and transnational campaigns can overlap and coincide. Indeed, the anti-austerity mobilisations under investigation in this dissertation bear resemblance to the Latin American cases and should be considered as national reactions to liberalisation processes.

2.1.3. Between Idealist and Materialist Explanations.

Another essential division present in the literature is between idealist and materialist types of explanations. The former highlights post-materialist issues and converges with new social movements’ approaches regarding grievances and cleavages, emphasising individualist and psychological explanations of protest, without considering broader contexts or power structures. As with the collective behaviour approach (Della Porta & Diani, 2006), protest movements are seen as emerging out of irrational outbursts, leading to the aggregation of individuals and emotions over the internet. This view gives more attention to virtual networks and social media rather than structures of power and specific national contexts; but mobilisations do not operate in a cultural, social, economic or political void. Rather, they have to be situated in longer processes that articulate national and transnational spaces. As Koopmans argues, a network of actors able to mobilise grievances is necessary, since the “parameters of contention are first and foremost relational and defined by conflict lines, network links, and power relations among actors, both elite and extra-institutional” (Koopmans, 2004, pp. 22-23).

With materialism economic structures are emphasised as the primary determinant of political change and protest mobilisation. Quaranta’s assessment (Quaranta, 2015) of the European Social Survey Data shows the impact of the economic crisis on the emergence and increase in political protest across Europe. However, even though economic factors certainly trigger protest mobilisations and political change, such factors on their own are not sufficient to explain or determine the political paths and processes followed in each country (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Flesher Fominaya, 2014a; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Instead, these paths and processes are more closely linked to existing structures of mobilisation, as well as other features of the political context. Therefore, even if
various countries all found themselves under similar structural conditions of economic crisis, their respective political fields would work to mediate the path taken, and thus to condition social and political outcomes. To invoke a distinction often made in social movements studies, economic factors are crucial for answering why questions but are insufficient for answering the how questions that I intend to study here, simply because protests are not mechanical reactions to crises. Della Porta and Diani have insisted that “collective action does not spring automatically from structural tensions (…) Numerous factors determine whether or not this will occur. These factors include the availability of adequate organizational resources, the ability of movement leaders to produce appropriate ideological representations, and the presence of a favorable political context” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 63).

Even so, as I argued in the introduction, the existing tensions of the institutions of democratic capitalism are the expression of economic and political reconfigurations, in which markets become dominant over political institutions. Furthermore, since the onset of the crisis, austerity policies have been at the heart of the political game and are thus an essential element for understanding how the political process unfolds. Consequently, the Great Recession provoked a resurgence of debates about capitalism in mainstream social movement studies. Authors such as Della Porta (Della Porta, 2015, 2017; Della Porta et al., 2016), Hetland and Goodwin (2013) and Císař & Navrátil (2017) have criticised the oblivion on the topic in the field, which came to be dominated by the study of new social movements and identity issues.

Goodwin and Hetland (2013) emphasise that exactly when capitalism became more powerful, popular movements and labour disappeared from social scientific analysis. They argue that capitalist dynamics still shape the so-called post-materialist movements. Espousing a Gramscian perspective, they insist that it is not only that the objective and economic nature of class dynamics, labour and - I would add - austerity, need to be taken into account, but also the manner in which these dynamics are sociologically and politically constructed must also be considered. In such a vein, this study of the dynamics of resistance to neoliberalism, crisis and austerity in Portugal and Spain will provide evidence regarding how political actors reacted, adapted and managed the crisis and its impacts in the political sphere, leading to a deeper understanding of how social movements influence the realm of Political Economy. As

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9 There is a parallel between this disappearance of economic issues in social movements and social classes. As I have shown in previous work on the relation between social classes and political citizenship (Carvalho, 2014a), and following the literature in the field (Atkinson, 2010a, 2010b) - include this, various strands of literature on modernity and politics point out the disappearance of social class as an important and predictive variable. The demise of analysis of class and capitalism in mainstream social sciences is the result of the move towards perspectives that focus on individuals.
suggested by Hetland and Goodwin (2013), social movements are not only reactions to the dynamics of capitalism, but they also shape them.

Adding to this Della Porta (2017) has commented that many of the tools in social movements studies were developed in times of affluence, particularly in advanced democracies with stable political systems. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Great Recession renders urgent the introduction (or re-introduction) of analytical instruments that allow for the study of capitalism in relation with social movements, leading to a distinction between “movements of affluence” and “movements of the crisis”. This means a return of sorts to class cleavages, after a focus on new social movements which typically highlighted issues related to daily life and personal autonomy. More than a crisis of scarcity, this is a crisis of redistribution, in which austerity has led to cuts in social services and social rights, in turn eroding consent and leading to distrust in institutions (Della Porta et al., 2016). The result was a crisis of legitimacy since citizens do not see their needs as being met. In this sense, as Della Porta (Della Porta et al., 2016) has argued, a comparative effort needs to be made to bridge contentious politics with other fields. The interaction between crisis, market liberalisation and national contexts produced different countermovements in the context of a crisis of hegemony. A broad perspective combining the features of the socioeconomic crisis and austerity, the political cultures of these countries, and the political reactions in terms of political opportunity structures and threats is thus required.

Taking these elements into account, Polanyi provides a framework for understanding the ongoing dynamics of market liberalization. Rather than taking them as constituting separate spheres, in the Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944) considers political and economic dynamics together, describing how they interact in a double movement: a movement of planned liberalisation, of domination of the market over society, and is opposed by a spontaneous and plural countermovement for protection in a variety of social and political movements. As Buroway remarks, in Polanyi’s approach, society is in “contradictory tension with the market” (Buroway, 1994, p. 199) and that generates multiple opposition actors. As such, in his view “the market tends to destroy society, but on the other hand, society (re)acts to defend itself and to subordinate the market” (Buroway, 1994, p. 198). Market liberalisation imposes and stretches itself beyond all spheres of life, thereby imposing its own logic. In this sense, this framework can be transposed to the study of the anti-austerity cycle, for understanding the plurality of counter-movements for protection against further economic liberalisation that has emerged with it (Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, in his interpretative scheme, this plurality included both movements and political parties (i.e., actors that opposed the liberalisation
movement). Nevertheless, these have varied depending on the specific structures of mobilisation and configurations of actors of each country. As it has been already noted, contention and counter-movements are not automatic.

In this sense, and considering what has been discussed so far, Latin America can be seen as a locus and model of the effects of neoliberal market reforms in the transformation of the political system and protest. Using a Polanyian framework, these have been widely studied and add a broader understanding of these “defensive mobilisations” (Almeida, 2007). Going further and considering changes in the political landscape brought by market reforms, Roberts (2008, 2012) shows how market reforms in the 1980/90s work as critical junctures that transformed the party system being “triggered by the spread of social and political resistance to market liberalization during the critical juncture” (Robert, 2012, p. 1424). In his view “democratic regimes are reasonably stable, economic dependence and vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks can generate forms of political uncertainty that are highly disruptive for party systems” (Robert, 2012, p. 1424). As a result, the programmatic alignment and dealignment of the party system and its transformation depends on the process of market liberalisation. In his work, Roberts finds three types of critical junctures:

“Programmatic alignment occurred where conservative actors took the lead in the adoption of market reforms and a major party of the left existed in consistent opposition, creating a political legacy that I call contested liberalism. Dealigning critical junctures occurred where established populist or center-left parties, or other independent populist figures who campaigned against structural adjustment policies, played a major role in the implementation of market reforms. Neutral critical junctures occurred where conservative actors led the process of market reform, but no major party of the left existed to offer consistent opposition.” (Roberts, 2012, p. 1435-36)

Roberts’ work brings political economy and the transformations of the party system together. Not only that, he integrates a relational dimension by which the result depends on who implements the market reforms and who opposes it. As it will be seen later in this dissertation, this is a crucial aspect in understanding the ongoing processes in the cases here under analysis. Still, despite these contributions that make the need to integrate and consider capitalism dynamics within contentious politics evident, there is a need for a more fine-grained approach that considers simultaneously not only the process but the dynamics between institutional and non-institutional actors. Roberts’ work shows that capitalist dynamics have to be framed by the ongoing and existing political dynamics and how they are politicised, leading
to alignment or dealignment and political change, rather than being automatic. Furthermore, despite departing from a Polanyian point of view, he is able to show that resistance is not spontaneous and results from a set of conditions under which it emerges.

2.1.4. Summary
In this section, I reviewed the main trends on the anti-austerity mobilisations have been interpreted to develop a broader approach in the following sections. As described, this focused mainly on social movements with claims on representation at the national level, which contrasts with the transnational wave of protest of the GJM. I argued that despite the importance of the social movements, to understand the full picture of the anti-austerity mobilisations and the political changes they encompass we need a framework that considers the various actors in the field and how these came to shape the cycle. Furthermore, despite the importance of economic crisis in setting the scene for the development of the wave of protest, at the national level reactions seem to be dependent on the way political actors interact with austerity processes. In this sense, in the following sections, based on contentious politics I will develop an approach that provides answers to the critiques I have pointed out here.

2.2. Contentious Politics
Contentious politics, more than a theory, is an all-encompassing prescriptive research program that brings together a variety of strands of literature in the field of social movements into an open-ended, relational, processual and dynamic conceptualisation that focus on uncovering the internal mechanisms of an episode of contention. While following a tendency of theoretical synthesis that it is characteristic of Sociology, it cannot be considered a grand-theory, since it is specific to the field of political conflict. Nevertheless, because of its realist position, it aims for universal explanations rather particular ones. In this way, episodes of contention, despite their differences, follow similar patterns.

The term was first coined by Charles Tilly during the 1970s, and gained preponderance with the publication of the seminal Dynamics of Contention, written together with Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam (McAdam et al., 2001). Contentious politics can be defined as the “interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are as targets, the objects of claims, or third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 236). Their main concern was to push the study of non-routine forms of politics and political action beyond
social movements, incorporating into this perspective other forms of conflict such as riots, civil wars or nationalism. Adding to this, against the dominant static and single actor approaches, the contentious politics framework analyses the interactions between multiple actors across time. As such, its concepts are open-ended and broad, intended to facilitate the analysis of a vast array of episodes of contention both in their variations and regularities. Additionally, this framework breaks from disciplinary boundaries, integrating history, sociology and political science into the “study of contentious politics with the study of political regimes and regime change” (Tarrow, 2008, p. 226).

In sum, the contentious politics approach incorporates a variety of different features that facilitate a more systematic interpretation, while remaining non-dogmatic and open-ended. By considering the dynamic relations between a plurality of actors over the cycle of protest, and taking into account repertoires and claim-making, this approach helps to understand political change far better than interpretations based on exclusively social movements. Plus, if the Polanyian perspective developed in the previous section allows for the identification of the political and economic dynamics that lead to the eruption of countermovements under market liberalisation, the internal dynamics and agency of the contestation movements are hardly explored by this perspective.

In the following sections, I will explore and devise an alternative and a revised approach to contentious politics. This entails a definition of its processual, relational and symbolic aspects. Therefore, I will discuss and conceptualise tools that will be present throughout the dissertation such as the cycle of contention, actors, claims and repertoires.

2.2.1. A Cycle-Based Approach

Taking into account not only this temporal dimension but also the multiple actors that emerge, a cycle-based approach seems to be the most convenient way to tackle the questions at hand, as it implicitly deals with internal dynamics of the cycle where a variety of actors are present. Tarrow defines it as a:

“phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action frames, a combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. Such widespread contention produces externalities, which give challengers at least a temporary advantage and allow them to overcome the weaknesses in their resource base. It demands that states
devise broad strategies of response that are repressive or facilitative, or a combination of the two. And it produces general outcomes that are more than the sum of the results of an aggregate of unconnected events.” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 199)

A cycle of contention tends to constitute a transformative moment that condenses previous latent tensions, while at the same time it introduces new political dynamics and repertoires. Therefore, it is not a mere reproduction and mirror of previously existing political structures, but it starts itself a process of change. It is constituted by a pluralist set of actors in a multi organisational-field that goes beyond social movements (Koopmans 2004). This comes in line with the processual turn in social movements studies that point out for the need of a relational and dynamic approach (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).

Despite the terminological differences, both Koopmans (2004) and Tarrow (2011) agree that a cycle of contention is constituted by different sets of phases, where protest unfolds with diverse intensities. Koopmans points to expansion, transformation and contraction, while Tarrow to a process of diffusion, exhaustion and radicalisation/institutionalisation. Nonetheless, it should be clear that no unilinear model exists and that the analysis of the internal processes of the cycles should instead recognise the more or less recurring patterns found in different cases. Even so, understanding how the sequence of events and mobilisations unfolds is a central aspect of this analytical framework.

Therefore, rather than a static approach, contentious politics it is a relational, processual and dynamic endeavour. It takes episodes of contention as “bounded sequences of continuous interaction (…) for purpose of systematic observation, comparison and explanation” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 39). This means to relationally consider a variety of actors within a particular contextual regime and across-time that can assume a variety of configurations. In this way, this paradigm developed from a more structuralist onset (e.g., studying the impact of economic structures in collective action) to a relational realist one that focus on contention, its dynamics and internal processes. For Tilly, relational realism was the “the doctrine that transactions, interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life” (Tilly, 2016, p. 7) and as such the outcomes of a contention cycle must take into consideration the not only the preexisting configurations but also how these develop across the cycle. This comprehends the way networks and mobilising structures work. More importantly, is to consider that, as it will be seen below, that political issues go beyond institutions and institutional actors and that contentious politics play a fundamental role in political transformation.
Central to this approach, and more specifically to this dimension, is that all these features combined result in an explanatory mode that focus in the political dynamics and interactions between non-institutional actors and institutions as targets and in setting the context, which rather than being structurally defined is open to agency and process. In fact, the political opportunity structure (POS) emerges as the main explanatory concept. Changes in the political environment seem to explain the opportunities and threats that trigger contentious actors’ actions. It is the way these different opportunities change over time that provides the context that affects and trigger mobilisation.

However, over time, the POS started to accommodate and designate any specific type of events that transformed the political context. But by integrating any class of factors into the explanation, it loses explanatory power by becoming less specific. That is why Tilly and Tarrow do not include any kind of symbolic or discursive elements, remaining exclusively relational and actor focused regarding the openness of the structure of power. Still, this does not mean that opportunities are objective per se, as they should be perceived and attributed to become a source of mobilisation (i.e., an unseen opportunity does not exist). In their view, this concept is more useful if restricted to environmental factors that visibly open up the prospect of mobilisation (objectively or subjectively): 1) opening and increasing access to new actors; 2) evidence of political realignment in shifting alignments/electoral instability; 3) availability of influential allies; 4) emerging splits within the elite (Tarrow, 2011).

In line with what I have written so far, and partially ignoring the proponents of this approach, I am going to explore two additional dimensions: political economy opportunity structure, and the discursive opportunity structure. In considering these two additional dimensions, I am suggesting that economic and discursive changes generate opportunities and resources for critical actors which influence the structure of opportunities. Furthermore, taking into account what has been discussed so far and the context of this dissertation these are useful tools to add to the analysis.

Regarding the first, it should be noted that Tilly’s seminal work already demonstrates how changes in capitalism transform the repertoires of protest. As such, following a Polanyian logic of progressive institutionalisation of capitalism and changes in its structures, Cisar and Navril (2017) propose the study of political economy opportunity structures. This means that considering their case study (Czech Republic), they are able to evaluate how different configurations of political economy transform and “trigger different popular responses” (Cisar & Navril, 2017, p. 83). In their study, the opportunity structure is the result of the specific configurations and changes in the economic and political elite, in the institutions (e.g.
financialisation and changes in the banking system), but also specific measures such as austerity. As they explain:

“political economic opportunity structure is a set of political and economic factors that shape the conditions for the involvment of movement actors in protest politics. These factors cluster in particular patterns or ‘models’. Consequently, we specify how these particular models shape what social movement studies identify as the relevant dimensions of political protest, such as organizers, cooperation among organizers in protest events, the frequency of protest events, the action repertoire, the targets and frames used, and we look at these models in the particular context of the development of Czech capitalism” (Cisar & Navril, 2017, p. 84).

Considering both the contextualisation given so far, as well as the changes in southern European capitalism, this will serve to situate the economic context and how austerity changed throughout the period under analysis. As it will be seen, particular changes in the economic conjuncture led to transformations in protest dynamics. Additionally, a complementary concept is of discursive opportunity structure that

“provides social movement scholars with a conceptual tool to understand which social movement frames are likely to have the greatest capacity to mobilize existing and new recruits, to convince the public of a movement’s demands, and to persuade authorities to alter policy and practices in line with the movement’s agenda. The conceptualization of discursive opportunities synthesizes theories of social movement framing and political opportunity structure” (McCammon, 2013).

This allows the integration of essential discursive, symbolic and cultural elements into the analysis. As it will be seen throughout this thesis, there are particular inflection points where the perceived discursive opportunity structure changes and actors change that discourse. As explored with Ramos Pinto (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019), and as will be seen in later chapters, if Portuguese frames barely included any reference to the 1974-1975 revolutionary moment until the summer of 2012, after the decisions ruled by the Constitutional Court against particular austerity measures, these became central for all the relevant actors that recovered the imaginary of the revolution. Furthermore, it helps to understand the symbolic dynamics of the regime and why particular elements have more prominence than others. I will further explore the symbolic elements related to discursive repertoires and claim-making in the following sections.
A cycle-based approach is therefore central in contentious politics and enhances the detailed understanding of the political processes. Its temporal element contributes to a dynamic and dense reading of the episodes of contentions under study here, as it allows the identification of different phases and factors behind it. Still, even if institutions and institutional actors are considered, they seem to set the scene without being active players. I will discuss this in more detail in the next section.

2.2.2. Institutional and Non-institutional Actors: a Multi-Actor Perspective

As previously mentioned, the literature on movements of the crisis has focused almost exclusively on the ‘new’ emerging actors such as the 15M, without taking into consideration the plurality of actors that have contested austerity since the emergence of the Great Recession. These constitute invaluable contributions to the literature and detailed knowledge about the initial moments of the wave of contestation. Nonetheless, multiple actors co-exist, and the relationships between them were central to shaping the anti-austerity cycle of contention.

Most of the studies on democratic regimes tend to focus solely on social movements, without taking into account the role that actors such as trade unions and political parties might have. During the Great Recession, political parties only started to be considered in the field of social movements, with the resurgence of far-left and far-right parties across Europe. Many of these parties have populist traces and can be connected to movements of protest that preceded them. Nonetheless, institutional actors are hardly considered active actors throughout other phases of the cycle. Furthermore, if anything they are never at the centre of the analysis and are only seen as external actors that either constrain or allow the opening of the opportunity structures. However, as it will be seen, there have been calls to include these actors further into the analysis and new literature is beginning to emerge that can expand the potential of contentious politics analysis (e.g., Piccio, 2016, 2017).

Contentious politics presents itself as a multi-actor perspective. For these authors, social movements are the typical form of contention under democratic regimes. Phenomena like strikes, civil wars and revolutions exist concurrent or in combination with movement’s actions. Social movements are taken as “sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 237). These authors suggest that these are divided into campaigns and bases. The former term refers to public challenges and claim-making to power holders, and the latter to the “social background, organisational resources, and cultural framework of contention and collective action” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015,
Therefore, actors are not simply constituted through the mobilisation of resources or as a response to political opportunities, but they must be perceived in context, with their repertoire and in interaction with other actors. Actors are “recognisable sets of people who carry on collective action in which governments are directly or indirectly involved, making and/or receiving contentious claims.” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 236). Focusing on a multi-actor perspective Koopmans suggests:

“(…) what we need is an approach that transcends the isolated view of single movements and inserts them in time and space, but treats the latter not as dimensions on which to sample ‘‘cases,’’ but as variables that are an intrinsic and central part of the analysis of contention. (…) Against the focus on single movements, this approach argues that contention is always a multi-actor process that cannot be adequately understood by focusing attention on one actor and reducing the others to the role of context variables. Instead, inter-actions between actors become the fundamental units of analysis” (Koopmans, 2004, p. 40).

Invaluable work has been done on the most recent wave of contention by engaging with this perspective to consider a variety of different actors (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Diani & Kousis, 2014; Kanellopoulos et al., 2017; Kousis & Karakioulafi, 2013; Portos, 2017). However, in many aspects, the study of contentious dynamics remains a black box regarding the interactions between institutional and non-institutional actors and the way this determines how cycles of contention unfold. As Piccio (2016a) remarks, even if there have been calls to more thoroughly explore the relationship between these different actors in this field, a dearth of research remains and the gaps in knowledge have yet to be filled. Adding to this issue, when reviewing the contributions of this approach, Tarrow (2015) calls for a broader inclusion of political parties in the contentious processes as this has not been actively researched and could lead to other developments (proactive electoral mobilisation, reactive electoral mobilisation, movements induce shifts in electoral fortunes, movement induced polarization). Moreover, Tarrow (2011) suggests that the “Iron Law” of the Oligarchy tends to be the only way through which institutionalisation of social movements are observed, but there are many other paths that social movements not only can take but also assume when relating to political parties.

As such, the contentious politics approach offers the opportunity to go beyond the apparent non-institutional novelty and focus on the assemblages of contention and how the national context, institutions and actors mediate this outcome. These reactions should be part of a longer contentious process and interaction between institutional and non-institutional
actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Goldstone, 2004, 2003b; McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). This brings into question not only how they transform along the cycle, but also how they interact within a cycle-based approach. Moreover, within the unexplored capitalist dynamics, Roberts (2008) shows that market liberalisation tends to fragment and pluralise the already existing contentious actors across both the institutional and non-institutional groups.

The distinction between institutional (or insiders) and non-institutional (or outsiders) actors is of importance and it is at the heart of the main distinctions surrounding power theories and debates between elitists and pluralists. As Scott suggests protest, or non-institutionalized collective action, constitutes an alternative perspective in these discussions: “While ‘parties’ are groups that follow conventional, institutionalized patterns of political participation, protest groups are organized around collective resistance to the very structures that underpin party politics” (Scott, 2001, p. 111). Protest is then taken as form of collective action directed towards political parties, even though this is still a rigid way of looking into actors. Considering both actor types along a cycle of contention, whereby they are both active players, allows us to close the gap regarding this aspect, as there is no dialogue between social movement studies and political parties. Even if contentious politics investigates institutional actors and institutions, it rarely presents them as being active players.

This division of labour seemingly results from assumptions within particular strands of democratic theory and specific power theories. Kitschelt (1993) remarks that implicit to the conceptualisation of protest cycles is the idea of institutional (un)responsiveness. As institutions fail to meet the demands and grievances of various social groups, protest becomes an alternative channel to express their discontent. As the cycle unfolds and institutions become responsive, the criticisms are incorporated, either through the creation of new political actors, institutional changes, or repression leading protests to fade out. Goldstone (2004) points out that in most research on social movements there is a distinction between social movements and political parties, whereby the former is taken as an extra-institutional actor and an outsider to the political sphere that, if successful, transitions to the institutional sphere. Even if simplistic, it is a useful idea as a starting point, to conceptualise the relationship between different types of actors along the cycle of contention in both their nature and outcomes.

Nonetheless, engrained in this perspective there is a normative stance whereby protest actors are perceived as an anomaly and disruption and outsiders are not a legitimate part of the democratic process. This constitutes a unidirectional perspective where extra-institutional actors target institutions and if successful are incorporated into the institutional sphere. Furthermore, this is the principle behind the ‘channelling hypothesis’ which has been the basis
of most interpretations of the Southern European Politics of Austerity. This idea seems to be expressed, even if in different ways, in Roberts (2013) work on Latin America and Fishman’s (2011, 2012b) research on Portugal and Spain: discontent occurs differently depending on the contingent arrangements between political parties and their responsiveness in the protest arena.

As such, the relations entailed between institutional and non-institutional actors are more complex than simply exerting pressure on politicians and governments (Kriesi, 2015). Social movements are some of the cornerstones of modern political participation and they shape the nature of democracy and citizenship. In fact, democracy not only contributes to the diffusion and development of social movement, as these players are fundamental in the continuous struggle to redefine the political sphere (Eisenstadt, 1998; Goldstone, 2004). As Goldstone remarks: “social movement activity is not so much an alternative to institutionalized politics, diminishing as the latter increases; rather it is a complementary mode of political action, which increases even as democratic politics spread” (Goldstone, 2004, p. 336).

Therefore, Goldstone suggests that the relationship between actors is blurred and less clear-cut than it would be expected. Institutional and non-institutional actors are mutually dependent and deeply intertwined (Goldstone, 2003a, 2004; Kriesi, 2015). Nevertheless, it could be argued that more complex and intricate mechanisms are in place. There is the need to consider both the transformative capacity of protest, as well as the interaction between movements and parties along the process, instead of understanding it through a channelling mechanism. A bi-directional configuration could be taken where institutional and non-institutional actors interact. However, this would maintain a rigid approach whereby two separate arenas are in place.

In this sense, it could be pointed out that the political field is replete with a variety of actors that do not fit this model, entailing a more complex chain of interactions between them (Piccio, 2016a, 2016b). Institutional and non-institutional actors’ interactions can take different modalities, being intricate and involving a diversity of forms and entry points. One specific example is that of “hybrid” actors such as movement-parties that mix features traditionally associated with both parties and social movements (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017), or social movement unionism that brings aspects of social movements into the field of labour (Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2015). Reinforcing this idea, Goldstone identifies that Tilly’s work is, in fact, representative of the symbiotic nature between social movements and democracy:

“Social protest repertories emerged in England at roughly the same time as repertoires for influencing elections to Parliament, and with the same purpose – to influence the outcomes
of Parliament’s deliberations. This was not a coincidence but represented a fundamental evolution in the nature of politics: both democratisation and social movements built on the same basic principle, that ordinary people are politically worthy of consultation.” (Goldstone, 2014, p. 342)

In another example, in the context of crisis, Kanellopoulos and colleagues (2016) have shown that multiple actors were involved during the anti-austerity campaign. The polycephalous nature of the protests splits between three camps that involve trade unions, political parties and emerging social movements. It is the relation between these actors that entail and defines how the cycle will unfold. As they remark, old and new actors coordinate and the so called ‘new social movements’ seem to be more of a

“new logic of collective action carried out by ‘old’ actors since the whole organization of square occupations rested in resources and activists linked to political organizations heavily engaged at that period at coalitional modes of coordination. These ‘old’ actors soon returned to their usual duties as the anti-austerity campaign continued and climaxed after the summer of 2011” (Kanellopoulos et al., 2016, p. 115).

Therefore, linking with the previous section, the emergence of protest is not spontaneous as some seem to imply, but rather one needs to take into account pre-existing networks that converged into the first phase of the campaign and evolved over the cycle of protest. Although they are often ignored, ‘old’ actors are required in order to sustain a protest campaign due to their resources and mobilisation capacity (Kannellopoulos et al., 2016; Portos, 2016).

Therefore, processes like alliance building, institutionalisation, co-option, movement-parties or political articulation are specific forms of interaction that can occur along a cycle of contention that should be included among our analyses - it is precisely this interaction which I intend to demonstrate throughout my thesis. Different configurations and assemblages of contention would then be the focus of research that entails cooperation, competition and hierarchy (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Consequently, rather than taking for granted which sets of relationships exist, empirical research should investigate the specific nature of the fields of contention and the configurations of actors across time. This would serve as a base for comparative research where both positive and negative cases help to comprehend the nature of the process. I will examine to the symbolic aspects regarding repertoires and claim-making.
2.2.3. Repertoires, Discourses and Claim-Making

The argument presented above regarding actors can and should be extended to the domain of claim-making. Focusing solely on political claims for democracy obviates the fact that if multiple actors are involved in the process, then multiple interests and claims are being articulated as well. Not only that, these must be understood contextually by taking into account the nature of the regime, institutions and actors. Furthermore, if neoliberalism and austerity mean, as described before, a limited conception of citizenship whereby the markets and commodification take over labour and social rights, then these should be included in the broader formations of meaning. As such, this challenges the proposals for transversal and transnational frameworks that focused on representation and were present in many of the works analysed in previous sections.

In this section I will propose an analytical framework through which claim-making can be interpreted beyond (mis)representation. This will allow for the creation of a typology of citizenship claims that will later be applied to the data. This is not to say that claims on social rights are not political claims, but it should be considered that when they originate from certain actors they might not be conflated with claims for representation: for instance, if trade unions make claims on social rights, these claims will probably not entail the same meaning as with social movements. As such, this framework opens the door to the diversity of claims throughout the period under analysis and observe their evolution, as in which types of claims were more prevalent at one time over another. I will discuss and depart from central concepts of the contentious politics approach such as repertoire and claim-making, to propose a broader understanding of citizenship to counter the analysis that focuses almost solely on representation. Following my critique of previous literature, by the end of this section, I will develop a framework to categorise the various citizenship claims that were encountered in this research. For this, I will establish a parallel between the way the authors of contentious politics approach repertoires and criticise the lack of a similar framework for discourses.

A repertoire constitutes a historical script, embedded in the political culture, that people follow in their protest actions and performances. Repertoires can be defined as “claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 16). In this way, it can be relationally defined as it involves not only what people do when engaged in conflict but also what they know how do to and expect others to do.

Two types of repertoires can be historically distinguished due to the historical shifts brought about by capitalism and state-building. There is a fundamental change from parochial
to modular forms of protests that directed itself to a confrontation with the authorities in a variety of different ways rather than attacking the perpetrators directly. In this way, repertoires evolved from local, non-standardised and parochial to modular and cosmopolitan that target central authorities. Tarrow (2011) points out that this distinction involves three dimensions: 1) parochial vs cosmopolitan: from local interests and interactions in a single community to interests that span across many communities; 2) segmented vs modular: from addressing local issues and nearby objects to easily transferable settings; 3) particular vs autonomous: it varied a great deal from group, issue and locality to establishing more nationally linked protests. The latter were violent, direct, brief and specific. They were not apolitical or pre-political but “against evidence that authorities were ignoring their inherited rights” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 46) (e.g., food riots, religious conflicts, peasant revolts, and death rights). The modern repertoires changed and have taken on other forms such as boycotts, mass petitioning, public meetings, strikes, marches, demonstrations, and occupations.

It is important to notice that, as with repertoires, there is not a proposal regarding the how claims develop alongside capitalism and the state. As proposed by Bourdieu (1991) the political field is the site where the collective actors articulate, impose and oppose their visions of the world as a way to mobilise support and accumulate political capital. Transposing the idea of political field already established in the previous section, there is a sort of homology between actors and discourses developed. In this sense, the language of contention results from conflicts and interaction between actors. Politics, with contention included, is above all a discursive action.

Therefore, claim-making as demands directed towards targets should be considered more broadly about the way actors’ relationships shape the political field and its meanings. Furthermore, when considering this symbolic dimension, the idea of discursive opportunity structures delineated above should be taken into account. This is closely linked with the idea of language of contention as developed by Tarrow (2013) in an attempt to explain how and why particular frames and discourses of contention have become more prominent than others.

For this, Tarrow relies on the term coined by Steinberg (1999) of discursive repertoires, which “are reciprocally linked to the repertoires of collective actions that groups develop to realize their goals” (Steinberg, 1999, p. xxi). These are historically constructed and politically bounded not only to how regimes are built, but also the relation of forces between institutions, institutional and non-institutional actors.

In this way, even if it departs from an approach to social movement framings, Tarrow’s perspective goes beyond it by proposing two sets of variables to analyse the problem at hand:
symbolic resonance and strategic modularity. The latter departs from the conceptualisation proposed by Benford and Snow (2000) on frameworks and emphasis the “core meaning of a specific term”. It shows how it resonates within processes of mobilisation that will ensure diffusion beyond the core members. However, though resonance is important, Tarrow remarks that it is not enough to understand the success and persistence of discourse over time, requiring adaptability as well as resonance. As such, strategic modularity refers to “the degree to which terms that emerge in one strategic context can be repeated without losing the strategic advantages they originally possessed” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 17). These discursive repertoires tend to be persistent due to their adaptability to different contexts and political opportunity structures, as they are embedded in a network of meaning that corresponds to the way it was built by actors and regimes. As such, discursive repertoires need to be malleable and open to interpretation to ensure persistence over time.

As with the assumptions initially written above, language in contentious processes is taken as relational and dynamic, that develops through the interaction between actors during the contentious process (McAdam et al. 2001). Tarrow argues that “the deployment and diffusion of contentious language respond to both cultural and strategic incentives through the constitution of actors who draw upon a battery of language to describe their identities, their claims, their opponents, and their forms of action” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 20). With this conceptualisation, it is possible to go beyond not only the perspectives on symbolic resonance in social movements studies, but it also allows for post-structuralist approaches that focus solely on discourse or even the populist approach of Laclau (2005) that focus on articulation and hegemony. These are insufficient methods of analysis as they do not account for the rooted and conflictive nature of the language of contention within the political field.

However, Tarrow’s approach to discursive repertoires lacks an understanding of how these evolved historically in the same way as repertoires as a protest action developed parallel and in interaction to the State and Capitalism. Tarrow only proposes a way to read why and what discursive repertoires tend to persist. As such, I will argue that to evaluate processes of claim-making throughout a cycle of contention there is the need for an approach that fits not only a historical analysis of how movements and contentious politics evolve, but also the development of Capitalism, State-structures, Citizenship and the language of rights. Thinking of discursive repertoires alongside the development of citizenship opposes the more recent and seemingly ahistorical perspectives that focus solely on the development of a broad and open discourse for democratic regeneration. This myopia of the present within the movements of the
crisis tends to forget the importance of historical struggles that developed throughout the last centuries and that continue to shape current contestation cycles.

Furthermore, as it was argued in the introduction of this dissertation, austerity corrodes democratic legitimacy as it diminishes social rights. Therefore, it can be argued that not only political claims to democracy are in play, but also claims for social rights. Claim-making is multidimensional and can address several demands simultaneously, however past approaches only study one particular dimension. As Roberts establishes, the processes of economic liberalisation represent “responses to a set of common problems that are rooted in the contradictions between democratic citizenship and socioeconomic exclusion—the central fault line of democracy in the aftermath of market liberalization in the world’s most inequitable region.” (Roberts, 2008, p. 319) As such, as I will show throughout this dissertation, the anti-austerity cycle of contention was comprised of multiple actors with different conceptions of citizenship and democratic rights. As such, in this sense, embedded in Contentious Politics, I argue for the need to go beyond the social movement perspective that takes into account the multiple conceptions of citizenship and democracy present throughout the cycle of protest. This resulted in different sorts of claim-making being made at different stages of the process and deepens the understanding of modularity in discursive repertoires, but also the ideational aspects behind claim-making such as regime-type, the configurations and interactions between actors and the stage of the cycle of protest.

Historically, citizenship rights are at the centre of the development and centralisation of the modern state. The creation of social citizenship resulted not only from movements struggles to expand democracy and citizenship rights, as it led to state centralisation (Eisenstadt, 1998; Mann, 2012; Mouzelis, 2008). Following this argument throughout the dissertation, I will use the various dimensions of citizenship rights even if loosely and broadly defined to understand how claim-making develops throughout the cycle of protest more thoroughly. In this sense, I will define protest claim-making as demands made in the public sphere by contentious actors. I will breakdown citizenship into three main dimensions that tend to be present in both social movements and citizenship theories. These are constitutive of democratic dynamics and will be used to interpret the evolution of citizens claims and demands through time.

Citizenship, more than a discourse or ideology, assumes a relationship between the State and citizens. Furthermore, ensuring rights for citizens is central to the development and sustenance of democracy. What is at play is how conflicting actors in the political sphere discuss and argue about the content of these particular rights in a democracy. The constitutive
categories will then provide a loose and adaptable classificatory scheme to analyse and interpret claim-making throughout the cycle of contention.

The classical conceptualisation formulated by Marshall defines citizenship as ‘status bestowed on those who are fully members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed’ (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992).

Based on the English case, Marshall puts the expansion of rights on a continuum over three centuries. In the 18th century, civic rights develop: these relate to individual liberties, like freedom of expression and thought, rights of property and the right to due process. In the 19th century, political rights matured as the right to participate in the exercise of political power as a member of the political body. Finally, in the 20th century, social rights guaranteed an economic and social safety net that ensured a decent living for all. Marshall demonstrates that until the concession of social rights, no principle safeguarded citizens equity towards class inequalities nor guaranteed the social and political inclusion of the working class. Furthermore, this is in line with conceptions of democracy that go beyond civil liberties. For instance, Tilly defines democracy by stating that “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 2007, pp. 13-14). This could be translated into equality, voice, inclusion that is ensured by more specific types of rights.

However, other perspectives can be adapted to the understanding of claim-making and its diversity in contentious politics. Fraser (2008) proposes an approach to social justice based on three major families of justice claims: redistribution, recognition and representation. Even if connected by participatory parity, these cannot be reduced to each other. For all of these justice means the dismantling of the institutionalised obstacles associated with each one, and in this sense, it is similar to the way that Marshall approaches citizenship. As such, they constitute basic categories that allow the reading of claim-making in a broader sense.

Claims for redistribution target distributive injustice or maldistribution and deal closely with the dynamics of capitalism and class structure. Recognition discusses and opposes the discourses against status inequality or misrepresentation, being related to the impediment of participating due to “institutionalized hierarchies of values”. Lastly, representation constitutes a political dimension of this grammar of claim-making, that it is directly connected with the
“scope of the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation”. (Fraser, 2008, p. 17) It is related with who is included and excluded in the political community.

**TABLE 2.1 GRAMMARS OF CLAIM-MAKING AND CITIZENSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marshall</th>
<th>Tilly</th>
<th>Fraser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Inclusion/integration</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining these perspectives into a single framework allows for a multi-faceted perspective whereby multiple claims and interests are considered and recognised in the political field. This provides a broader scope of understanding the demands made throughout the cycle of contention and how discursive repertoires evolve in the different phases, which allows going beyond social movement perspectives that through their participatory conceptions of democracy ask for an expansion of voice, political citizenship and representation in order to improve other dimensions of citizenship. Even if these dimensions do not perfectly overlap, there are multiple connections in the way that they try to approach similar issues. In this way, I will be better equipped to deal with the variety of claims throughout the cycle.  

### 2.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I provide an analytical framework that enables me to look into contentious responses in two cases of implementation of austerity. Following a dynamic approach, this considers both the nature of the actors and of claim-making throughout the cycle of contention. The primary objective is to go beyond a perspective that solely examines specific actors and events and instead takes into account the full scope of the political process. In this way, I will be considering multiple actors and a variety of claims, but more importantly, I will also consider how the interaction between multiple actors and claims shapes the cycle of contention.

To fully understand the configurations that the contentious paths took, this period needs to be considered as a moment of “thick history” whereby history compresses and accelerates with high levels of contention (Tilly, 1978). As the crisis becomes a moving target, the challenge here is, therefore, to have the necessary tools to analyze these shifting sands and for that the perspective espoused by authors such McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) on contentious politics provides an approach that it is open-ended, relational and processual.

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10 I will develop the operationalisation further in the methodological chapter.
considering a multiplicity of actors and their links. So far, there is not a process-based approach that fully draws the connections between the actors and the disparate elements presented here.

Case studies on Portugal and Spain present a quantitative difference of work published. While a vast array of publications discusses the protest mobilisation during this period in Spain, as it was one of the most potent cycles of contention, Portugal has not been studied nearly as in-depth and there are fewer researchers working on the topic. The apparent less intriguing and explosive nature of the protests received less attention in books and international research projects. Nonetheless, this is arguably what makes it a compelling case of study as it displays different contentious configurations, even if displaying similar conditions for protests to arise. The comparison should help us to understand how the previous institutional arrangements are necessary in mobilising against austerity and neo-liberal policies and how the process between 2011 and 2015 plays a role in understanding this outcome.

The puzzle here is less about the impact of the economic crisis and how it leads to protest and more about the political dynamics in which protests are embedded. In the following chapter, the methodological tools based on these principles from a contentious politics approach will be considered in order to approach these questions. This crisis constitutes a critical juncture that redefined the political field and relations in the time to come in these countries. Thus, these cases will help to illuminate the trajectory and the factors of change under democracy, market reform and the tensions between them. Therefore, this work examines the internal dynamics of the contentious cycle by assessing the dynamic relations between “social movements, political contention and regimes, and at the embedding of national patterns of contention in world politics” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 179).
3. Methods

My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social word can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as “a special case of what is possible”, as Bachelard puts it, that is an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations

Bourdieu, 1998b, p.2

As Bourdieu (1998b) states in the above citation, scientific work in social sciences requires a deep immersion and knowledge of the realities under study. This means not only considering variables but also having an anthropological and historical awareness that allows a contextualisation of events and phenomena under observation. Taking this into account, together with the assumptions and rationale established in the previous two chapters, in this chapter I will describe and reflect on the methodological tools used in this dissertation.

The discussion that follows takes into consideration the analytical dimensions that were established in the previous chapters in order to analyse the contentious responses to austerity. Besides time and space, I study on the one hand actors and their networks and alliances, while on the other hand I consider movement practices such as their repertoires, strategies and discourses. In designing the methodological apparatus, I have also taken into account the fit between theory, questions and data to be collected. Regarding this, I will first discuss the general approach to the research process and how this is translated into a paired comparison in which process tracing is used, followed by a more detailed examination of the tools used and how the process of data collection unfolded.


The overarching research design is based on a combination of paired comparison and process tracing. Both falls under the scope of tools generally used in Contentious Politics. Before presenting the methodological strategy followed, I will briefly comment on the set of epistemological principles that guide this work. This will help to situate the methodological and empirical work developed here within the framework of critical realism.

Brante (2001) defines three fundamental principles of critical realism. First, an ontological principle that establishes that social reality is independent from our representation or our conscience (even though social reality is both material and mental). Second, an epistemological one sets that it is possible to acquire knowledge about reality. Finally, that methodologically all knowledge is fallible and therefore amendable. For this author, each
theory is directed towards different levels of social reality, and rather than finding “the basic and all-encompassing formula by which all social phenomena can be explained”, what is important in social sciences is to “map out the respective mechanisms for each structure in order to be able to explain social phenomena” (Brante, 2001, pp. 177-178). Therefore, cumulative knowledge is not only empirical but also consists in the identification of mechanisms and social processes. In this way, if empirical data allows us a detailed and meticulous acquaintance with reality and the testing of hypothesis, it is through systematic reflections that we can identify operating mechanisms. As Berthelot observed there is a need to “conceive Sociology as an effort for reflected description of social world, of puzzle-solving, of elucidating constitutive mechanisms, of gauging interpretive schemes based on a common problematization area, where the objective is the “clear indexation of results and conflicting benchmarks” 11 (Berthelot, 2000, p. 127).

As such, research design vary along with the context, object and objective. Methodologies should be developed as flexible and adaptable tools, and not as a formula. As Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), I argue that research does not entail a positivist path, but rather a continuous cycle between evidence and theory, that focuses on theoretically oriented empirical research (Rueschemeyer, 2009). This is not to say that epistemic relativism is followed, but rather that the field of possibilities is opened by combining different forms of data and methods to build a solid object through clear epistemological vigilance and reflexivity.

Instead of following a prescriptive recipe, the research design should adapt to fit the problems under research. As Abbott (2004) suggests, scientific discovery is as much about rigour as it is about creativity. Even if scientific work establishes detailed and systematic procedures that does not mean erasing creativity; imagination plays a crucial role in articulating and generating ideas. The vast array of methods developed in social sciences over the last 100 years are a toolbox open to be mixed and triangulated. With this approach it is possible to strategically combine and integrate multiple sets and sources of information, allowing the observation of complementary processes.

Moreover, opting for a pluralist and open set of methodologies makes it possible to overcome and complement the limitations of each one. In line with this, the analytical principles and research design that guide this endeavour are firmly established in what can be described as methodological pluralism (Abbott, 2004; Brady & Collier, 2010; Della Porta & Keating, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Briefly, it is advocated here that problem-driven

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11 Translated from Portuguese.
research is not led by methodologies, but instead that these are tools that can be creatively combined to answer the questions at hand. Against positivist hegemony (and to a certain extent its reductionism), methodological validity is given not by methodologies itself, but rather by research problems.

Therefore, my research strategy aims at understanding and comparing how the contentious process developed in Portugal and Spain from 2008 until 2015. In the tradition of historical sociology, it involves both pattern identification and process analysis. If the former “searches for recurrent structures and sequences across time and space”, the latter

“examines how social interactions impinge on each other in space and time. Instead of considering space and time as additional variables, it presumes that space-time connections define social processes and that social processes operate differently as a function of their placement in space and time” (Tilly, 2001: 6754).

Therefore, to uncover political change, I opted for a processual comparative analysis inspired and grounded in the work developed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2015). In line with the theoretical chapter and of the critical realism above mentioned, the contentious politics approach centres itself on mechanisms as factors that explain political change. These are not laws, but rather recurrent patterns (relational, cognitive, environmental) found throughout cycles of contention. These do not need to happen necessarily in the same sequence, but instead they appear in different combinations. The purpose of this type of comparative approach is to - rather than focus on the different factors behind processes of change - explore the processual black-boxes beyond these causes. In this sense, it is an interesting method for exploring patterns between countries and to study them in a more comprehensive way (Ragin, 1987).

In regard to contestation of neoliberal austerity policies, Portugal and Spain are contrasting cases that have been feeding ongoing discussions about their democratic practice (Fishman, 2011, 2012b; Fishman & Lizardo, 2013). However, it should be said that the trajectory and sequence of political and historical events between Portugal and Spain was very similar. During the 20th century, these countries went through a long period of authoritarian regimes, with the transition to democracy happening in the mid-1970s. This was followed by simultaneous access to the EU (1986) then more recently by the economic crisis and austerity which hit them around 2010. In the face of the Great Recession, both countries faced a critical situation with regards to the international crisis, the European responses, and domestic policies.
Socialist governments were in power until conservatives took over in 2011 in both cases, and launched austerity reforms. Trade unions spearheaded initial reactions with calls for general strikes at the end of 2010, and in 2011 new actors emerged. After this point, as it will be seen, both cases followed distinct paths when it comes to the contentious responses to austerity.

Therefore, Portugal and Spain seem to be historically bound due to their “periphery of the centre” or semi-peripheral status (Santos, 1990) which results in their being exposed to the same global dynamics. Nevertheless, despite these resemblances, their political trajectories under austerity do not follow the same path. Even if it is possible to detect a political change in most European countries - particularly those most affected by crisis and austerity - the processes of change seem to be mostly bound to their political structures, with institutional and non-institutional actors reacting in different ways.

Two major comparative methodological devices are combined to uncover the mechanisms behind these episodes of contention. Firstly, within these broader epistemological and methodological contexts, a strategy of paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). This allows the clarification of distinct dynamics and trajectories in each case. Tarrow argues that paired comparison is a “method of political analysis distinct from both single-case studies and multicase analysis” (Tarrow, 2010, p. 231) that allows for an in-depth comparison of two cases. This strategy provides deep background knowledge of the cases and causal-process analysis that a large-N strategy would not provide, pushing the theoretical arguments further. By emphasising the process, it increases the observation points making the empirical work more intense and detailed and thus providing the tools for uncovering more intricate and complex mechanisms and relations between actors. Furthermore, Tarrow justifies the two-case strategy:

“The answer, I think, is that the move from single-case to paired comparison offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added. The moment we go from one case to two, I would argue, we are in the realm of hypothesis-generating comparative study, while also enabling ourselves to examine how common mechanisms are influenced by the particular features of each case; as we increase the number of cases, however, the leverage afforded by paired comparison becomes weaker, because the number of unmeasured variables increases.” (Tarrow, 2010, p. 246)

Adding to this, when studying contentious processes, there is a tendency in the literature to focus only on positive, more importantly, visible cases of contention (Zamponi, 2012). The Portuguese case, despite the similar economic situation to their southern counterparts, reveals
a different outcome that helps to shed light on different types of contentious cycles and their constitutive mechanisms. Moreover, taking into account one of the central questions of this dissertation (the relations between actors) this adds to the variety of types of relations that can be studied. It could then be said that the analysis is built over a negative case (Emigh, 1997) considering that Portugal displays a lower level of protest that would be expected.

A second central methodological element of this dissertation is process tracing; a type of within-case methods comparison, which investigates the constitution of a causal narrative and sequence that tries to link two related phenomena and their mechanisms (Lange, 2013). Therefore, a core insight of process tracing is that it allows the analysis of temporality by exploring causal ordering, covariation over time, and path dependence. The interplay between sources is at the core of this approach:

“In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (…) The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable or variables and the outcome of the dependent variable” (Tansey, 2007, p. 206)

The combination of a variety of sources for process tracing and consequently the building up of analytical and causal narratives and conceptual articulation is central here. These can be conceptualised as causal process observations which are defined as:

“Pieces of data that provide information about context, process, or mechanism and contribute distinctive leverage in causal inference. They are contrasted with data-set observations (DSOs), which correspond to the familiar rectangular data set of quantitative researchers. In quantitative research, the idea of an ‘observation’ (as in DSO) has special status as a foundation for causal inference, and we deliberately incorporated this label in the idea of CPOs to underscore their relationship to causal inference. Obviously, we do not thereby mean that one directly observes causation. Rather, this involves inference, not direct observation.” (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 202)

All these elements give preponderance to what could be called “thick description” and in-depth knowledge of the case studies. Being process rather variable-oriented leads to immersion and reliance on multiple sources of empirical data in a fine-grained and detailed reconstruction of processes and mechanisms. This culminates in the usual distinction, albeit
defensive, between the why and how questions. As is often argued by authors from interactionist perspectives, an alternative to examining long trends and chains of causality in social structures, is to focus on deconstructing chains of interactions and its effects on political outcomes.

**3.2. From Conceptualisation to Data Collection**

The research design aims at understanding and comparing how the contentious process under austerity developed in Portugal and Spain between 2009 and 2015. Departing from social movements methodological problems such as *myopia of the visible* (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a) in which collective action is equated with visible protest and mobilisations, hardly considering symbolic and unseen elements, I distinguish between two complementary levels of data collection. Inspired by Goffman’s (1990) distinction between *front* and *backstage*, I suggest that research on contentious politics should combine both a seen dimension of mobilisation present in public protest with an unseen dimension regarding movement culture, discourses and most of all interactions between actors that are not visible in the public sphere.

The data collection involved a protest event analysis and interviews with key actors involved in the process of mobilisation. In the first step, the protest event analysis (PEA) allowed me to map and perceive the changes in protest during this cycle of contention regarding actors, repertoires and claims. This was followed by interviews with members of political parties, trade unions and social movements which helped to define and understand the unseen dynamics of mobilisation in the backstage, such as the links between actors and their strategies.

If triangulated, these constitute complementary forms of data collection, as will be seen in the following sections. Interviews were particularly valuable to my understanding of the quantitative data. They elucidated for many features of the political life in both countries, especially in Spain whose politics I had less insight into prior to commencing this work.

As remarked in the preceding chapter, some of the perspectives and analysis of the movements of the crisis fall into overgeneralisation and romanticisation that exaggerates their transformative potential (Roberts, 2008). One of the reasons behind this is the overly biased samples that studies tend to rely on. Focusing solely on ‘new’ social movements without paying attention to the diversity of responses to market liberalisation is a limitation that affects our understanding of anti-austerity mobilisations. Hence, a full and detailed account of the events and groups that mobilised against austerity is needed and that can only be achieved through a systematic collection of data looking into the variety of contentious responses, not only from institutional and non-institutional actors but also how these interacted along the way.
3.2.1. Protest Event Analysis: Actors and Protest in the Public Sphere

PEA is a technique developed explicitly in the field of social movement, related to the political process approach, contentious politics and directly translating its assumptions (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Hutter, 2014a; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008). Not only does it serve to make an accurate description of the political process, but also to enlighten and read the mechanisms of contention as suggested by authors like McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2008). Additionally, it is flexible enough to encompass other research traditions such as resource mobilisation or new social movements (Earl et al., 2004). As it stands, it is a tool that focuses on a systematic data collection of protest from one or various sources of data. This avoids cherry-picking and allows the analysis of evolution and changes within the protest cycle regarding actors, claims and repertoires.

The PEA is a type of quantitative content analysis that “turns words into numbers” through which it is possible to understand “how protests co-vary with the changes in their environment” (Hutter, 2014a, p. 336). Hutter adds that as “an unobtrusive technique, it can handle unstructured matter as data, it is context-sensitive, and it can cope with large volumes of data” and that “the ability to move beyond a few cases and illustrative examples is also what made PEA so attractive to social movements scholars” (Hutter, 2014a, p. 337). By covering multiple dimensions of the mobilisation process such as actors, claims, repertoires, time and space, it allows to establish a chronology and to perceive the dynamics and proprieties of the protest cycle (Hutter, 2014a). Examining data across time allows moving to procedural and mechanistic forms of explanation, focusing on action rather than organisational views of social movements (Earl et al., 2004; Fillieulle & Jiménez, 2003). This means that it is possible to identify action repertoires and waves of protest, allowing several contentious actors to be studied simultaneously. Regarding research design, it moves from a qualitative to a quantitative approach, that allows comparative and historical analysis due to “the relative simplicity and standardisation of procedures” (Fillieulle & Jimenez, 2003, p. 258).

Regarding the unit of analysis, this methodology focuses on events. By concentrating on events rather than organisations/actors, it considers a plurality of claim-making actors that goes beyond social movements. In the Acts of Dissent it is written that “from an analytical standpoint, we should not equate the study of protest with the study of social movements. Social movements tend to protest but not all protests are conducted by social movements” (Fillieulle

I will not give a historical approach of this technique here since it is not the objective, rather I will make a reflection on how this fits my questions and objectives. For a historical overview see: Earl et al, 2004 and Hutter, 2014a.
& Jimenez, 2003, p. 272). In this way, following the codebook of the project Dynamics of Collective Action I will consider an event: (1) it is collective act (more than one person); (2) it is a public act; (3) it is a protest event (as some movement activities can include e.g., fundraising); (4) and it involves claim-making and desire to change society.\(^\text{13}\)

In this way, and in line with the definition given by Tilly, a protest event constitutes a collective and public claim-making endeavour. With this wider definition, a broad spectrum of actions must be considered: there are several ways of expressing disagreement and discontent, both from institutional and non-institutional actors, allowing the study of different actors and their emergence across time. Alongside this, a vast repertoire of actions will be considered, not only protests and strikes but also manifestos, petitions, occupation and squatting to name a few.

Regarding the delimitation of time and space, a long period of time was chosen: from the USA financial collapse in 2009 to the 2015 general elections in Spain and Portugal (2009-2015). To understand the changes in mobilisation, I have defined three distinct phases of contention: (1) between 2009 and 2010 - from the beginning of the global crisis until the beginning of austerity in both countries; (2) between 2010 and 2014 in which austerity packages were applied in both countries; (3) finally, an electoral period between the years of 2014 and 2015. Therefore, I will be comparing three different periods where there is a mix of distinct economic and political circumstances: pre-austerity, austerity and pre-elections. Establishing an extended period helps to compare the nature of the mobilisations within the same contexts but along different circumstances.

Critiques of this technique point out that media selectivity might bias the results. However, it is widely recognised by researchers in the field that it “should not be equated with the universe of protests that occur daily in many places” (Koopmans & Rucht, 1999, p. 246). Despite not being wholly representative, this technique helps to envisage the whole sequence of events in a clear and systematic way and take into consideration the plurality of protest actors, claims and repertoires in the field.

Regarding data collection procedures several considerations should be made. Even if other records or sources can be used, the PEA makes typically use of newspaper sources. It is usual to triangulate sources, and as such to use different newspapers covering the same period and territory in order to complement and corroborate the information collected. However, due to a combination of time constraints, the time span and numbers of cases covered I have selected only one source in each country. Adding to this, as I only use one source, following

\(^{13}\) See the codebook in: [https://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/](https://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/).
Franzosi (1987), I have not used sampling techniques and proceeded to an exhaustive, systematic and daily collection of protest events, as sampling can distort final results. This allows a full mapping of protest events reported ensuring more diversity.

Regarding the sources, I have used one large-scale circulation newspaper in each country with an online edition. Instead of using keywords, I have made daily search allowing a more detailed analysis and collection of events. In Portugal I have used *Diário de Notícias* and in Spain *El País*.

*Diário de Notícias* was created in 1864 and is the oldest national newspaper in Portugal to have national coverage. Accornero observes that despite the various phases of the newspaper, it can be said to have a conservative positioning. The online edition of the newspaper had eleven million views and it was the third most viewed in Portugal. In addition, it had a circulation of 43 thousand at the beginning of 2011 and circa 21 thousand at the start of 2018. *El País* was founded in 1976 and ever since, despite some distance in the last decade, has been a newspaper closely associated with PSOE. Its coverage is nationwide with regional supplements in Catalan, Valencia, Andalucia, Basque Country and Galicia, which could serve to explain the higher numbers in protests reported in these regions (Portos, 2016).

These resulted in a database with 4566 events spanning between January 2009 and December 2015. In Portugal I have collected and coded 1345 events, while in Spain this resulted in 3221 protest actions. Taking into account the questions and conceptualisation established in previous chapters, the database is composed of four dimensions with the corresponding variables. In developing these, I took inspiration from works in the field that use a similar methodology, adjusting it to the objectives at hand. Moreover, many of these were adapted not only considering the countries and their particularities but also ensuring that the variables and categories would fit both cases. In that sense, many of the variables had to be open and broad, while being comparable and significative for the analysis. Even if a pre-established codebook existed, this had to be refined progressively at different stages of the research based on protest events found.

The following dimensions and variables were considered:

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As visible in table 3.1, the four dimensions are the following.\textsuperscript{15}

1. Time and Space: these are critical variables regarding situating protest events in the different phases of contention. These correspond to the geographical location, and have been further coded in terms of year, half-year, three months and month.

2. Actors: this corresponds to the type of organisation or group that organised the protest. I have split them into three major groups, with each one being an independent variable. Therefore, as will be seen, there is the possibility of two or more actors being involved in the organisation of events. Initially, the decision was to code them thematically, taking into account the type of groups organising, for example environmental, women, or anti-austerity groups. However, this resulted in an unmanageable number of groups in a single variable that was not comparable. Thus, I decided to have broader and more inclusive categories in multiple binary variables. Therefore, movements and civil society actors correspond to all groups outside the institutional arena; labour and trade unions contains all the groups related with work issues, either large and national trade

\textsuperscript{15} More detailed description of the codebook in the Appendix III.
unions or groups that organise independently from them at the factory level; finally, political parties and groups refers to party organisation or other institutional actors.

3. Claims and Issues: translates the grammars of protest that I have discussed in the analytical framework as the language of rights and social justice. Similarly, to the actors I have refined the variable along coding process. If initially, I intended to have only one variable, I have later followed the same strategy; plus I did not predict many of the claims categories I have found (e.g. production and consumption). Following what was discussed in chapter two, I have operationalised and refined the categories proposed in the framework. In this way, redistributions correspond to both economic and social claims, while representation refers to political claims. Recognition was integrated within cultural claims. I have divided this into four primary dimensions:

a. Economic claims are related to economic issues ranging from austerity to labour, but also questions related to consumption and production. The first distinction that should be noted is between austerity and work. The latter refers to protests against austerity, as policies of liberalisation and cut down of labour costs, it is understood here as macroeconomic policies of the right hand of the State (Bourdieu, 1998a). The former is related to questions around labour such as precarity and unemployment, both at the public and private level. Consumption related claims related to demands by and around private consumers such as banks. Finally, to deal with small business owners that protest for legislation in their sectors or benefits, I classify them with claims around production.

b. Political claims are linked with questions around the state and democracy, political citizenship and representation. I have divided them into national and international demands. The latter denotes issues, for example relating to other nation-states. Concerning the former, I have divided them between claims on representation and participation, and state and inclusion. This comprehends the regional nationalism in Spain, and is absent in Portugal.

c. Social claims refer to social rights at large in relation with the retrenchment of the welfare state or the left-hand of the state (Bourdieu, 1998a). In this sense, it gives a perspective over claims of redistribution on education, health and housing.
Lastly, cultural claims are associated with demands typically related to new social movements and recognition such as identity politics, but also environmental issues.

4. Modes of Protest refer to all the variables referring to non-symbolic features of the protest. This allows further identifying of the characteristics of these such as repertoires, target, place, length, violence and dimension of the protest.

Various problems emerged in the construction of this database. The reference newspaper for Portugal, *Diário de Notícias*, had its website and search mode changed in October 2015, limiting the PEA of this country until that date as it did not allow for data collection after this point. Also, it should be noted that the quantification of numbers of participants in the Portuguese protests was of low quality. Reports were often imprecise referring merely to hundreds or thousands.

This vast array of variables allows for a detailed description and depiction of what the evolution of the protest cycle looked like. Nonetheless, as Tarrow observed when commenting on Tilly’s methodological endeavours, simple event counts are weak in “relating sequences of events to non time-series variables like institutions, political processes, and the contingent factors (...) it also made it difficult to detect the internal mechanisms of particular events or chains of events, such as escalation, factionalization, radicalization, moderation, and institutionalization. It was also insensitive to the internal dynamics of episodes of conflict” (Tarrow, 2008, p. 234). Taking this into consideration, and to counter the effects of merely studying the process through event-counts, I have collected and systematised data on what has been termed as eventful protests (Della Porta, 2008) or large protest events (Diani & Kousis, 2014): massive events of protest that have symbolic impact and that change the trajectory of the political process. As cited, methodologically this gives several points of observation that allows for a more systematic and in-depth story telling.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, complementary to this and to make more sense of the internal dynamics of the contentious episode, I have constructed a chronology of the main political and economic events between 2007 and 2015, through a variety of sources in Portugal, Spain and Europe. Beside using similar data, in chapter 4 - Preludes to Mobilisation - I have used secondary data sourced from the *European Protest and Coercion Data* collected from international news

\(^{16}\) I have included this data in Appendix I.
agencies by Ronald Francisco between 1980 and 1995 (Francisco, 2000). I will develop further how I have use this data in the chapter accordingly.

3.2.2. Interviews and Fieldwork Strategy: Underlying Structure of Mobilisation

The second stage of the data collection process involved interviewing members from different political parties, trade unions and social movements. This technique constitutes a qualitative research procedure that involves in-depth questioning of respondents to explore their perspectives on particular situations or facts. Despite the non-representativeness of the PEA sources, by triangulating it with the interview data, there is potential not only to confirm the trends and patterns identified but also to complement them.

While the PEA allows for the systematisation of information regarding protest in the public sphere in terms of what is seen, it provides little reliable data about the unseen aspects of these mobilisations. As Flescher Fominaya (2014a) points out, the contentious politics or political process approach and by extent their methodological tools, tend to focus merely on the active phases of contention without considering their continuity over time through the “survival of activist networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics and a continued sense of collective identity” (Fominaya, 2014a, p. 147). This is reflected in two aspects of this research, as on the one hand the PEA provides insufficient evidence on the relations between actors, and on the other hand does not allow to uncover the emergence of non-protest actors, despite their connections, and how particular groups develop, such as Podemos.

The interviews allow for an analysis of the backstage and to conduct a broader historical reconstruction of the process under study. Therefore, they illuminate aspects of the mobilisation process such sequences of events, framing and claims, and relations between actors. Furthermore, interviews with well-positioned actors allowed me to access information that would not be accessible otherwise and elucidated me on questions that I was not aware of before.

I have conducted semi-structured elite interviews with well-positioned people in the field to gain an overview of the events and organisations. The interviewee was given the chance of talking freely over predefined topics. This would occur almost as a conversation, where I would rarely intervene unless it was to introduce a new question or a comment. In this way, no fixed interview script existed and rather changed depending on the interviewee position in the field, and according to the material and knowledge I had acquired in previous interviews. These were done mostly off the record, to ensure confidentiality and were instrumental in reconstituting the events, narratives and facts previously missing from my analysis.
Nonetheless, the interviews followed the themes already approached in previous chapters and that constitute the main analytical dimensions of this dissertation. With the intent of uncovering causal mechanisms, I focus on obtaining specific information about the events under study. Interviews focused on different themes to reconstitute the mobilisation process through different perspectives: (1) constellation of actors, their alliances and conflicts; (2) the nature of the claim-making, frameworks, narratives and how they evolved throughout the cycle of protest; (3) repertoires of action and different forms of movement culture and organisation. Other dimensions covered included an introductory question regarding their past political trajectories to reconstruct previous episodes and campaigns of contention and connect them.

I have interviewed people from three types of actors, namely trade unions, political parties and social movements. The latter is to be divided in events, groups and platforms, such as the gathering of several groups around a specific issue. In addition, if the institutional actors are more permanent, the social movements could sometimes be more ethereal and demobilise quicker. Due to the nature of this, many of the interviewees had multiple belongings along the process contributing to a more efficient reconstruction. This was accomplished both by talking with leaders and public figures, but also with second lines of the movements and groups whose discourse would not be compromised and could eventually reveal more information. It is important to notice that in contrast to the PEA there was no attempt to be as systematic, but rather to collect multiple perspectives within and across groups to allow the triangulation of different and conflicting discourses in the field. This objective of this principle is to:

“Obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, and the most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the key political actors—those who have had the most involvement with the processes of interest. The aim is not to draw a representative sample of a larger population of political actors that can be used as the basis to make generalisations about the full population, but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players who have participated in the political events being studied.” (Tansey, 2007: 765)

I have established a purposive sample, in which the gathering of informants was based on pre-established networks and creation of new ones especially through other scholars and informal contacts. Adding to this, snowballing also played an important role.
Nevertheless, it should be added that there were differences between countries, as in Portugal I already had a previously established contact network,\textsuperscript{17} which meant easier access and significantly less time to conduct interviews than in Spain. In Spain this occurred through a prolonged stay in Madrid whereby I was able to establish multiple contacts while observing and getting acquaintance with the political landscape: this accomplished by an attempt of anthropological emersion in which I attended political events and rallies.\textsuperscript{18}

To analyse the interviews I developed a codebook whose purpose was to organise information in each group. This revolved around two main aspects. On the one hand, I would ask each interviewee about their trajectories of activism to identify the main movements and political dynamics preceding 2008. This feeds directly into the chapter of the antecedents of protest and shows that many activists were already politically involved in the 1990s and there are multiple continuities from those years. On the other hand, I have analysed each actor separately taking into account the relevant analytical dimensions such as: origins; relations between actors; internal dynamics and organisation; frameworks and claims; repertoires.

With the information organised for each group, I have produced summaries for each group involved in the cycle of contention that supported the writing up of the dissertation. It is important to note that in writing these I have taken some caution in not reproducing actors’ discourses. Instead, I have filtered them and cross checked them with multiple testimonies and sources I have collected.

\textbf{3.3. Conclusion}

The breadth of the research and data collection here is important as it bridges distinct theoretical and methodological approaches. This mixed-methods approach whereby I triangulate information allows for a detailed and in-depth analysis of the contentious process in two countries both in terms of the public sphere and the backstage interactions. Moreover, its saturated nature links the field of social movement studies with the field of political parties,

\textsuperscript{17} In between 2011 and 2014, I participated in a European research project (MYPLACE - https://myplaceresearch.wordpress.com/) that allowed me access to the field of social movements in Portugal at the height of the crisis. This was important to the process of data collection, as due to multiple interviews I was acquainted with many of the actors on the ground. Nevertheless, the process of data collection gave me a new perspective on the field and shed light on many aspects that I was not aware. A list of the people interviewed is in Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{18} I attended the BE convention and the first Constituent Assembly of Podemos - both at the end of 2014. During my time in Spain (October 2015 to May 2016) I followed the electoral process closely and attended various rallies and demonstrations.
which as will be seen later in this dissertation is central to the understanding of the field and the regimes of contention studied here.

In a way, in the attempt to fully reconstruct the process, I follow a Gramscian method of political analysis: I consider the whole social formation and the different relation of forces between actors. Not only that, but in a context of political and economic crisis it is important to keep in mind the distinction proposed by Gramsci between organic crisis, referring to the relatively permanent nature of structures, and to the conjunctural, denoting the more immediate and occasional events that despite the contextual circumstances end up reflecting in-depth power relations.

However, this is not without limitations. This comes both from insufficiencies of the methods that even through triangulation cannot compensate for, and problems that emerged during fieldwork. One such example is the balance between the PEA and the interviews in the two countries. In Spain, due to the dimension of its territory and dispersion of protest, the PEA database is significantly more diverse than in Portugal, where protest tends to be less varied and as a result reports have less descriptive thickness. Nevertheless, the Portuguese interview set was richer, not only because of my previous knowledge of the field, but also due to its smaller extension it was possible to have more description. This was not the case in Spain, where my interviews were restricted to Madrid, which introduces bias in the description and understanding of the process. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that this city was central in the mobilisation process across the country. There might be other studies that also make these points regarding the different levels of mobilisation and processes that I can use to inform my research.

The methodological tools described in this chapter, combined with contextual and theoretical considerations done previously, will be developed in the following chapters for the context of the Portuguese and Spanish anti-austerity contentious processes.
4. Preludes to Mobilisation: from Transitions to Democracy to Anti-Austerity Protests

In this chapter, I reconstruct the structures of mobilisations in Portugal and Spain from their transitions to democracy to the austerity years. While this chapter contributes to a broader understanding of the processes that prepare and operate at the opening of cycles of contention, it also examines the links between different episodes over time (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a; Tarrow, 1993; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017), encouraging scrutiny of interpretations that portray the 2011 mobilisations in the two countries as spontaneous or novel. In light of the debates discussed in the introduction and analytical framework chapter, I argue that despite being unpredictable, the protests that emerged during the anti-austerity years followed patterns established in previous decades.

Building on a genealogical approach, I will show not only the “survival of activist networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics and a continued sense of collective identity” (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a, p. 147), but also how these networks, repertoires, and identities change over time. In the words of Flesher Fominaya: “we need to pay more attention to movement genealogies, including the configuration, spaces and resources of pre-existing networks, and to the role of movement cultures and discursive processes in mobilisation” (Flesher Fominaya, 2017, p. 8). Despite the existing analysis that identifies distinct features of protest mobilisations in these countries, we lack consolidated meso-level theory, such as analysis of actors and their interactions over time.

I argue that despite the apparent unpredictability of the 2011 protests, mobilisation did not emerge spontaneously (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). Instead, it resulted from (1) the interaction between mobilising and connective structures, openness and configuration of institutions in democratic settings and (2) conjunctural and contingent elements (Portos, 2017; Tarrow, 2011, 2015; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017). If the former refers to the configuration of actors that results from past contentious processes, the latter considers political opportunities, structures, and threats (Kriesi, 2007; McAdam et al., 2001), such as economic or and political crises, market liberalisation, or globalisation. Furthermore, being rooted in mobilisation experiences and having a genealogy of its own that cannot be ignored, a discursive and symbolic dimension is to be considered in both how it reflects already existing cleavages (Hutter, 2014b), or how these are politically articulated (De Leon, Desai, & Tugal, 2009).
Portugal and Spain offer distinct paths that help to elucidate the processes, conditions and configurations behind the emergence of cycles of contention. The overview given in the following sections will allow me to trace the continuities and changes regarding past mobilisations within each country, while also exploring and situating the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors from the transitions to democracy to the anti-austerity years. In this regard, the two countries show different patterns over the last four decades that we see reproduced in the anti-austerity cycle: in Portugal institutional actors dominate the landscape, intervening and embedded in social movements, while in Spain, the two arenas display more autonomy. Additionally, there are differences regarding movement practices and discourses: in Portugal the movement actors remained centralised, small, closed and conflictive between themselves, while in Spain there was a strong stream of decentralized, local, horizontal organisations. Regarding discursive repertoires, in the years preceding the crisis, Portuguese demands focused on labour precarity without questioning the regime foundation; in Spain, a strong critique of the institutions that emerged with the transition to democracy.

I will make use of secondary literature literature, secondary data, and interviews to synthesise and identify transformations in the contentious field involving political parties, trade unions and social movements until the emergence of the anti-austerity mobilisations.

I have organised the chapter into three sections. The first encompasses the two decades of mobilisations from the transition to democracy until the end of the governments of Felipe González in Spain (1996) and Cavaco Silva in Portugal (1995). Consolidation of democracy and admission to the European Economic Community (later the European Union) are the main events that marked this period. The second deals with the Global Justice Movement and the political dynamics from the late 1990s to 2005. The final period describes the mobilisation immediately preceding the Great Recession, from 2005 to 2011, when Socialist parties were in government in both countries. By shedding light on the histories of mobilisation, we can better understand the contentious configurations that emerged during austerity years.

4.1. Dynamics of Contention in the 1980s and 1990s in Portugal and Spain
The decades following the transitions to democracy in both countries share some aspects regarding contentious processes. A first identifiable trend is the absence or weakness of the so-called new social movements. During the 1980s, contrary to other Western European countries

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19 The reconstruction of the Portuguese of the mobilisation processes before the crisis is harder. The literature on social movements and protest is scantier than in Spain, where reflections on social movements and protest have been ongoing since 1980s.
where feminism, environmentalism or pacifism became part of the social movement landscape, labour and political issues were still at the fore in the recently formed Iberian democracies. For instance, despite the multiple protests against nuclear energy, especially in Spain²⁰ (Cruz, 2015) but also in Portugal (Barca & Delicado, 2016), these outbursts were essentially local in character and never coalesced into a larger movement or political party, like the Green parties elsewhere.²¹

Nevertheless, each county displayed different cycles and dynamics of protest that developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.²²

**Figure 4.1 Protest Actions (Per 1000 People) in Portugal and Spain per Year (1980-1995)**

As illustrated in Figure 4.1, it is possible to the number of contentious actions per year differs between the two countries. In Portugal, 1982 was the year with most protest, followed by 1994 and 1989. In Spain, the 1980s were quite conflictive due to the violence perpetrated

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²⁰ Rafael Cruz (2015) compiles a useful chronology of contentious events in his book “Protestar en España, 1900-2013” that allows for in-depth analysis of the main trends of protest in Spain.

²¹ Instead, leftist political parties either adopted this issue or integrated fringe political forces into their lists. For instance, in Portugal, the equivalent of the Green party allies with the PCP since the 1980s.

²² The data presented here comes from the “European Protest and Coercion Data” collected and systematized by Ronald Francisco. It is available at http://web.ku.edu/~ronfrand/data/. I use this data to investigate some of the main contentious trends in Spain and Portugal. Some caution is necessary as the data comes from international news agencies and not from national sources. Therefore, it might be less diverse and biased towards protests with international visibility. I have also cleaned and changed the database to exclude coercion events (i.e., repressive actions by the authorities) and kept solely protest events. I have reduced all multi-day events (repeated in the database) to single events.
by *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), but the number of protest actions per 1000 people dropped to about half after 1987.

**Figure 4.2 Contentious Actors (%) in Portugal (1980-1995)**

In Portugal, as shown in Figure 4.2, labour and trade union actors were dominant until 1990, apart from 1984 to 1986. Furthermore, the primary type of tactic was the strike, as intense labour mobilisations marked the first two decades of democracy in Portugal (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015). The highest number of protests occurred in 1982 in the context of a deteriorating economic situation that preceded the second IMF intervention (1983). It was also the year of the first two general strikes in Portugal (February and May) organised by the CGTP union federation (the third happens in 1988, with the collaboration of both CGTP and UGT). These trade union federations shared close ties with different political parties (in ways that have not changed to this day). Founded in 1971, CGTP was directly linked with the PCP. On the other hand, the PS, and to some extent the PSD, were involved in creation of UGT in 1978 to dispute the communist hegemony in the world of labour. Stoleroff (1988) observed that the CGTP, the main trade union in Portugal, advocates a class unionism that is anti-capitalist, while the UGT, the minority trade union, pursues a reformist and neocorporativist strategy. As such, ‘the Portuguese syndicalism is a politicised syndicalism, oriented to state intervention, and even dependent on it’\(^{23}\) (Stoleroff, 1988, p. 148).

\(^{23}\) Translated from Portuguese.
Figure 4. 3 shows that trade unions were dominant as a protest actor in Spain in the 1980s, with exception of the period between 1984 and 1986, when political actors such as ETA were active. In addition, social movements only start gaining preponderance in the 1990s.

*Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO) was created in 1962 by the PSOE, while it was still under Franco’s regime. The *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT) dates back to 1888 (it remained in clandestinely during Franco’s dictatorship). These actors led strong labour mobilisations that shaped the period of the transition to democracy and continued to be important afterwards (Cruz, 2015; Jiménez Sánchez, 2011; Romanos & Aguilar, 2016; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014a). Nevertheless, as the main parties on the left, the PSOE and the PCE (*Partido Comunista Español*), integrated the negotiations during the transition to democracy, trade unions (CCOO and UGT) were demobilised not only because their overall demands were accepted, but also to facilitate the negotiation process. As institutional actors became ingrained in State structure, trade unions started demobilising their members and civil society actors gained more autonomy. Before the year 2000, Spain saw general strikes in 1981, 1985, 1988, 1992, and 1994.

Trade unions membership progressively declined and, as politics became increasingly institutionalised, mobilisation in the street became less important. Nevertheless, the trade union retained some of its trademarks: horizontal practices (expressed in open assemblies) and direct actions (such as occupations). Notably, even initially built as a political and social movement, the CCOO abandoned that project as it institutionalised further in the late 1980s (Cruz, 2015).
An important difference in the evolution of the political arena between the two countries is that in Spain, unlike in Portugal, the link between political parties and trade unions was progressively disrupted. The liberalising character of the policies taken by PSOE government after the 1982 election led to fracturing with the UGT; the latter even mobilised against the government’s labour law of 1984. At the same time, the Communist Party and the CCOO ended up acting more independently from each other as a result of the formation of the new left-wing party Izquierda Unida (IU) in 1986. Nevertheless, a third element to be considered is the close collaboration upon institutionalisation and embeddedness in the state of the so-called majoritarian trade unions (CCOO and UGT) (Gunther & Montero, 2009): rather than in conflict, these had very close ties. This institutionalisation does not mean that these actors were not conflictive: during Aznar’s governments, they opposed to several of the policies implemented. Nevertheless, this oppositional stance diminished under Zapatero’s PSOE government.

**Figure 4.4 Union Density (per active population) in Portugal and Spain (1977-2015)**

![Figure 4.4 Union Density](image)


Adding to these dynamics, as shown in the Figure 4.4 below, membership in trade unions followed distinct patterns since 1977, when data is available. In Spain after a steep increase from 1977 to 1978, density suddenly falls to 11% in 1981. From then onward it increases slowly until 1998 when it reaches 18%, and remains relatively stable from then until 2015. Portugal starts with higher levels of union density, circa 60%. However, it declines steeply stabilising around the year 2000.
Labour was not the sole issue or actor of contention. In both countries, political organisations pursued violent and disruptive actions, although they had different objectives: political violence in Spain was associated with nationalist projects, while in Portugal it served revolutionary and radical purposes.24

Political actors associated with the nationalist question were predominant in Spain throughout the 1980s. Terra Llire (Catalonia), Ejército Guerrillero de Pueblo Gallego Libre (Galicia) or, the principal group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country) were only contained or decreased their action by the end of the 1980s. Notice the large proportion of the political actors (Figure 4.3) and violent repertoires in Spain (Figure 4.6) throughout the 1980s which started to shift from the 1990s onwards.25

**Figure 4.5 Repertoires (%) in Portugal (1980-1995)**26

![Figure 4.5 Repertoires (%) in Portugal (1980-1995)](image)

Source: Francisco (2000)

In Portugal, there were also several violent groups active from the years of the revolution onwards. In the 1980s, the FP2527 emerged as the expression of radicalisation of those whose post-dictatorship view for society was rejected. The action of this group is visible

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24 Furthermore, there were instances of far-right and anti-communist violence in both countries, see: Palacios (2003) for Portugal. In Spain, Cruz (2015) shows how the far-right remained active and demonstrated until 1981 (23F) but then its activity decreases.

25 It is interesting to notice that these actions generated counter-mobilisations against terrorist violence that would become closely associated with PP (Díez & Laraña, 2017, p. 170).

26 Besides strikes, these repertoires include the following: 1) demonstrations - demonstrations, marches, rallies; 2) violence - forms of political violence such as bombs, taking hostages or assassinations; 3) civil disobedience - hunger strike, boycott, vandalism, occupation and riots.

27 Forças Populares 25 de April - Popular Forces April 25th was a revolutionary group that operated in Portugal between 1980 and 1987. They were against the path of parliamentary democracy and capitalism taken after 1975.
between 1984 and 1986 in Figure 4. 5 when political actors using violence increased. State action led to the imprisonment of the members of this group and their disappearance.

**FIGURE 4. 6 REPEROIRES (%) IN SPAIN (1980-1995)**

![Graph showing repertoires in Spain (1980-1995)](image)

Source: Francisco (2000)

The end of the 1980s brought about a change in contention. New protagonists, issues and repertoires, particularly non-institutional actors, emerged. In Spain, two main processes seem to co-exist. On the one hand, trade unions institutionalised further, demobilising their respective bases. At the same time, urban neighbourhood associations, which were relevant during the transition, also began demobilising (Cruz 2015; Romanos & Aguilar 2016). Nonetheless, the cultural elements and movement practices that pervaded these groups – such as horizontal, decentralised and local actions – persisted in future movements. However, even if small and based on local, decentralised cultural practices and repertoires, alternative autonomous and radical groups developed. These would later become the basis for the Spanish Global Justice Movement (GJM), which will be discussed in the next in the section of this chapter. The most important mobilisations of the 1980s were the pacifists and the movement against the NATO (with significant mobilisations against the referendum to decide on the permanence of the organisation in 1986) (Díez & Laraña, 2017). This went hand in hand with the movement against conscription that spread to the whole country (Sampedro, 1997). This period also saw the development of housing squats (Martínez López, 2018). Finally, after a year of campaigning in 1994, a demonstration promoted by more than 200 organisations followed by a weeks-long encampment in Madrid pressured the PSOE government to allocate 0.7% of the GDP to foreign aid (Cruz, 2015; Díez & Laraña, 2017).
In Portugal, the mid-1980s marks the rise of Cavaco Silva’s PSD centre-right government and his liberalising economic policies, such as privatising national economic sectors. By the end of his mandate in 1995, contestation was high and marked by several disruptive events, and for the first time since the revolution, labour issues did not dominate protest activities.

One example of this was the set of protests against educational reforms, which had both a national and a local character (Drago, 2003; Mendes & Seixas, 2005; Seixas, 2005). Nationally, these mobilisations were initially against the introduction of a new university access exam (in 1989) and later against the introduction of tuition fees in higher education (in 1991). These protests formed and ‘trained’ a generation of activists who would be present in future mobilisations (including the anti-austerity cycle of protest). The movement delayed the implementation of tuition fees for several years and led to the overthrow of several ministers. Locally, Mendes and Seixas (2005) show that basic education was one of the main protest issues in Portugal between 1992 and 2002. Most of these local protests were rooted in problems related to education, housing, living conditions, and fundamental social rights of citizenship.

Another important mobilisation was the 1994 mobilisations against the toll increase on the (then) only bridge over the Tagus River in Lisbon. As the population and truck drivers conducted roadblocks to protest against the increases, the government answered with a police charge that deeply delegitimised the government and arguably led to its demise.

The 1990s brought about new trends in Portugal. At both national and local levels, contentious actors in this decade were largely outside the institutional actors’ circuit and displayed some degree of autonomy and innovation. It is particularly important to note that the actors were outside protest in the labour world and involved a reaction to welfare retrenchment and rising taxation.

These trends are visible in the data from the European Protest and Coercion data. In the period between 1991 and 1995, social movements carried out demonstrations, but also disruptive civil disobedience actions. This survey of contentious processes that developed in

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28 During the Revolutionary period (1974-75) various economic sectors were nationalised (e.g. banks). Cavaco Silva, with the support of the PS, reverted many of these.

29 The link between different cycles of protest in Portugal is not clear, but from my interviews there seems to be some continuity in time that would be worth exploring in future projects. This is important since, despite the lack of an important history of protest, social movements and political citizenship in Portugal, it is possible to trace links between the activists that were present in anti-fees education movement of the 1990s and later in the anti-austerity one.
both countries in the decades following the transition to democracy reveals a number of patterns and contrasts. Even if ‘weak’, new issues became increasingly prominent in the protest sphere. When stronger labour mobilisations developed, these were embedded in different configurations: in Portugal, unions maintained strong links to political parties, while in Spain, even if unions became progressively institutionalised, the links with parties were progressively disrupted. Political violence was particularly visible in Spain with the ETA, and in Portugal with FP25 (although on a markedly different scale). With the demise of political violence by the late 1980s, new and alternative forms of mobilisation developed throughout the 1990s outside the world of labour. In Portugal, reactions against welfare retrenchment and liberalisation, for example in education, grew in importance as an alternative to traditional actors. In Spain, local groups, even if small, developed horizontal practices that would become important later. In both countries, these would become mainstream forms of mobilisation fuelled by global economic and political dynamics.

4.2. The Global Justice Movement in the Iberian Peninsula

New dynamics of protest emerged at the turn of the millennium. The Global Justice Movement (GJM), active throughout the 1990s and 2000s, appeared as a response to political and economic globalisation and led to a shift in the contentious fields in Portugal and Spain. It introduced new repertoires, discourses, and organisational forms.

The GJM was a transnational social movement, involving a global network of actors from NGOs, grassroots organisations, labour unions and political parties (Della Porta, 2007). Despite their heterogeneity, the different actors shared a critique of neoliberal globalisation, resistance to hegemonic economic models, and proposals for radical changes (Baumgarten, 2017c). While their campaigns were global in nature, covering a range of economic, social, political, and environmental issues, local networks committed to participatory democracy were responsible for putting their agendas into practice (Della Porta, 2013). Facilitated by the developments of new communication technologies, these diverse groups initiated contentious events of resistance such as in Seattle (1999) and Genoa (2001) in addition to joint events or meetings such as the Social Forums in Porto Alegre (World Social Forum, since 2001) and Florence (European Social Forum in 2001) (Baumgarten 2017c, Della Porta, 2013).

Emerging at the intersection of national contexts and transnational protest dynamics, the GJM was crucial in leading nationally focused social movements to adopt similar repertoires, practices, and issues, forming a generation of activists with similar references and
experiences (Romanos & Aguilar 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2014). Nevertheless, each country integrated these dynamics into pre-existing cultures and structures of mobilisation. As a result, the configurations that the GJM took in each country varied. More importantly, the antiglobalisation dynamics came to influence not only the formation of later protest movements, but were also crucial to renewing and introducing new ideas and practices to political parties.\(^\text{30}\)

This reformulation is particularly visible in Portugal, where the end of the 1990s and the 2000s brought about a reconfiguration of the political field and the relations between social movements and institutional actors. For example, a new party on the left, the *Bloco de Esquerda* (BE, or Left Bloc) emerged in 1999. Drawing activists from many of the mobilisations in the 1990s (e.g., anti-tuition fees), the BE became one of the expressions of the GJM in Portugal. Formed as a movement-party it incorporated deliberative and participatory democracy into its practices and organisation (Soeiro, 2009). Going beyond the usual platform of redistribution in Portuguese democracy, it introduced recognition and representation into their discursive repertoire. The new party presented itself as a strategic ally that could collaborate, leverage, and support the growth of various new movements.\(^\text{31}\)

The creation of the BE was not the only change at the party level that contributed to the reorganisation of the political sphere during this period. Starting with the disintegration of the USSR,\(^\text{32}\) dissident voices began criticizing the Portuguese Communist Party’s stiffness and hierarchical organisation, culminating in the 2002 party congress. Not only did dissidents critique the lack of pluralism and internal debate within the party and the punishment of any deviation from the official line, but they also called for a collaboration of the PCP with other left organisations.\(^\text{33}\) The PCP hardliners considered such calls to be reformist and refused to

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\(^{30}\) I do not intend to overstate the importance of the GJM. Rather, I am reconstructing mobilisations that influenced those I will be looking at in following chapters.

\(^{31}\) It is important to notice that BE was formed after the collaboration of three radical left parties throughout the campaigns of liberation of East Timor and for the 1\(^{st}\) referendum for the decriminalization of abortion, both in 1998. I will develop the history of the party more thoroughly in the last empirical chapter.

\(^{32}\) Aligning with the same critics, after the dissolution of the USSR there was an internal movement for renewal of the PCP. Many of these militants left the Communist Party and formed the *Plataforma de Esquerda* in the 1990s. Later they either joined PS or founded BE. Contrary to the cases of Spain or Italy, the Portuguese Communist Party never followed a Eurocommunist line and remained in tune with the Leninist approach.

\(^{33}\) To this day the Communist Party plays a crucial role in the formation of political cadres: more than half of my interviewees were part of the party at some point. At the same time, the PCP is close to the CGTP.
make concessions. This resulted in well-known militants, known as *renovadores*, being expelled or leaving the party. These dissidents formed small groups for reflection, created associations such as the *Renovação Comunista* or, in some cases, joined the BE.

Concurrently, the GJM had consequences outside the sphere of political parties. However, there is little published research on these groups in Portugal, and no full description of their characteristics other than agreement that, in comparison with other countries, the network of civic organisations was limited and precarious (Lima & Nunes, 2008).

The attempt to form a Portuguese version of the World Social Forum reflects these features. As Nunes (2011) reports, the idea for the *Fórum Social Português* (FSP) first came about in 2002 from activists, intellectuals and personalities linked to the BE and the PCP who had participated in international events associated with the GJM. Throughout 2002 there were several preparatory initiatives, in which various actors and tendencies participated, leading to the first FSP in June 2003. The establishment of the FSP brought organisations linked LGBT and women’s rights, human rights and development, and the environment together with political parties and trade unions. The objective was to form a unitary platform that could coordinate their actions oriented towards global aspects of political and economic life.

Contrary to the principles established in the World Social Forum, the BE and the PCP were present and involved in the FSP’s organisation from the start. Nunes (2011), as well as some of my interviewees, point out that their participation was controversial.

“[…] in the FSP, from 2003 to 2006 […] I experienced assemblies where the PCP brought buses with people to win debates, where you would have one person telling a hundred how to vote.” (interviewee 12, Portugal)

There is a widespread notion among the social movements groups that political parties monopolised the FSP, which could be why it did not become a permanent platform for debate and discussion (Nunes, 2011). Various groups’ attempts to limit the participation of political parties and trade unions failed. Considering the characteristics of Portuguese civil society in

34 Translated as renovators.
35 Translated as Communist Renewal.
36 This tendency defended a closer relation or pacts with other leftist forces and came to be crucial in left pact formed in 2015 (I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 7).
37 Translated as Portuguese Social Forum.
which polimembership is common (Soeiro, 2014), (activists or militants with multiple affiliations simultaneously belong to political parties and social movement groups), social movement groups decided not to break with parties, since their members would be present due to overlapping memberships.

Paradoxically, Nunes (2011) shows that the confrontation between political parties in this platform allowed Portuguese GJM groups some autonomy to develop their actions in the first Forum. While it was active, the FSP participated in international protest events such as the demonstrations against the war in Iraq and the contestation of the 2001 G8 meeting in Genoa. Nevertheless, the BE decided not to participate in the second gathering in 2006, allowing the PCP and its satellites to gain dominance over the organisation. Shortly afterwards this led to the extinction of the FSP platform (Nunes, 2011).

Overall, GJM-linked movements never gained much traction in Portugal. Institutional actors subjugated the attempts to build a Portuguese version of the movement. Nevertheless, the GJM introduced new ideas and repertoires of action that reshaped the political field, even if institutional actors appropriated them.

In Spain, in contrast, the GJM was stronger and more autonomous, comprising a heterogenous set of groups and networks that emerged after the transition to democracy (ecologist, radical feminist, antimilitarist, squatters, etc.). As such, the movement of the movements in Spain was shaped by a political culture among activists that favoured decentralisation. A leftist and decentralized culture marked the Spanish GJM identity and repertoires. When compared with the GJM in other countries, it presented higher levels of informality and localism. Despite the Spanish GJM movement’s heterogeneity, at the heart of its identity and practice lay a unifying principle based on participatory and radical democracy that reinforced the characteristics they introduced. This led to an important renewal and resignification of repertoires and practices with new forms of street actions and performances, which translated into a broader global framework and the use of civil disobedience as a repertoire (Jiménez Sánchez & Calle, 2007).

It was in this context that the “open social centres” became popular. This combined the GJM transnational influence with long-standing traditions of local and grassroots activism that sprang out of neighbourhoods across the country, also in addition to the numerous squats that had formed since the 1980s (Martínez López, 2018; Rubio-Pueyo, 2016). As these spaces emphasised openness to the community and activist-based forms of knowledge creation, they came to constitute the backbone of the infrastructures of mobilisation for the core participants of the GJM movement. These centres provided – and continue to provide - spaces for interaction, meeting, and socializing activists in new ideas and practices (Alonso, Betancor Nuez et al. 2015; Rubio-Pueyo 2016).

With exception of CGT, an anarcho-syndicalist union that shares similar organizational practices and repertoires with the grassroots movements, trade unions and political parties barely collaborated with social movement actors; when they did the relationship was strained. Social movements aspired to autonomy from institutional actors such as the IU and the major trade unions (CCOO and UGT), which they saw as wanting not only to capture them, but also as being complicit with the economic policies they opposed (Díez & Laraña, 2017; Flesher Fominaya, 2007, 2014a).

In line with precedent set in previous decades, political parties and trade unions were mostly absent from the protest movement field during this period. Two points seem to confirm the idea of autonomy and lack of cross-pollination between institutional and non-institutional actors in Spain. First, Flesher Fominaya (2007) observes that in Madrid at the beginning of the 20th century, the division between political actors was along autonomous and institutional lines: despite left wing parties’ (IU) attempts at collaboration, social movement actors avoided it. Second, my interviewees barely mentioned the presence of parties in the social movement milieu or simply discarded their importance. Nevertheless, Flesher Fominaya (2007) points out that despite the tensions between groups, instances of collaboration did exist: While the autonomous social movements retained discursive legitimacy based on their principles of horizontality, openness and integration in global networks, institutional leftist remained hegemonic at an organizational level. Thus, autonomous groups collaborated with and relied upon parties for space and financial and legal support, resulting in some cases of overlapping militancy.

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40 Social centers constitute self-managed community centers that are run democratically and horizontally. They tend to be closely affiliated with anarchist or autonomist groups.
Politically, this period was characterized by several large protest events that shifted the political process and imaginary and marked the second term of the Aznar government (2000-2004). The first, the movement Nunca Más41 resulted from the mobilisations against the mismanagement of the accidental oil spillage on the coast of Galicia in 2002. This platform organised demonstrations in Galicia and Madrid throughout 2002 and 2003 (Cruz, 2015; Fernández & Peña, 2004). Second, in line with the GJM, was the protest against the war in Iraq and the Spanish government’s support for it in 2003. Protests occurred in over 55 cities across the country, and conservative estimates report that over three million people mobilised (Jiménez Sánchez & Calle, 2007). These protests were not an isolated, and a network of trade unions and social movements campaigned for more than a year afterward (Cruz, 2015).

However, the most emblematic and remarkable mobilisations were the actions preceding the 2004 general elections in the wake of the terrorist attack on Atocha (three days before the elections).42 Following the attack, the PP led a misinformation campaign, initially pointing the finger at ETA, even though Al-Qaeda had already assumed responsibility. Commentators explain this attempted misdirection by positing that PP figured that admitting the attack was perpetrated by Islamic terrorists would have political consequences in the upcoming elections due to the party’s involvement in the war in Iraq. Spontaneous calls for protests started emerging in the GJM network (Flesher Fominaya, 2011). The protests occurred right before election day, and the mobilisation relied on SMS (Flesher Fominaya, 2011; Sampedro & Sanchez, 2011). Consequently, knowledge of the protests expanded beyond the usual networks of activists and spread quickly from Madrid to other cities to become a national protest. This mobilisation relied on broad generic frames that expressed distrust in political parties and excluded them from mobilisation; the famous “they [the parties] do not represent us” or “they call it a democracy, but it is not” were heard for the first time (Flesher Fominaya, 2011).

Flesher Fominaya (2011) argues that these protests were crucial in exposing the campaign of misinformation and pressuring the government. More importantly, they came to influence public opinion, leading to the end of PP’s rule and the victory of the PSOE.

In this section, I have shown the emerging processes and transformations in the political field of the early 2000s. These characteristics are critical to understanding the mobilisation structures present later in the anti-austerity cycle. I have also highlighted how the GJM

41 Translated as Never Again.
42 In his chronology, Cruz (2015) points out that almost 12 million people in whole country protested on the day immediately after the attack.
reflected existing features of movements in each country: in Portugal, change was driven by political parties, which constrained and shaped the way conflicts in the field emerged and progressed; in Spain, movements displayed autonomy from political parties and centrally organised protests.

While there were continuities regarding movement culture, practice, repertoires at the national level between the GJM and the anti-austerity movements emerging from 2011, there is not a direct link (Della Porta, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2014b). Broadly speaking, the GJM ‘demobilised’ not just in the Iberian Peninsula, but also transnationally. As centre-left parties came to power in both Spain and Portugal (2004 in Spain and 2005 in Portugal), new sets of demands and struggles emerged that would more directly shape the post-2011 mobilisations.

4.3. Precursor Mobilisations (2005-2011)
Cycles or waves of contention tend to follow specific dynamics of protest from expansion to transformation and, finally, contraction (Koopmans, 2004; Tarrow, 1989). Contention does not emerge out of thin air, but it is a political process that evolves over time that involves multiple actors (Koopmans, 2004; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). In this sense, the period from 2005 to 2009 was a precursor to the mobilisations against austerity. Besides the patterns that developed throughout the GJM, other factors came to the fore, namely the development of a structure of opportunities during the 2008 financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis and austerity from 2009/10 onwards. These were political opportunities created by both top-down and bottom-up processes.

The centre-left parties in Spain and Portugal pushed for liberalising and market-oriented policies (López & Rodríguez, 2011). Apart from these reforms, they also enacted a number of socially liberalising policies that fulfilled the aims of social movements and contributed to a decrease in the number of protests. For example, with regard to LGBT and feminist demands, both countries legalised same-sex marriage and abortion (Alonso, Betancor Nuez, & Cilleros Conde, 2015; Jiménez Sánchez, 2011; Monteiro, 2012). As a result of Zapatero’s reforms (e.g., allowing gay marriage and abortion), Spain experienced counter-mobilisations pushed by a network of right wing and conservative organisations (Cruz, 2015; Díez & Laraña, 2017; Fernández, 2012). Although they did not overlap with the networks that formed the 15M and anti-austerity mobilisations, they were also present.

In Portugal, the BE brought many of the demands on same-sex marriage and abortion to parliament with multiple goals: first, the BE wanted to be able to articulate their views on
issues of recognition. Second, and more strategically, the BE wanted to ensure a media space where it was prominent and competed with both the PCP and the PS by going beyond labour issues. As previously noted, the BE had worked to amplify social movements’ messages. The second referendum on abortion (2007)\footnote{The first referendum on this issue happened in 1998 – and had resulted in defeat for the decriminalization proposal.} was an example of this strategy, as it mobilised the institutional and non-institutional actors equally and also, most importantly, saw an alliance between various groups on the left (Melo, 2017). Despite the involvement of multiple social movement actors, institutional actors also played a major role (Monteiro, 2012): political parties supported many of the campaigning platforms with resources and personnel.

More importantly, new issues developed and came to mark the anti-austerity mobilisations in Portugal. First, the Socialist government pursued policies that entailed the closure of public services such as schools and health care services around the country. As a result, reflecting a trend in the 1990s, protests erupted all over the country, especially in the countryside where, due to depopulation, there was a retrenchment of educational and health care services (Nunes, 2008). At the trade union level, in the period between 2007 and 2009, teachers contested the reforms undertaken in the education sector (Stoleroff & Pereira, 2008) and organised large demonstrations that mobilised most of their professional class. Also, a reform of the labour law passed in 2008 was met with protests in the streets and a general strike in 2007 while being discussed in parliament and before approval.

Secondly, in the years preceding the crisis the most important dynamic was the formation of networks around the issue of labour precarity; throughout the 2000s, both transversal and sectorial initiatives developed (Soeiro, 2015).\footnote{In his dissertation, Soeiro (2015) extensively describes the mobilisations against precarity. FERVE (Fartos destes Recibos Verdes - tired of this precarious condition) is an example of a transversal group that deals with all activity sectors, while ABIC (Associação de Bolseiros de Investigação Científica - group to attend research assistants precarity issues) is an example of a sectorial one.} Additionally, the BE was also a central actor in bringing the discussion of precarity into the public domain with multiple campaigns (Lisi, 2013).

Both the literature (Cairns, Alves, Alexandre, & Correia, 2016; Soeiro, 2015) and interviewees agree that the adoption of the EuroMayDay\footnote{The EuroMayDay was a parallel event organised as part of the traditional celebrations of the Mayday all over Europe against labour precarity since the mid-2000s. Rather than organised by trade unions, autonomist and libertarian collectives were the ones that mobilized for this event.} in Portugal, in 2007 was central to the formation of networks around precarity.
“It is impossible to understand the 12th of March without understanding all the movements of precariousness that were formed since 2000, since Stop Precarity […] when a demonstration like the 12th of March happens, it does not happen spontaneously, it emerges from a set of networks, themes that were constantly on the agenda”
(Interviewee 10, Portugal)

“What the 12th of March did was to continue these processes: if experiences like the MayDay did not happen before, the Geração à Rasca⁴⁶ could have happened but it would not have happen in the same way […] there was a lot of collective work developed in the Portuguese social movement between different organizations and issues that allowed the GaR to happen […] a lot of the mobilisation structures and knowledge already existed since 2007” (Interviewee 11, Portugal)

The EuroMayDay in Portugal resulted from the confluence of activists coming from different sectors, namely from students associated with the BE, the GJM and the more autonomist groups. Their main objective was to create a collective identity not based on labour sectors, as trade unions do, but rather on a transversal, shared and lived experience of precarity by all workers. This broad alliance of collectives adopted a more spontaneous and fluid repertoire, as well as an assembly style of organisation typical of the GJM and the autonomist movements. On the 1st of May, they would organise a picnic and party and later an independent march that joined the march organised by the CGTP, even if not without conflicts and resistance from the union. Interviewees report that from 2007 to 2011 the annual march grew not only territorially (e.g. to Porto), but also numerically.

The EuroMayDay protest in Portugal could be considered an early experience of the conflicts that would emerge in the anti-austerity cycle of contention. The interviewees I contacted refer to a division between a group closer to the BE, who would later create the Precários Inflexíveis⁴⁷ group, and a more autonomist sector. Within the EuroMayDay the central tension was, as in the FSP a few years earlier, about the group’s relationship toward institutional actors, (i.e., trade unions and political parties). If the first group defended starting with an independent action followed by joining in the CGTP march, the second group preferred to go further and constitute an autonomous space outside the institutional arena with its own

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⁴⁶ Protest that happened in March 2011 in Portugal and was central to contesting austerity. I will discuss it in detail in the next chapter.
⁴⁷ Precários Inflexíveis was created in 2007 with the EuroMayDay. As an organization close BE, it was one of the main contenders of austerity and precarity in the public sphere (Alves, Cairns, Alexandre & Correira, 2016).
language. This divergence led to a split (see Soeiro, 2015, pp. 186-7; Alves, Cairns, Alexandre & Correira, 2016; Interviews), which ultimately stemmed from a fundamental conflict within the Portuguese left: some see any participation of institutional actors as an intrusion into or interference with the autonomy of the social movements. This approach is significantly different from the myriad of groups close to the BE, such as Precários Inflexíveis, which saw such collaboration as fundamental to their activities. Nonetheless, the CGTP was also reluctant to collaborate with the EuroMayDay: not only was the PCP-aligned union federation critical of alternative movements and forms of activism calling them pejoratively inorganic, they were also aware of the connection of these groups to the BE.

“A lot of people connected to the BE […] then people coming from the autonomist space, like RDA, that left the MayDay organization due to political disagreement, because they wanted a different type of relationship with the trade unions […] they lost that battle. In 2009, the biggest year of the Mayday there was an assembly - since the beginning there is an important issue about trade unions because the Mayday at the European level develops a critique to trade unions. The idea behind the Mayday, as fluid movement of representation of the precariat, of the precariat as a different from the working class […] what we did here was to think about precarity as a labour relation, our understanding is that precarity is not a new thing […] it is the loss of rights conquered during the 20th century. (…) On the other side, there was an understanding of precarious workers as being a class in itself and a strong critic to trade unions […] the connection with trade unions was a strategic question of the Mayday, because there was a different understanding of what was precarity.” (Interviewee 11, Portugal)

From 2010 onwards, in the context of austerity, protest became more visible. By the end of this year, two crucial mobilisations started to set the scene for the upcoming anti-austerity protests. Some social movements mobilised to support the general strike (jointly organised by the CGTP and the UGT) against the ongoing cuts in the public sector. Traditionally trade unions had not organised street protests during general strikes. However, in this General Strike, there was a march and rally in Lisbon organised by non-institutional actors and with the support of the BE. Furthermore, at the end of 2010, multiple protests, including trade unions and autonomous groups, confronted the NATO summit in Lisbon.

In Spain, apart from the dynamics already discussed with the GJM and the autonomous sector, several sectorial mobilisations developed less visibly in the mid-2000s. In contrast to Portugal, where public finances were already under strain and public sector cuts were felt
before 2010, Spain was going through a period of economic growth in which a housing bubble developed (bursting in 2008/9). As reported by Portos “a multi-organizational field of activist networks proliferated and consolidated during the low peak of the mobilisation wave, between 2003 and 2010”, which “created a deposit and developed an expertise on which protesters in the shadow of austerity built” (Portos, 2016, p. 191).

There were five types of movements active in this period that would also be central during the main-anti-austerity cycle: (1) the housing movement; (2) student and anti-precarity movements that developed outside the institutional sphere; (3) groups that directed criticisms at the political system against the main parties, the electoral system, corruption or the management of the historical memory; (4) internet-based mobilisations; and (5) nationalist movements, especially in Catalonia.

Regarding the last issue, in the years immediately before the crisis as the Basque conflict settled, mobilisations for the referendum in Catalonia emerged (Della Porta, O'Connor, Portos, & Subirats, 2017). These would become a central aspect of the political crisis in Spain. This set of political and nationalist groups were absent from Portugal and constitute one of the main differences between the two countries.

The mobilisations against *Ley Sinde*48 are usually named one of the main predecessors (Morell, 2012) of the 15M due to the activism around the use of the internet. The online activism of the Free Culture and Digital Commons Movement shaped the 15M movement practices decisively, not only in its composition but also in its framing and organisation.

Concerning the housing movement, there had been mobilisations since the mid-2000s against rising costs and unaffordable housing by immigrant collectives in Madrid, V de Vivienda, and later PAH (2009). The persistence of assemblies and horizontal organisation were two of their main features. Nonetheless, the radical framework and the lack of alliances with other actors limited their mobilisation potential (Aguilar & Fernández, 2010).

The student movement enjoys a long tradition in Spain (Diez & Laraña, 2017). In the years preceding the crisis, students mobilised against the Bologna Reform using occupations and assemblies. Claims were both economic and political in nature: if, on the one hand, the reforms were considered a commodification of higher education, on the other hand, they regarded the reform as anti-democratic due to its top-down and mercantilist nature. More importantly, these political claims already called for an alternative democratic model of the university (Alonso et al., 2015; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017). Zamponi and

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48 “Sinde Law”, named after minister of culture, intended to regulate and limit online downloads.
Fernandez (2017) argue that the student movement shaped the anti-austerity mobilisations in Spain: they were initiators and “brokers in the adaptation of the anti-neoliberal discourse in the new context, with the goal of addressing a wider audience” (2017, abstract). By 2010, Spain had some of the highest levels of unemployment and precarity among young people in Europe. As a result of these disheartening statistics and building on accumulated experience from the anti-Bologna movement, by the end of 2010, the group Juventud sin Futuro grew in various universities. Using the direct transfer of activists skills, these groups created a broader discourse that went beyond youth and built transversal loyalties (Alonso et al., 2015; Zamponi & Fernández González, 2017).

Parallel to this, between 2005 and 2010 various initiatives took aim at the political system, echoing some of the criticisms of 2004 at the demonstrations against PP in the aftermath of the attacks in Atocha (Flesher Fominaya, 2011). Although small and relatively underground, the groups such as No les Votes and Rompamos el Silencio⁴⁹ (active since 2005) denounced the concentration of power under two main parties (PP and PSOE) and how that contributed to corruption and the complicity between business and politics (Cruz, 2015). Moreover, these groups implicitly critiqued the pacted transition to democracy, which they considered incomplete (Diez & Laraña, 2017).

In both Iberian democracies, in the years immediately preceding the crisis and under the control of centre-left parties, the openness increased around questions of recognition. The new policies dealing with abortion and same-sex marriage mobilised many groups. Simultaneously, the on-going economic liberalisation, the future financial disruption and Great Recession in 2008, and the 2010 austerity measures meant a deterioration of labour conditions in both countries. Not only did unemployment rise steeply, but precarity and underemployment disproportionately affected youth, leading to new forms of mobilisation and contestation. While trade unions continued to confine themselves to the protection of the insiders (i.e., workers with stable jobs), outsiders had to look for alternative forms of mobilisation. In response, the countries’ paths diverged. In Portugal, the emerging movements were restricted to the themes of labour and precarity, without elaborating on the political conditions in which they developed. In Spain, besides economic issues, multiple sectors were already questioning the regime.

⁴⁹ Translated as Do not vote them and Break the Silence.
4.4. Conclusion

Despite some superficial similarities, Spain and Portugal present two distinct paths of mobilisation up to the 2008 financial crisis. Even if embedded in the same international scenario, with some parallels between protest cycles, different contentious responses erupted. Between the transition to democracy and the emergence of the crisis, a complex picture of mobilisations emerges. Differences stem from multiple interactions not only between institutional and non-institutional contentious actors, but also between structures of opportunities, networks, and cultures of mobilisation.

The main contrast is in the relationship between institutional and non-institutional actors. In the years before the anti-austerity mobilisations, the space of contentious politics in Portugal underwent a constrained renewal, whereby renovation of the social movement field was done within the sphere of political parties; in Spain, this renewal entailed autonomy between institutional and non-institutional actors.

In Portugal, protest in the decade preceding the crisis flourished. However, contention existed within the limits of a restructured left (with the emergence of the BE and the group that left the Communist Party in the 1990s and 2000s). The creation of the BE as a strong institutional actor in competition with the PCP was of great importance. It created opportunities for the non-institutional actors to grow, allowing them more resources and coordination outside the control of the PCP. This would later feed back into the recomposition and creation of the groups linked to the BE that intervened in the anti-austerity cycle of contention.

This contrasts with the picture in Spain. While trade unions were major contentious actors during the transition to democracy, upon institutionalisation street politics became secondary for these actors. Nonetheless, alternative and autonomous vehicles sprang out from already existing cultures of protest in combination with transnational forms of mobilisation that emerged during the 1990s/2000s. Rather than linked to political parties, movements in Spain tended to have an open character that integrates assemblies at every step. Many of these features will re-emerge during the anti-austerity protests, even if they come to be transformed and resignified.

Besides the repertoires and configurations of contention, another important aspect to consider is the nature of the conflict per se. In Portugal, this, in the years before the crisis, was almost solely focused on labour and precarity and the retrenchment of the welfare state, and did not develop a critique of the regime. These activist groups were not able to expand beyond core militants and become a transversal movement, as they did in Spain. The movements that
emerged in Spain were more diverse thematically (housing, youth, and critique of the regime), and developed a frame that went beyond labour issues and became immediately transversal upon the explosion of the crisis. As such, movements in Spain articulated a new discourse that criticised the regime, while in Portugal there was an acceptance, to a certain extent, of the regime status quo.

**Table 4.1 Actors, Practices and Discourses in Portugal and Spain since the 1970s**

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<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Trade union strength, connection with political parties</td>
<td>State-embedded trade unions, with no strong link to political parties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strength and presence of political parties among social movement groups</td>
<td>Autonomy between social movements and political parties, with cases of collaboration at times</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– weak GJM</td>
<td>Strong GJM</td>
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<td>Local movements that emerge upon changes in the welfare state (small,</td>
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<td>reactive and more disruptive)</td>
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<td><strong>Practices</strong></td>
<td>Small, closed and conflictive</td>
<td>Horizontal repertoires, localism and decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourses</strong></td>
<td>Labour precarity emerges before the crisis as a grievance</td>
<td>Besides labour precarity and liberalisation, a critique of the regime</td>
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As a result, in both countries, the political field that emerged between 2008 and 2011 solidified and crystallised the axis of contention that developed in the years before the crisis. While in Portugal new forms of protest and institutional actors cooperated, in Spain the conflict kept the groups independent. In Portugal, parties play a role connecting with other actors (the PCP with the CGTP; the BE with their satellite organisations, e.g., the Precários Inflexíveis), while autonomous groups tried to develop outside their sphere of influence. In Spain, beyond local dynamics of protest, social movements were autonomous and stronger than in Portugal. As I will show in the following chapters, all these features will be present and essential in understanding how contentious responses to austerity developed.
5. Turning Points: between a Stuttering Start and a “Trigger of Energy Spilling”

Several aspects of the functioning of democracies are currently a source of intense discontent among their citizens. There is widespread dissatisfaction that democracy has been unable to generate socioeconomic equality, to make people feel that their political participation is effective, to ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not what they have no mandate to do, and to balance public order with noninterference in private lives.

Przeworski, 2016, p.4

In this chapter, I compare the turning points of the cycles of contention in Portugal and Spain in 2011. By turning points, I mean the first protest events during the cycle that successfully mobilise beyond trade unions and whereby latent contentious issues and networks, described in the previous chapter, scaled up to mass protests. Following Tarrow (1993, 2011), the intensification of conflict, its geographical diffusion, and the emergence of new actors, symbols, frames and repertoires of action lead to new phases of the cycle of protest.

After 2011 the character of mobilisations changed decisively. Before 2011, apart from small protest actions from autonomous movements or general strikes from trade unions, large protest events from non-institutional actors were non-existent. Nonetheless, with the introduction of austerity measures between 2010 and 2011, social movements became a central player in the political process and introduced a particular set of repertoires and discourses.

Therefore, in this chapter, I analyse the mobilisations between January and December 2011, highlighting the two eventful protests of this period: the Geração à Rasca in Portugal and the 15M in Spain. This means that I analyse not only the events at hand, but also their impact on the overall cycle of protest in each country. Due to the movements’ stuttering nature, in the Portuguese case this involves not only the Geração à Rasca, but also a series of subsequent events such as the Acampada and the 15O. In Spain, I analyse the 15M and its decentralisation to the locally based assemblies in neighbourhoods.

While in Spain a sustained crescendo of mobilisations “spilled” the protests' “energy” (to use an expression of one of my interviewees) into contentious actions until 2013, the Portuguese movement was unable to generate momentum and followed a stop-and-go pattern. I argue that the fundamental difference concerns the ability of the emergent non-institutional actors to sustain their mobilisation continuously over time. If in Spain the 15M movement’s frames and repertoires became dominant and shaped future mobilisations’ actors, practices and discourses, in Portugal institutional actors became the leading force in the protest field by the
end of 2011. Thus, my question is why did the paths differ? More importantly, why were Spanish protest movements better able to generate and sustain mobilisation independently of institutional groups?

I argue that the capacity for movements to sustain mobilisation in the long run is linked to their ability to go beyond the core of their activists, expand and politicise new members, and diffuse new repertoires and discourses. When comparing Spain and Portugal, both endogenous and exogenous factors affected the protest field. Endogenous factors include: (1) the ability to establish connective structures and build networks that ensure permanent mobilisation (Tarrow, 2011), rather than intermittent ones, and (2) the openness of movement culture and an appealing and inclusive frame. Exogenous factors include (1) the strength of institutional actors and their capacity to control “insurgencies”, and also of the non-institutional actors to maintain their autonomy and (2) the overall political and economic context.

Departing from the interviews, the protest event analysis, and survey data, I reconstruct this period’s main features: actors, discourses, and capacity to build a connective network. With this paired comparison, I aim to identify essential factors in mobilisation, how claims evolve during the cycle of contention, and how institutional actors get involved. Therefore, in this chapter, I first identify the main actors and features of the movements and their capacity to sustain protest over time. Building on this, in the second part of the chapter, I expand on how both endogenous (movement culture, frames, and connective structures) and exogenous (political opportunity structure) factors come to structure contention during the first phase of the cycle.

5.1. Networks and Actors: Going Beyond the Core

In 2010, Spain and Portugal, led by their respective Socialist Parties, pursued austerity policies that envisaged wage cuts and welfare retrenchment. As a result, like in many other countries between 2010 and 2011 following the financial crisis of 2008, they experienced part of the global wave of contestation that emerged with the Great Recession. This wide range of protests that started with the “pots and pans revolution” in Iceland (2008) was followed by the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, Indignados in the southern European countries, and the Occupy Wall Street in the USA (2011); it went as far as Turkey and Brazil (2013) and later to France with Nuit Debout (2016). These protests affected the political process by introducing new discourses that, as Przeworski (2016) puts it in the quotation above, attacked rising inequality and citizens’ feelings of ineffectiveness and lack of influence over the political
system and their representatives. In most cases, this discontent resulted in prolonged occupations and re-claiming of the public space. The emergence of new protest actors shaped the political process, in both the short and long term.

In Portugal and Spain, two eventful protests (Della Porta, 2008) mark this moment: *Geração à Rasca*\(^{50}\) (GaR) in Portugal (March 2011) and 15M (May 2011) in Spain. These inflections can be considered the turning points of the cycles of contention that constituted “moments of madness” (Zolberg, 1972). The objective of this section is to introduce in more detail the process, key actors, and events throughout this stage and to show how social movements in Spain were able to go beyond the core in a way that Portuguese movements could not throughout or after 2011. I describe this phase of the cycle of protest and focus on how the groups in Spain and Portugal either were or were not able to expand their protest participants beyond their usual membership.

As shown in Figure 5.1, the number of protests per month in both countries follows a similar trend between 2009 and 2011. However, after 2011, protest in Portugal deflates and follows a stop-and-go pattern, while in Spain it escalates into an unceasing and sustained wave of contention until the end of 2013.

**Figure 5.1 Number of Protest Events per Month in Portugal and Spain (2009-2015)**

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\(^{50}\) Usually translated as “Screwed Generation” or “Desperate Generation”.

96
5.1.1. Turning Points in Portugal

In Portugal, at the beginning of 2011, seemingly out of nowhere, the self-named group GaR used social media (Facebook) to call for a demonstration the following March. The name was a play on the term used by a journalist (Vicente Jorge Silva) to designate the young people protesting against the introduction of tuition fees in the early 1990s who lowered their trousers and showed their bottoms to then Minister of Education, Couto dos Santos. *Geração Rasca* has a negative connotation that means ordinary or without value: lousy. But adding à changes the meaning to a generation with difficulty to making ends meet. With this wordplay, the group linked the struggles of two different generations and cycles of protest.

The GaR preceded most of the movement of the squares in Europe. Together with the “pots and pans” revolution in Iceland, it was the first significant protest event that touched upon the conditions of youth – and overall population - as a consequence of austerity. It was a clear precursor for the mobilisations that followed in most Southern European countries, influencing their repertoires and discourses (Flesher Fominaya, 2017; Baumgarten, 2013).

The mass media in Portugal picked up the GaR’s call, and the exposure led to the initial large protest event outside the trade union circuit (Baumgarten, 2013; Estanque, Costa, & Soeiro, 2013; Soeiro, 2015). The official story propagated by the mass media at the time, was that a group of friends not known to the public and without established networks of activism formed the GaR. Despite not being prominent activists, the four friends had political experience either in their universities or in short periods of political party membership. Inspired by the ongoing mobilisations of the Arab Spring, they joined forces with more established and experienced social movement militants who had been active since the tuition fees protest in the 1990s.

As a media strategy, the actual group was divided in two: one group (the four friends) was visible to the mass media, while another group of activists was responsible for setting up the media strategy and mobilisation of other groups behind the scenes.

“The GaR is organized by eight people, those four appeared publicly […] and then there were other people: mainly in the part of media training to prepare them for the hardest TV interviews, since it was something some of us already did for LGBT movement […] it was a group of eight to ten people, between people that collaborated in the graphic part etc., behind the guys that would appear publicly […]” (Interviewee 12, Portugal)
Although the GaR protest (March 2011) was initially scheduled only for Lisbon, as political tension in the country rose due to austerity measures and conflicts between the main political parties, it attracted broader involvement: groups in the main cities of the country joined the movement and organised local protests. Even though initial estimates counted three hundred thousand people in the streets, one of my interviewees recounted that after giving that number to the press, the organisers realised that it was incorrect; they claim that slightly over five hundred thousand people demonstrated across Portugal, which is about 5% of the overall population of the country. The organisers reached younger and older generations, both affected by the crisis and precarious labour conditions, bridging “social organisations (feminists, LGBT, among others), organised sectors of the anticapitalist left (such as the BE), some right-wing sectors (like the PSD youth party branch JSD), and also, for example, the then leader of the biggest Portuguese Trade Union, Carvalho da Silva, and even some members of the far-right” (Soeiro, 2015, p. 308).

Despite the initial enthusiasm, the attempt to expand the movement beyond this day was not successful. However, as the first major eventful protest of this cycle, it was a turning point, showing that there was mobilisation capacity beyond trade unions.

The next large protest event would only take place in October, the Spanish 15M-organised Global Action Day. Although there were small and scattered protests between the GaR event and October, no large protest performances materialised, aside from the CGTP-sponsored events. The GaR was followed by a period of “platforms and assemblies” (Baumgarten, 2016) that starts with the Acampada do Rossio (May 2011), which I will now describe, and expires with the Global Action Day (October 2011), from which the 15O platform emerges.

The Acampada started with activists gathering in front of the Spanish consulate in Lisbon in solidarity with on-going 15M mobilisations in Spain. After the first assembly, the group decided to move to Rossio. They remained camped in the square for three weeks, and more people joined, especially for the assemblies. The Acampada was the first meeting point of different actors after the GaR (Baumgarten, 2013). However, no direct organisational link existed between the GaR and the Acampada: even if some of the GaR organisers participated in the latter, they did not lead it.

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51 Translated from Portuguese.
Emerging spontaneously, the *Acampada* brought together anarchists, libertarians, autonomists, anti-parties groups, and members of internal tendencies the BE. As Luhuna Carvalho explains, this occupation was not “buil[t] on a previous network of social, countercultural, or political movements. These movements existed, but not on an organised or tangible scale capable of giving an infrastructural substance to the occupations, which then fell into a mere reproduction of the ‘popular assemblies’” (Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122).

Contrary to what was happening in Spain (as will be discussed shortly), the *Acampada* was a small event composed mainly of seasoned activists and party militants, bringing together various factions of institutional and non-institutional actors. Even if many newcomers became engaged with politics for the first time, they largely remained within grassroots subcultures of the movement and participated in establishing a “network of autonomous spaces, practices and movements” (Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122) in Lisbon.

Even if there had been potential for radical anti-systemic mobilisation in Portugal, it never reached the same level as in Spain. At its peak, around 500 people participated in the assemblies of the *Acampada* (estimated by an interviewee). However, the *Acampada* sowed the seeds for the constitution of a platform that would organise the Global Action Day.52

“Rossio is an important moment in all of this, which went unnoticed. If you were not there you would not have any idea, but most of these people met in Rossio. [...] it brought together people with experience with people that had never done anything before. Plus, it coincided with the general elections, with the memorandum and symbolically it had some effects. So, the 15O is born from various people that were present in Rossio, that knowing that there would be an international demonstration started to meet regularly. People from Rubra, MAS and then people with no connections [...] that is the moment that a lot of people start to meet [...] it was very small, but at the Lisbon scale it had some importance.” (Interviewee 14, Portugal)

52 The Global Action Day occurred on October 15th 2011 to mark the 5-month anniversary of the first protest in Spain (15M). Despite being called from Spain, groups in various countries organized events as well.
“The fact that it brought so many groups together, that were close within themselves, potentiated a lot of things. It ended up working as a catalyst for what happens after.”
(Interviewee 13, Portugal)

The Global Action Day in October 2011 constituted the first mobilisation attempted outside the CGTP’s sphere of influence, which protested against the austerity policies of the right-wing coalition government elected in June 2011. Distinct from the GaR, instead of being organised by a small clique of activists, the organising platform was a coalition of more than 40 collectives of social movement groups (Soeiro, 2014). Following the organisational patterns found in other countries, the assemblies followed a deliberative and open model, without formal structure or leadership. The organisers estimated a hundred thousand people protested all over the country.

Despite the wide range of groups that supported the Global Action Day, it is important to note the ongoing tensions between autonomous and libertarian groups with anti-party discourse and more institutional actors. In addition, rival factions within the BE competed for the control of movement groups. Carvalho points out that the participants of the Acampada

“had a complex relationship with the institutional left and these mobilisations against austerity were eventually co-opted by the political parties or by the groups who aspired to become the new political parties. The content of the demonstrations turned from a blatant refusal of austerity without specific demands into something instrumentalized toward reclaiming new elections and hence the victory of a hypothetical ‘unified left.’”
(Fernández-Savater et al., 2017, p. 122)

The newly emerging groups were overtaken by their institutionally linked counterparts, which then allowed the better-established groups to dominate the field. An element that was frequently mention in interviews was the disruptive nature of infighting between BE-associated factions. These divisions would endure until the Ruptura/FER53 came to control the 15O platform after the General Strike of March 2012. As this happens the groups still affiliated with the BE disconnect from the platform leaving a rift between them and the Ruptura/FER faction. The groups that continued to be affiliated with the BE would later embark on a mobilisation

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53 Ruptura/FER was one of the minority tendencies inside Bloco de Esquerda that would abandon the party in late 2011 and constitute MAS (Movimento Alternativa Socialista). They were very active throughout the protest cycle. I will provide more details in Chapter 7.
project that would lead to a new protest platform called *Que se Lixe a Troika* (which I discuss in the next chapter) and lack of united mobilisations throughout the cycle.

**Figure 5. 2 Number of Protests (per half-year) by Type of Actor in Portugal (2009-2015)**

![Graph showing the number of protests per half-year by type of actor in Portugal from 2009 to 2015.](image)

Note: I have combined the protest activities of trade unions and social movements to show that there were various instances of protest.

Furthermore, in contrast to what I will show in the next section in Spain, trade unions were the dominant protest actor throughout 2009 to 2015 as it can be seen in Figure 5. 2.

### 5.1.2. Turning Points in Spain

On Sunday, May 15th of 2011, a week before the regional elections of May 22nd - two months after the GaR in Portugal – and after a growing process of mobilisation by different groups, a joint effort by *Democracia Real, Ya!* and *Juventud Sin Futuro* was the turning point of the protest cycle in Spain (Kerman Calvo, 2013; Díez & Laraña, 2017; Portos, 2016, 2017; Romanos, 2013, 2016). After the demonstration, attended by around twenty thousand people, a small group of protesters decided to camp at one of Madrid’s central squares, the *Puertas del Sol*. The police repressed the initiative, which lead to a call for other protest groups to take the square (*toma la plaza*).

This event triggered a massive wave of mobilisation led by autonomous groups with non-hierarchical and horizontal structures. They occupied squares across Spain for about two months (depending on the city and the degree of repression) and held daily public assemblies to discuss matters such as education, health, feminism, and democracy. The 15M movement led to almost three years of sustained protest, generating multiple spin-offs and giving visibility
to pre-existing groups like the housing movement. Consequently, their symbols and forms of organisation came to mark all mobilisations in Spain that emerged afterwards.

**Figure 5. 3 Number of Protests (per half-year) by type of actor in Spain (2009-2015)**

Note: I have combined the trade unions and social movements to show that there were various instances of protest, particularly in Spain, where this two types of actors collaborated.

After more than two months (from May to July) of occupying squares throughout the whole country, the movement dispersed into neighbourhoods. These local assemblies were networks of groups working together on the ground. As I will show, they were integral to the movement’s ability to sustain mobilisation.

During this period (Summer 2011) the first sectoral struggles also began. After the summer, sectoral campaigns in education that would become known as *Mareas* (tides) emerged, incorporating practices, resources and members of both trade unions and social movements. A feedback effect arguably reinforced these tendencies of simultaneous decentralisation and specialisation.

Another outcome of this initial stage was the organisation of the Global Action Day, which was initially promoted by *Democracia Real, Ya!* (DRY!). This initiative would incorporate more than one million people all over Spain and extend beyond borders, to countries such as Portugal.

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I deal with contention around social rights in more detail in the next chapter.
5.1.3. Going Beyond the Core: a Summary

Some large differences between the turning points in Portugal and Spain were the ability of protest actors to sustain protest by going beyond the core, generating multiple spinoffs, and amplifying the protest capacity of pre-existing groups.

Highlighted both by the literature and my interviewees, one of the most important features of the Spanish movement 15M’s ability to mobilise and politicise a whole new generation of activists (Antentas, 2015; Romanos & Aguilar, 2016). Taibo (2011) suggests that despite the movement’s novelty, 15M combined previously existing social movements (which he calls “critical social movements” and includes, for example, the GJM, Feminists and existing squats in Madrid) and the new groups that came to organise the demonstration (such as the DRY!). This collaboration would persist throughout the two to three months of the encampments in Spain. In the Portuguese case, even though the GaR mobilised people on the day of the demonstration, it was not able to sustain mobilisation afterwards.55 The GaR protest was an example of an intermittent going beyond the core, as it possessed overarching structures of mobilisation but did not carry them forward.

Second, the different strengths and positions of the institutional actors vis-à-vis non-institutional actors during this period is also crucial. In Portugal, this stage of fitful mobilisation ends with the general strike in November 2011, organised by the main trade union federations, the CGTP and the UGT, with explicit support of social movements. By then, it was clear that trade unions were the dominant protest actors in Portugal. Furthermore, it is possible to observe other actors linked to the BE disputing the space of social movements with non-institutional groups. Despite the emergence of new forms of protest throughout 2011, the social movement enters 2012 in a state of disarray, broken and divided. These later protests never created a momentum that allowed new sectors to form a stronger countermovement against austerity and liberalisation. The movement barely expanded beyond activists and institutional actors.

In contrast with the Portuguese case, trade unions and political parties in Spain were barely present or visible in the 15M-related mobilisations: indeed, they were unpopular and viewed (by the protestors) as illegitimate. The delegitimised parties and trade unions would only gain traction in later stages of the cycle of protest.

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55 This will prove consistent throughout the whole cycle of protest, as I demonstrate in the following chapters.
**Figure 5.4** Taken part in lawful public protest in the last 12 months (%) (2002-2016)

Source: European Social Survey

**Figure 5.5** Feel close to a party and participated in lawful protest (%) in Portugal (2002-2016)

Source: European Social Survey
If looking to data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2016 it is possible to see an increase of number of participants in protest events in the period between 2008 and 2012 in Portugal and Spain confirming the trends identified throughout this section. Lawful protests almost doubled in both cases: in Spain participation in protest goes beyond 25% of the population, while in Portugal reaches 8%.

Beyond protest participation, it is important to understand how institutions channel dissatisfaction. When combining the variables “feel closer to a political party” and “taking part in a lawful protest”, stark differences emerge between countries in terms of the role that protest assumes. In Portugal, both categories regarding protest never surpass 10 per cent, while in Spain they do in almost every survey round. In Portugal the category with the biggest increase since 2002 was those who neither participated in protest nor felt closer to any party. In Spain, protest categories grew the most. From 2014 onwards, parties recover in both countries, possibly thanks to the renewal of pre-existing parties and creation of new parties such as Podemos.

If in Portugal the crisis led to political disaffection and apathy among most of the population, in Spain protest became a major source of political engagement. However, the contrast lies not only between strategies of “exit” and “voice”, but also between institutional and non-institutional solutions: in 2014, Portuguese political parties recover supporters, but in Spain political parties combine with protest movements due to the creation of Podemos. In the following sections I unpack the main reasons for these differences.
5.2. Between Democracy, Precarity and Austerity: Movement Culture and Frames

As Tarrow remarks (1989; 2011), turning points of contentious cycles exhibit both previously existing trends and open, broad discourse that mobilises beyond the core constituency. With the movements of the crisis (Della Porta, 2015), an overarching and transversal critical discourse directed both at governments and economic players emerged, carrying signifiers that resonated with distinct segments of the population. The movements against austerity demanded a democratisation of politics and full inclusion of citizens, as opposed to what they viewed as an oligarchic takeover of political institutions (Gerbaudo, 2017). Their purpose was to make democracy “more democratic” through full participatory inclusion of citizens and opposing established elites.

At the turning point of the cycle of protest this democratic desire was expressed by what Gerbaudo (2017, abstract) calls “citizenism”:

“Citizenship has acted both as a source of popular identity interpolating a diverse set of demographics, and as a central demand, organising calls for greater popular participation in decision-making, freedom of expression and against corruption. Anti-austerity movements put forward an anti-oligarchic view of citizenship.”

This polarising discourse with populist traits can be seen both as a demand for inclusion and as a source of collective identity that, due to its transversal appeal, unites multiple groups contesting austerity.

Claims to and frames of representation play an essential role at the opening of cycles of contention due to their ability to mobilise broader sectors. They work not only as diagnoses of injustice (Benford & Snow, 2000), but also fulfill a strategic role (Tarrow, 1989, 2013; Zamponi, 2012). However, limiting the analysis to broad claims on participation and representation would reproduce a romantic narrative transmitted by the movements to researchers: spontaneity and novelty were used to broaden the scope of participants and present the mobilisations as distinct from previous ones (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a). To a certain extent I argue that “citizenism” was a broad and open discourse whose modularity ensured its durability. As Tarrow argues:

“Once invented, words for contentious politics are polysemic, and that makes their meaning both ambiguous and available: their ambiguity is part of what makes them modular and therefore available for repetition […] Ambiguity helps create coalitions, enabling groups ‘with very different agendas to come together in a common stance of
indignation’ [...] Ambiguity also condenses meanings. Contentious words are what Edward Sapir called ‘condensation symbols’, which grow in complexity with increased dissociation from their original usage.” (Tarrow, 2013, p. 15)

The citizenship discourses at the turning points were far from spontaneous reactions to an overall crisis of legitimacy, but constituted, to a certain extent, a materialisation of power relations between actors on the ground. Therefore, actors in different power relationships articulated diverse discourses.

Besides the modularity and resonance of frames and discourses, I also consider how movements translated them into practices, which led to broader and more inclusive recruitment. Besides frames, I also investigate organisational forms and repertoires as being part and an extension of the wider symbolic domain of social movements.

I argue that at the turning points some degree of innovation and openness introduced new repertoires and claims based on democracy and political rights, which become central elements of mobilisation. As I show in the following chapter, as austerity endured, new actors emerged, and labour and social rights progressively became the central issues of protest in Portugal and Spain. By emphasising the processual and relational origins of claims, it is possible to observe how different articulations of citizenship rights emerge throughout the cycle of protest and also translate into practices.

In Spain, 15M’s discourse and organisation was based on two main ideas that shaped their action. The first was a democratic principle by which their objective was to make common people engage in politics and to discuss and make decisions collectively by consensus. Secondly, the movement was anti-personalist and, as a result, against any type of representation. The movement's practices positioned it as an alternative to the representative democracy that allowed economic and political powers to inflict injustices on citizens.

Instead of a one-off event without broader repercussions, this movement became a sustained protest wave that lasted for almost three years. It was not a unified or centralised movement, but rather one that evolved with changing actors and contexts. In fact, 15M became an umbrella term for a variety of different groups that shared a common approach to popular and deliberative democracy (Romanos, 2016): most followed a horizontal, deliberative model. The movement appeared in three forms throughout the peak mobilisations between 2011 and 2014: unitary (15M), sectoral (Mareas, which stood in defence of public services; I develop this group in the next chapter) and local groups (neighbourhood assemblies, which I discuss in
more detail in the following section). These components were not mutually exclusive, but overlapped and cooperated depending on the type and period of mobilisation.

15M featured a compound repertoire of action that combined permanent occupation and claims to the public space, open and deliberative assemblies, and civil disobedience. Its openness, the non-defined contents of the debate and the disappearance of acronyms or flags representing organisations marked the movement. Formed outside the institutional sphere, it produced a language that was inclusive and tolerant by avoiding attachment to symbols of identity such as flags and closed political ideologies, which resulted in an attempt to simplify communication, that was replicated online (Anduiza, Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014; Castells, 2012; Morell, 2012).

“I believe that they [participants in DRY!] were people without previous political experiences, maybe some, but the important thing was not so much where people came from, but rather the space they create [...] what they propose and create is a UFO [...] it opens a new space, where all of us feel called to, where all of us feel included, it is a space without flags, without identities, without ideologies, where the language is very direct and it relates with the common people and creates a certain imaginary of the problems [...]” (Interviewee 18, Spain)

Finally, the groups on the ground ascribed to a more autonomist and loose definition of the movement. Amador Fernández-Savater defines the 15M as a “climate” that spreads, changing the understanding of politics and society beyond the squares, and unites groups with the common objective of transforming society. 56 Likewise, many of my interviewees underscored how touching the first moments of the public assemblies at Puerta del Sol were.

“I went with my partner and with some friends and we arrived to Sol and we saw 40 thousand people, i.e., the square was completely occupied, it was an awesome feeling, especially when they say this is an assembly [...] and people sat down to do the assembly. It really started to change my mind” (Interviewee 3, Spain)

“It was very exciting [...] we were all at the Puertas del Sol and suddenly there was someone who says 'comrades, this is a citizens' assembly' and the word citizen assembly gave me goosebumps” (Interviewee 15, Spain)

56 See Amador Fernández Savater - “Como se organiza un clima?” http://blogs.publico.es/fueradelugar/1438/%C2%BFcomo-se-organiza-un-clima
When it comes to this period in Portugal, protests featured some horizontal, directly democratic practices and demands for deeper democratisation, but they were more limited and in general less hostile toward institutional politics. At GaR there was a discursive element of self-organisation and open demonstration. The organisers framed this initial protest as “peaceful, secular and non-partisan” (which they contrast with apolitical) and encouraged people to bring their demands.

Inspired by transnational repertoires and ideas, GaR’s frame appealed to a project of political transformation whose objective was, in the organisers’ own words and inspired by the Portuguese writer José Saramago, to “turn every citizen into a politician” (interview). The 1974-5 revolutionary moment in Portugal was drawn as an inspiration to the GaR, since the Portuguese Revolutionary Period (PREC) constituted, in their view, a moment of true democracy with grassroots mobilisations from urban movement to students, but also occupation of lands and factories. They felt that the end of the revolutionary period coincided with the entrenchment of shallow democracy in institutions.

“There was a premise, that what happens after the 25th of April, in terms of participation, the whole period of the PREC, with a huge participation of people and civil society and that it is usually considered an instability, was in reality a period of true democracy. Our analysis is that was the period of biggest democracy in Portugal and that it was from the moment that democracy closed itself in parties and institutions that democracy lost its intensity [...] We thought it was our responsibility to be part of the solution. It was a bigger question, for us democracy exists when people living in a society can enjoy their freedoms and rights [...] like Saramago would say ‘to turn every citizen into a politician’ [...] it is not only about voting every four years [...] people can decide how to live in the different dimensions of their life.” (Raquel Freire57, Portugal)

In contrast with Spain, the focus of the GaR protest was on labour precarity, even incorporating it into their name as a generational issue and expression of discontent. However, even if the GaR intended to reinforce participatory democracy, its manifesto largely focused on labour and social rights. Soeiro’s (2015) data reinforces this observation: GaR organisers asked participants to bring their written demands to deliver to Parliament, and almost 50% of those demands were related to labour precarity, while only 23% of them related to the political system or transparency.

57 This interviewee asked to be identified.
The influence of transnational discourses of “citizenism” and representation were more explicit at the Acampada do Rossio and could still be observed at the Global Justice Day in October. However, as I argue in subsequent chapters, they were not dominant afterwards. At the Acampada, the repertoire of assemblies, occupation of spaces, and direct democracy was central and had the clear intent of going beyond the representative institutions. One of the main mottos of the Acampada was “democracy is questioned when austerity is the law” (interview). Daily life at the camp also revolved around these principles of self-organisation. Nonetheless, the group remained small and attracted very few new members. Despite the new repertoires and discourses, the movement never fully reached beyond already dedicated activists.

“There was a bit of an idea of going beyond the political agents in the parliament and that all of the rest is civil society, almost as a separation of activities. I think that was the big message from the Acampada: people in a square also do politics […] the attempt of self-organising to organise a demonstration, to create a communal kitchen, […] the idea that politics belongs to institutional politics, that belongs to certain agents suitable for the position […] Still, we felt it was a truly marginal thing […] being ridiculed in the press […] what happens in Spain is totally different from what happens here. We are portrayed as freaks camping in a square, but if you were to go there, you would understand it was something somehow different […] it was amazing for our size.” (Interviewee 13, Portugal)

Later, the Global Action Day in October 2011 – organised by the groups present at the Acampada – made a mix of economic and political claims. Fernandes (2016) notes that 15O protest was framed around claims for democracy based on the memory of the PREC. João Labrincha, one of the GaR organisers points out that “there were moments during the PREC […] where people could participate in popular assemblies but since then it had not happened again” (Público, 16 October 2011) (T. Fernandes, 2016, p. 189). GaR-inspired protesters reference the revolution more infrequently after the Global Action Day, and when they do, the references generally frame 1974-1975 as the moment of establishing labour, education, and health rights. After this stage these opposition groups started to adapt their discourses to logics closer to the classic left (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 467).

As a result, political claims for representation never became dominant. A discourse of opposition to institutional actors was never massive in Portugal as it was in Spain. Even though there were demands for open democracy, these came to be progressively subordinated to economic ones (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019).
In Portugal – as opposed to Spain – few groups questioned the legitimacy of the regime. Two interpretations of the revolution subsisted among contentious actors. The “unfinished revolution” is a future-oriented frame, where the past is not presented as the genesis of the regime, but rather a future not yet achieved, i.e., the promise of the revolution remains to be fulfilled. This interpretation was not dominant, exhibited only in a few documents and interviews by small autonomist groups. The “defence of the revolution” discourse, on the other hand, is a present-oriented and defensive articulation of the past. It sees the revolution as a foundational moment for a range of social rights, or what is normally referred as the “conquests of the revolution” (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). Because this dominant frame was intrinsically linked to institutional actors, the Portuguese movement never left the sphere of social rights and defence of the regime borne out of the transition to democracy (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019).

As such, it is important to notice that the continuous increase in demands regarding representation and participation in Portugal seen in Figure 5.7, when they reached their peak in the first half 2013, rather than being for the opening of democracy it was for the resignation of the government. Furthermore, these political claims were made not only by social movements but also by trade unions. Hence, protest groups would come to focus on the dispossession of social rights that the austerity regime precluded rather than an overt critique

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58 I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
of the political foundations, as in Spain. In the latter country, the frame was directed against “politics as usual”, criticising representative democracy and corruption:

“[…] activists have demanded a number of basic citizenship rights that political elites had neglected while prioritizing the interests of powerful economic actors. Activists have also clarified that the crisis was not only of the economy but also of an institutional system that facilitates corruption and impedes the emergence and development of an alternative to neoliberal policies” (Romanos, 2016, p. 131).

In Portugal, this type of frame never became dominant because the central topics were precarity and austerity, not institutions (Soeiro, 2014; Fernandes, 2016).

These differences have broader implications for movement frames and cultures. Gerbaudo (2017) argues that “citizenism” contrasts with class-based sources of mobilisation, as it seems to be more attractive in countries where the discourse of class has lost traction and is not a constitutive part of mobilising cleavages. For example, Cruz (2015) argues that over the last 40 years the “empire of class” and the mobilising capacity of trade unions in Spain declined. Even if in Portugal trade unionisation, linked with extensive precarisation of the workforce, has decreased, social and labour rights continue to constitute the central axis under which the regime was built and consequently dominate the field. Furthermore, in Spain, even groups like Juventud sin Futuro that have an explicit critique of youth precarity frame it within a political discourse and a critique of the regime.

In Spain, the discourse of dissatisfaction with the political status quo went beyond core activists. After three years, 70% of the population still agreed with the demands of the movement (Sampedro & Lobera, 2014). Even if Portuguese actors had begun to utilise this type of anti-regime discourse, they were never able to make it resonate as in Spain and remained entrenched in labour issues.

5.3. Networks of Resistance: Building a Connective Structure
Scale shift, or the capacity of an initial mobilisation to generate spinoffs, is central to the process of expanding the base of protest (Tarrow 2011). As discussed in the previous sections, if in Portugal protest organisation was top-down and decentralisation spinoffs were weak, one of the main characteristics of the Spanish movement was the shift toward locally based assemblies in neighbourhoods. In other words, in Spain the mobilisation process entailed a form of ‘grassrootisation’ or downward scale shift (Portos, 2017) that was absent in Portugal.
After the initial moments of protest, spin-off movements tend to develop (McAdam, 2013), both reinforcing and reconstituting ties that transform protest. Local networks of resistance are crucial to mobilisation capacity, even if they are not directly visible during the protests. These generate connective structures are central to contentious processes as they sustain mobilisations (Tarrow, 2011).

In Portugal and Spain, this downward scale-shift implies not only a particular form of organization based on local groups, but could also be considered a repertoire of direct action. In one way or another, in the southern European countries hit by the crisis, local forms of direct social action emerged. In the case of Italy, Bosi and Zamponi define this as “forms of action that focus upon directly transforming some specific aspects of society by means of the very action itself, instead of claiming something from the state or other power holders” (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015, p. abstract). These comprise a variety of repertoires of action that rely on alternative forms of resilience involving political consumerism, occupations, etc. They argue that rather than novel, these repertoires are embedded in the contentious histories of each country.

These connective structures differ in Portugal and Spain: anti-austerity protests in Portugal centralised their activities and focused on large protest events led by institutional actors or their partners. In Spain, decentralisation fueled mobilisation capacity by drawing on energy from decentralised groups. These spaces were already established in Spain, as noted in the previous chapter, and Madrid in particular, plays an essential role in enabling groups to position themselves in the urban landscape. These groups created meeting spaces for activists, laypeople, and collectives, which were the building blocks of future mobilisations. The lack of this culture and similar spaces in Portugal in the years preceding the crisis affected the capacity groups to mobilise to protest austerity policies.

In Spain, after more than two months occupying squares and public space throughout the whole country, the movement dispersed into neighbourhoods and formed local assemblies. The decision to decentralise did not come quickly. For several weeks, the movements in the squares debated whether or not to disperse as the objectives of that mobilisation seemed to not be achievable anymore in the squares. Several attempts to leave the square (levantar campo) stalled, as more radical or persistent groups would remain camped. Eventually, however, unceasing police violence and institutional pressure led to the abandonment of the camp. Participants both felt that disbanding brought the risk that the

59 As my fieldwork was centered in Madrid, the description corresponds to this city.
movement might totally disappear, but also that it might be an opportunity to reinvigorate the movement from below.

“A lot of people thought that we should leave because the environment was degrading and that the key was to move to the neighbourhoods.” (Interviewee 3, Spain)

“The decision is taken because there was a risk of the movement to disappear; the assemblies start to lose quality and it provokes a reaction that I thought it was smart. Let’s move into the neighbourhoods, let’s try to decentralize our struggles and develop them in smaller areas.” (Interviewee 1, Spain)

By dispersing and recuperating a long and established tradition of local grassroots activism and structures, the process of decentralisation came to constitute a network of local groups acting on the ground and in close contact with communities. This move was of importance considering the intense and daily nature of contentious action between 2011 and 2013. The flexible and robust network of support allowed the activists to communicate quickly and easily. As the network extended beyond the neighbourhood, inter-network collaboration helped to sustain broader mobilisations.

These networks’ structures had a capillary and rhizomatic features. First, inter-neighbourhood assemblies helped to coordinate between neighbourhoods. Additionally, many of the activities of the assemblies necessitated partnerships with unitary and sectoral groups. Most neighbourhoods in Madrid developed specialised working groups on topics related to public services, such as health and education (as I show in the next chapters, these constitute critical contentious issues). For example, as the government attempted to privatise these services, these groups collaborated with workers from local public services. As such, these local assemblies expanded while supporting the activities of more extensive networks and movement issues.

“It was a very intense year, not only because we had the neighbourhood assemblies, but also because we participated in inter-neighbourhood assemblies, of coordination between all the groups. But we also coordinated ourselves with other movements.” (Interviewee 3, Spain)

“The 15M (...) ingrained all types of struggles since it happened. The 15M of Carabanchel was one of the most potent ones, it was big and we divided ourselves in various working groups, working with pre-existing associations in the neighbourhood
[...] we work a lot on housing and still to this day the housing assembly has more than a hundred people [...] we established a public services commission that worked on two axes: education and health. In health it coincided with the intent to privatise six hospitals and healthcare centres, The workers opened their assemblies to the 15M and to the citizenship, and we could have a continuous mobilisation until last year [2014]." (Interviewee 4, Spain)

In Portugal, there were some efforts to perpetuate the on-going mobilisations either by shifting mobilisations to the local level or by constituting unitary platforms. After the initial demonstration, the group around GaR tried to create a platform called M12M to unite the assemblies that emerged across the country in an attempt to decentralise the movement. However, they never gained traction.

Later, inspired by the Spanish example, the Acampada do Rossio attempted to continue its activities through decentralisation. Different activist groups also tried to decentralise their activities by forming popular local assemblies (Baumgarten, 2017a; Carvalho, 2014b).

“I think there was never the capacity to take it beyond the square, I think it could have had some effects and made the difference to take this into the neighbourhoods [...] there were several attempts, but it never became potent [...] to create an alternative to the trade unions, the political parties, the institutional powers, that failed completely.” (Interviewee 13, Portugal)

As in Spain, the main idea was to stimulate community activism around neighbourhoods, but it hardly reached beyond the activist groups. A few assemblies emerged around Lisbon, e.g. in Barreiro, Algés, Graça and Benfica, and they tried to embody a spirit of resilience based on self-organisation, urban gardening (production and consumption), and solidarity-based exchanges (Baumgarten, 2017a; Carvalho, 2014b).

Several other projects expressed the same concerns: groups such as RDA69 emerged around a particular area of Lisbon (Av. Almirante Reis in 2010) and were much closer to the squats and libertarian groups in Spain. These were deeply critical of a protest cycle dominated by institutional actors.⁶⁰ Again, they were never able to reach a broader audience.

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⁶⁰ These groups were always present during the cycle, even if they were not as visible or dominant, and they organised a demonstration at the end of the cycle in 2014 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of April 25th.
Even if small in scale, these autonomous groups became the basis for the emergence of an alternative circuit to the ones dominated by institutional actors. The groups that emerged out of the Acampada met again in Coimbra (in July 2011) and decided to join the pan-European Global Action Day protest against austerity (in October 2011). Though in many cases invisible throughout the cycle of protest, they were present at occupations in Porto (Fontinha School in April 2012) and Lisbon (São Lázaro in May 2012) and also in the celebration of Global Spring in 2012 (Baumgarten, 2013, 2016). However, they never reached the same scale as in Spain and could not sustain broader protests from the local neighbourhood level.

This is fundamental to understanding the different paths that each country took. Spain and Portugal had different traditions at the local level: in Spain there were more long-standing local networks (as described in the previous chapter) that supported decentralisation, but in Portugal these only became visible and constituted themselves during the cycle of protest, so it was harder for them to take root. Furthermore, the dominant actors also had different interests, and in Portugal, social movement groups were not able to generate enough resources to enlarge their bases:

“Groups remain small, and activists report a lack of support, particularly in smaller cities. There is a constant debate within and among groups about how to attract new participants and engage them in politics. New activists also cannot be recruited easily through personal networks” (Baumgarten, 2013, p. 460).

Different local networks of resistance were important. If in Spain the long-standing local structures were invigorated by 15M’s decentralisation that created a basis for sustained protest, in Portugal it constituted a small network of secondary groups that never became relevant.

Finally, in the case of Spain, interviewees established a connection between the process of decentralisation and the emergence and sustenance of Mareas; I develop this progression further in the following chapters.

### 5.4. External Intervention and Institutional Reactions

So far, I have dealt strictly with endogenous dimensions of protest to explain the differences at this turning point. However, these protests did not happen in a void, and the political opportunity structure is as crucial as internal dynamics of contention to explaining the presence or absence of mobilisation beyond the core.
As previously discussed, Spain and Portugal share similarities regarding the political and economic context in which anti-austerity protest arose. In 2010, these countries, led by their respective Socialist Parties, pursued austerity policies that envisaged wage cuts and welfare retrenchment; and the policies intensified under the right-wing governments elected to both in 2011. Initially trade unions led the opposition, calling for general strikes. It was only in 2011 that new actors from outside the institutional arena emerged, leading to the intensification of the wave of protest.

Although Portugal’s government under the PS initiated austerity measures to generate market trust, political tensions rose with mounting pressure for a bailout. This was a short (March to June) but eventful period of time, marked by the GaR protest, the resignation of the Socialist prime minister José Sócrates over parliament’s refusal of the fiscal austerity plan and, finally, the out-going government’s request for financial assistance from the EU-ECB-IMF Troika, with the support of the right-wing opposition parties, the PSD and CDS-PP. Between April and June, not only did elections take place, but negotiations with the lenders were ongoing. At the end of May, the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika that would commit the country to extensive budget cuts, whatever the outcome of the elections.

Despite the rising discontent, this situation led to a state of political paralysis where the discussions with the Troika and the upcoming elections were at the centre of political debate. The institutional actors that were involved in protests (the PCP and the BE) focused on the elections, and the legitimacy of austerity was barely disputed in media. Apart from the BE, the PCP, and the CGTP, there was barely any discourse countering austerity, which made articulating grievances using that rhetoric more difficult. As was the case in Italy with Berlusconi (Zamponi, 2012), Prime Minister Sócrates became such a divisive figure and the target of so many grievances that his resignation partially made mobilisation seem redundant. In June, the election of a technocratic flavoured right-wing government (exemplified by Vítor Gaspar, Minister of Finance, who had credentials in international institutions) was well received, and contestation would only rise again in mid-2012. The Troika’s bailout was legitimised as the only alternative to crisis.

The Spanish situation was slightly different. During the regional elections of May 2011, all over Spain, the protesters challenged the prohibition to remain in the squares during the ‘reflection day’ that preceded elections in an act of civil disobedience. Even if there was a growing crisis in Spain, the pressure to assume an external bailout was not as strong as in Portugal, translating into a very different conjuncture for non-institutional movements. In April
José Luis Zapatero, at the time President of the Spanish Government, decided not to stand as a candidate in the upcoming November general elections. Unlike in Portugal, there was no key personality to rally against, and together with more politically directed criticisms from the movements, there was a broader focus on the theme of an overall corrupt party and political system. Furthermore, due to the lack of external intervention, blame could not fall on international institutions.

The more national character of the Spanish process was reinforced by the proposal submitted by the PSOE (and supported by PP) in September to inscribe a maximum budget deficit in the constitution (also known as the “golden rule”). The constitutional reform reinforced the 15M’s frame of critiquing of transition to democracy. The blame lay not so much with a particular Prime Minister, but rather with the system as a whole; the external imposition was softer and could be interpreted as a political choice made by the elites, which intensified the impression of an oligarchic takeover. Nonetheless, PP won November’s general elections with its largest majority ever.

Additionally, relations of power and autonomy between actors differ in Spain and Portugal. In Spain, institutional actors such as IU, CCOO and UGT were never able to join forces with 15M because of the tradition of non-communication or distance between institutional and non-institutional actors (see Chapter 4 and Fominaya, 2015). The Spanish movements aspired to enlarge democracy beyond institutions and institutional actors. Furthermore, Fishman (2012b) argues that Spanish institutions are not as likely to be influenced by protest, leading to more frequent and disruptive ones.

By contrast, the main parties and trade unions on the Portuguese left engaged directly with and channelled protests. This resulted from the inability to constitute and activate networks of support as in Spain, but also from the conflictual field, where the institutional actors kept an attitude of despising (PCP) or divide and rule (BE) whereby they tried to control all the initiatives that emerged. Also, in Portugal, there were parties in parliament that could channel the population’s grievances. The PCP and BE channelled many of the grievances relating to the loss of labour and social rights to parliament. 61

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61 Furthermore, one final argument in terms of context has to do with the type of debt held by the country. Portugal’s debt was mainly public, while in Spain it was mainly a private one and it originated a housing bubble. Hence, in Portugal the cuts were directed towards the public sector resulting mainly in trade unions protest, while in Spain the housing bubble affected people’s livelihood more directly leading to local forms of grassroots movements that interacted with other protests and, therefore, exponentiated protest. This constitutes one important avenue of research for the future.
5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the emergence of non-institutional actors contesting austerity redefined the field of protest, constituting a turning point in the cycle that helps to understand Portugal and Spain’s divergent paths. What lies at the heart of this phase is the capacity (or lack thereof) of protest movements to go ‘beyond the core’ of their supporters and expand their bases and actions. Spain’s movement was more successful at building infrastructures of mobilisation than Portugal’s, due to different practices, culture, discourses and networks. A stuttering start in Portugal meant that the movement never developed a network that could withstand internal conflicts and pressure from institutional actors. In Spain, previously existing structures that developed outside the control of institutional actors contributed to creating a broad and inclusive movement.

There were also fundamental differences between these two countries’ political contexts. In Portugal, the turning point occurred in the shadow of external intervention and a government resignation combined with general elections, which seemed to diffuse grievances. Protest focused mainly on labour precarity and economic grievances, and claims about the legitimacy of the regime were subsumed under these themes. Largely directed by institutional actors, the main objective of the protest groups was the restoration of the “Spirit of April”, or the revival of the post-1974 social contract. Additionally, the movement was not able to decentralise or build sustained grassroots mobilisation. A different scenario emerged in Spain, where groups with open discourse and grassroots mobilisation constituted themselves as alternatives to institutional actors and challenged the status quo. Additionally, the lack of external intervention focused the blame on the domestic political class as a whole.

The protests in Spain generated a great capacity for amplification. As many of my interviewees remarked, the 15M movement leveraged a variety of pre-existing groups. In the first year of mobilisation, everything seemed possible. In Portugal, rather than decentralising tendencies, one-off events centralised mobilisations. In fact, despite some unifying events, the strength of institutional actors combined with the weakness of non-institutional players disrupted the emergence of new demands and structures of mobilisation.

All in all, this first phase of the protest cycle shaped the rest of the process. As the cycle developed in Portugal and Spain, new actor and claims came to challenge austerity. I will look into that in the following chapter.
6. From Representation to Redistribution: between Social Movements and Trade Unions

The most forceful argument of this study will be that people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change, and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society; when they bring people together around inherited cultural symbols; and when they can build on – or construct – dense social networks and connective structures, these episodes of contention result in sustained interactions with opponents in social movements

Tarrow, 2011, p. 29

In this chapter, I describe how the cycle of protest peaked in Portugal and Spain in 2012 until the demobilisation process that started in late 2013. With relation to the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, I consider the ways in which the interaction between multiple actors, interests, and discursive repertoires entangled during the cycle of contention. While working within a contentious politics framework, I discuss how the process operated (i.e. I provide a deconstruction of the interactions between the different actors during the process).

Following the turning points of mobilisation discussed in the previous chapter, the phase described in this chapter helps present a better understanding of how the cycle of contention unfolded in Portugal and Spain. The dynamics identified in previous chapters did not disappear: the ability to go beyond the core continue to be critical explanatory factor throughout this chapter as well. However, as I intend to show in this chapter, the anti-austerity mobilisations went beyond what was described previously. After the initial turning point, new dynamics of protest developed. Instead of being broad in scope, the claims by different contentious actors during this stage targeted specific policies linked with social rights such as education, healthcare, housing, and also labour. Furthermore, there was a resurgence of trade unionists, who played a key role in the movement.62 As a result of these dynamics, I argue that as austerity endured after 2011, protest changed. Discursive repertoires transformed in both countries: the centrality of political claims diminished in relation to the previous chapter decreased and, as a result, labour and social rights became the prominent issues, and new organisations came to the fore. The changes reflect the internal plurality of the contentious field: alongside social movements, trade unions and political parties were also essential actors.

62 Which does not mean that they had been absent before, but just that they had not been the main protagonists.
In Portugal, due to the movements’ incapacity to ensure a stable mobilisation structure, movements were only able to mobilize successfully upon the development of particular political opportunity structures (e.g. the attempt to implement the payroll tax by the right-wing government in September 2012 that leads to the resurgence of social movement). During this time, there was a dominant, strategic and convenient alliance between the QSLT and the CGTP. Nevertheless, the message of actors involved in this alliance changed after the Constitutional Court ruled against some of the austerity measures passed by the Portuguese government months before. After this judicial decision, the alliance focused on social rights and on the “defence of the revolution” (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019) and more radical approaches of “going beyond the revolution” were contained and never gained ground. As such, trade unions and the QSLT were able to control the emergence of an alternative discourse that was critical of the regime and asked for the fulfillment of more radical messages of revolution.

In Spain, between the end of 2011 and the end of 2013, the contention dynamics were more complex than in Portugal. The complexity was due to the heterogeneity of the actors, the size of the field, and the relative autonomy of the social movements’ vis-a-vis institutional actors. Rather than displaying a dominant form of mobilisation, various overlapping dynamics co-existed: after the decentralisation into the neighbourhoods described in the previous chapter, four protest dynamics developed. First, a defence of social rights, which to pertained to various issues, such as education and healthcare. The defence triggered joint mobilisations between social movements and trade unions on an equal footing. Secondly, movements for housing were equally important and helped to amplify local grievances at a national scale. Thirdly, there was a continuous stream of labour protests at the factory level. However, these movements lacked coordination and were not directly connected to major trade unions. Lastly, apart from these small and continuous mobilisations, there was the organisation of large events of protest where all these platforms converged to protest against austerity measures.

In this chapter, I will first set the context of enduring austerity after the election of right-wing governments in 2011 in Spain and Portugal. Since the cycle of contention took different paths in each country, I will approach these countries contentious dynamics separately. For example, whereas in Spain, the persistence of protest resulted from what I call “overlapping dynamics”, in Portugal the protest followed an almost linear sequence. As in the previous chapter, I rely on a methodology that includes protest event analysis, interviews, and observation of large events of protest to identify the main trends in the protests.
6.1. A New Political Context? Right-Wing Turn and Enduring Austerity

In 2011 general elections led to a right-wing turn in both Spain and Portugal, which resulted in the biggest defeat of centre-left parties in government since the 1970s. While in Portugal, the PSD and the CDS-PP formed a post-electoral coalition, in Spain the PP secured its most significant majority ever. The new governments pushed austerity programmes further and deepened the so-called structural reforms with budgetary cuts and privatisations. Despite the emergent wave of protest, no institutional alternatives developed at this point.\(^{63}\)

The Portuguese right-wing coalition, under the Memorandum of Understanding and surveillance of the Troika, committed itself to “go beyond the Troika” as a way not only to counter the spillover effects of the Greek crisis, but also to ensure market trust (Moury & Standring, 2017; Ramalho, Thassi, & Kanellopoulos, 2017). As a result, the newly elected government, announced new austerity measures. Between their election in June 2011 and January 2012 a series of decrees were issued that mainly involved public sector wage cuts. In December 2011, following the Spanish example, the prime minister of Portugal, Pedro Passos Coelho, suggested the addition of the deficit ‘golden rule’ into the Constitution, which never happened. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2012, the partners at social concertation (i.e., the joint platform between trade unions,\(^{64}\) employer confederations and government) reached an agreement to proceed with a labour reform that would leave workers with fewer unemployment benefits, holidays, and less collective bargaining power.

In the summer of 2012, after a brief period of contestation in 2011, the anti-austerity protest reached a new peak due to an opening up of opportunity structures. First, the Constitutional Court overruled some of the austerity measures. Second, in April 2013, the Socialist Party broke their relative neutral position towards austerity and would later propose a vote of no confidence to the government. Finally, in September 2012, the prime minister proposed a new measure (payroll tax) that led to open contestation from social movements to the junior coalition partner.\(^{65}\)

In Spain, following the austerity agenda of the PSOE, upon election, the PP government immediately proceeded with a labour reform that brought trade unions to the forefront of

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\(^{63}\) As I will show in the next chapter, political alternatives at the institutional level would only emerge in the electoral period of 2014-15.

\(^{64}\) Only UGT, employers’ confederations, and the Government signed the deal. CGTP did not.

\(^{65}\) See section 6.4. for a detailed discussion.
protests. Similarly, in the summer of 2012, not only did the PP government nationalise Bankia, but the ECB, in a demand for more austerity, bailed out the banking system.

Regional governments also applied austerity. Given their regional autonomy in policy making, there were attempts of privatisation of public services. For instance, as will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, in the summer of 2011 and the fall of 2012, the Community of Madrid advanced with reforms in education and healthcare services. These reforms were met with resistance from a variety of actors. The reforms served as a blueprint not only for other regional governments but also for the central government. Following the reforms, a new education law was implemented in 2013. If movements for education were starting to fade away at that point in time, the new measures rekindled the movements. As such, reactions that started at regional level quickly spilled over to other regions and to the national level. Furthermore, multiple corruption scandals developed during the crisis that affected the PP government and created a sense of indignation among the population.

As a result, in both Spain and Portugal, as austerity measures endured throughout the cycle of protest new forms of protest were prompted. Despite keeping many of the organisational features identified before, these new forms of protest were conceived to fight back specific measures such as the Mareas or the QSLT. In the following sections, I address the emergence of these mobilisations.

In this section, I will show the difference between actors and claim-making between 2009 and 2015 in Portugal and Spain. I will focus mainly on the years of most intense mobilisation between 2012 and 2013. Doing so will allow me to uncover the main trends of protest that I will unpack in the following sections in a more detailed way. I will show that there was an overall trend for the persistence of economic claims, followed by social ones, with trade unions continuing to be relevant. This discussion will serve as an introduction to the following sections, where I will explore in more detail the central dynamics of protest. The objective is show both the differences between the countries and the diversity of the anti-austerity field.

As already suggested in the previous chapter, the structures of mobilisation and actors during the anti-austerity cycle of protest were different in two countries. In Portugal, throughout 2009 to 2015, trade unions were dominant, particularly after 2011, while social

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66 Bankia was a private bank that was founded in 2010 as a result of the merger of various regional savings banks. In 2012 the bank was on the brink of bankruptcy and was partially nationalised.
movement and civil society actors were less expressive (see Figure 6. 2). This contrasts with the Spanish case, where social movements organised a larger number of protest events. Nevertheless, trade unions in Spain had a significant role as well, being present at more than 50% of events coded in 2012-2013. This is in line with some previous research and challenge the anti-austerity cycle of contention was led solely by social movements (Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015; Portos, 2017).

**FIGURE 6. 1 PROTEST EVENTS ORGANISED BY POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (%) IN SPAIN (2009-2015)**

![Figure 6.1](image)

Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale.

**FIGURE 6. 2 PROTEST EVENTS ORGANISED BY POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (%) IN PORTUGAL (2009-2015)**

![Figure 6.2](image)

Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale.

Analysis of claim-making between 2009 and 2015 identifies economic claims as the predominant type in both countries. The main difference arises from the weight of these types of claims in each country: while in Portugal economic claims were present in over 70% in most of the years, in Spain economic claims barely surpassed 60% in 2012. The overall dominance of economic claims in Portugal leaves little space for other types of claims to emerge.
In this way, it is possible to see that political claims had more preponderance in Spain than in Portugal. Between 2009 and 2015, political claims accounted for 16.9% of the total number of events, while amounting to only 9.7% in Portugal. As discussed in the previous chapter, these claims only became relevant in Portugal in 2012 and 2013 and focused mainly on the call for government resignation rather than a political renewal and institutional transformation. In Spain, on the other hand, due to the nationalist mobilisations, there was a spectrum of political claims. As can be seen from the data on the types of political claims in Spain (see Figure 6.2), claims about participation and representation peaked in 2011, while claims about the state and inclusion (i.e. nationalist demands such as the territorial conflict in Catalonia) remained relatively stable throughout the whole period.

**Figure 6.3 Claim-making in Spain (%) (2009-2015)**

![Graph showing claim-making in Spain (2009-2015)](image)

Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale.

**Figure 6.4 Claim-making in Portugal (%) (2009-2015)**

![Graph showing claim-making in Portugal (2009-2015)](image)

Note: Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0–100 scale.
With regard to social claims, no clear differences existed between Portugal and Spain. Between 2009 and 2015 in Spain the social claims accounted for 25% of the 3221 of the events coded, while in Portugal the claims represented approximately 21.5% of the total number of protests. Despite the lack of clear differences, there are differences in the organisational basis of protest and overall types of claims. In this way, in Spain, in the period under study, claims associated with education were present in 10.3% of the protest events (n=332), for healthcare the figures were 7.1% (n=230), while for housing they were 7.5% (n=240). As I will show in the following sections, it is important to note that despite the joint rise in 2011 and onwards, the mobilisations had multiple peaks throughout 2011 to 2013. In Portugal a different picture emerged, where education (11.7%; n=158) and health (7.4%; n=99) constituted the bulk of claim-making and housing was irrelevant (0.6%; n=8). In both countries social movements and trade unions were central actors, despite the fact that their importance and alliance preferences were different. In Portugal, trade unions and social movements were of relatively equal importance, while in Spain social movements were the leading player in the field, both unilaterally or in joint events with trade unions.
Figure 6.6 Type of actors (%) in social claims per year in Spain (2009-2015)

Note: this is a subset relative only to protests on social claims

Figure 6.7 Type of actors (%) in social claims per year in Portugal (2009-2015)

Note: this is a subset relative only to protests on social claims

Figure 6.8 shows a clear trend of the protest with claims for social rights following the same trajectory as the total number of protests in Spain. Moreover, there was a steep rise after Zapatero announced the first austerity measures in May 2010: the number of reported protests more than doubled, going from less than 10 events at the of 2010 to almost 70 events by the of 2011. These protests remained constant until 2013. Thus, it can be argued that the 15M extended its activity through the emergence of its offspring and through the enhancement of previously existing groups such as PAH and in the form of Mareas.

In contrast to Spain, in Portugal trade unions led the defence of social rights at the peak of austerity implementation. Social movements and civil society actors, as shown in previous
chapters, were particularly active in the mobilisation build-up between 2009 to 2010 due to the closure of services in depopulated rural areas. In 2011 to 2014, policies targeted mainly wages and labour rights in healthcare and education. The policies generated corporative campaigns from these sectors rather than the alliances evident in Spain. Furthermore, housing issues were absent from the agenda due to the lack of a speculative bubble that existed in Spain.

**Figure 6.8 Type of Social Claims (%) per Three Months in Spain (2009-2015)**

**Figure 6.9 Type of Social Claims (%) per Three Months in Portugal (2009-2015)**

Note: Social claims correspond to the overall claims in this domain, while the claims on education, health, and housing are subcategories of the broader category.

An analysis of the protest event analysis data reveals the different paths followed after 2011 with regard to actors and claim-making. Whereas in Portugal protest was predominantly confined to economic claims and trade unions, with some glimpses of social movements, in Spain social movements and trade unions collaborated on an equal basis with both economic and social claims being important. Following the argument advanced so far, the following section explores the roots of these different dynamics of mobilisation.
6.3. Spain: in Between Overlapping Dynamics of Contention

As shown in the previous sections, one of the main features of the Spanish cycle of protest was its sustained levels of protest between 2011 and 2014. This was due to what I will call “overlapping dynamics”. Rather than a single linear progression of protest, the contestation of austerity involved multiple issues and a myriad of actors who collaborated and participated in various and sometimes simultaneous activities. Following the 15M and its discursive repertoires, enduring austerity led into new mobilisations. I argue that these mobilisations were a continuation of the 15M, which is to say, their repertoires and claims were transformed and transferred to different types of mobilisations.

In the following sections, I will describe the four main dynamics present throughout this phase. The first was the movements in defence of education and healthcare services: as I will show, these position-takings involved both trade unions and social movements acting as a sort of hybrid actor. Secondly, as house evictions intensified, a powerful movement for housing developed. Moreover, it is essential to consider two more protest dynamics. On the one hand, the formation of large protest platforms that brought together multiple actors, on the other hand, another formation, what I call labour from below. The latter formation corresponds to small and non-interconnected forms of labour protest that develop in Spain in various sectoral areas, especially in the private sector. I will now describe how this developed throughout 2012 and 2013.

6.3.1. Mareas as a Hybrid: between Social Movements and Trade Unions

From 2011 onwards, cuts in public services led to the emergence of groups led to the emergence of groups fighting back those austerity measures, which came to be known as Mareas or Tides. As such, these groups constituted an answer to threats that emerged throughout the cycle of protest in a specific arena. The Mareas were sectorial mobilisations that mixed elements and resources from both social movements and trade unions: as it will be seen, if on the one hand, they kept organisational practices coming from the 15M, on the other hand, trade unions provided important resources for mobilisation in terms of personnel and infrastructures. The more visible ones were the ones in education and in healthcare.

The use of the term Marea was symbolic of the repertoire and movement practices: by using the term the groups wanted to point out to a more fluid, autonomous, decentralized,

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67 It is possible to see multiple examples of these groups here: https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_mareas
leaderless and democratic movement that was more or less spontaneous. Image-wise and symbolically, the use of same colour t-shirts at demonstrations reinforced this aspect of repertoire and movement practice by giving the *Mareas* a wave-like similarity and an immense visual impact.

The *Mareas* were all-inclusive regarding membership; apart from the workers, users of public services were also involved. For example, regarding the tide for education, which was symbolized by the colour green, one interviewee commented:

“In the school year of 2010 we already started to note cuts in education in some places like Vallecas […] there we started a movement at the neighbourhood level that unites teachers and parents […] we launched a very horizontal movement without trade unions, but just with the educative community.” (Interview 7, Spain)

“In Madrid, there were big demonstrations; you make it with the parents’ collaboration […] the student's unions are implicated as well. What starts as a teachers protest, for their labour conditions […] transforms itself in a more general struggle about the public school.” (Interview 7, Spain)

The *Mareas* involved both trade unions and various social movement actors. Nevertheless, despite the presence of labour organisations, the unionists upheld the movement practices that spread out and diffused after the turning point: going beyond the defence of labour rights, they defended the universality of public services. In this sense, the *Mareas* were a ‘hybrid’ composed of a mix between unions and movements (as it was not strictly an initiative from the former). Two indicators attest to the involvement of both social movements and trade unions the type of claims present in the protests and the actors involved. As it is possible to see there was a balance regarding actors in education and health sectors, which resulted in a combination of economic and social claims: these were simultaneously against austerity and for better labour conditions, as they were for the defence of public goods.
The formation and mobilisation of the two most active and engaged Mareas was similar. Both in education and health sectors, there were previously formed small platforms that provided the first basis for mobilisation. Also, the threats emerged locally and regionally, but quickly became national. As a result, the scale of the protests and mobilisations shifted (Tarrow, 2011).

Regarding the Marea Verde, in July 2011, in the midst of the ongoing 15M protests dynamics described in the previous chapter, the Government of the Community of Madrid, given its policy autonomy, announced measures involving cuts and privatisation in the education sector. As such, a group previously formed by teachers and parents in 2010 in the
Madrid neighbourhood of Vallecas\(^{68}\) launched a horizontal movement that involved the entire educative community. It was this small and initial mobilisation that developed the slogan “public school from everyone to everyone”, which would be taken by the broader movements.\(^{69}\)

As with the Green Tide, the White Tide (resistance in the health sector) emerged after an initial plan presented by the Community of Madrid to ‘sustain’ the health care services in the region in 2012.\(^{70}\) Initial reactions started at the Hospital de la Princesa in Madrid, where local mobilisations made use of civil disobedience.

Figure 6.8 shows the eruption of both types of mobilisation. The announcement of cuts and privatisations measures led to an immediate reaction with protests rising in late 2011. The number of protests decreased slightly afterwards, with a resurgence in 2013. Health mobilisations reached their peak by the end of 2012.

Nevertheless, it is critical to understand in more detail the *modus operandi* of these groups. For example, the Green Tide developed a repertoire that ended up diffusing to other sectorial protests. During the summer of 2011, teachers gathered in assemblies and decided to move on to strikes that were supported by a network of regional schools. These small-scale mobilisations led to an intense strike campaign between September and November of 2011. Besides the continuous strike days, the mobilisations involved multiple protest actions such as marches.

As other regions in Spain slowly undertaken similar type of policies and austerity measures throughout 2011 and 2012, a scale-shift in terms of mobilisations happens as these become national rather that regional. In the case of issues pertaining to education, the cuts led to continuous protests and mobilisation that, in May 2012, peaked with the first general strike in the sector that united Primary to Higher education levels. Not only that, but in 2013 the government passed a bill, the LOMCE or ‘ley Wert’,\(^{71}\) as it came to be known, which lead to another general strike in education in October of that year (Rogero-Garcia, Fernández Rodríguez, & Ibáñez Rojo, 2014). Similarly, in the health sector, the mobilisation followed the same process – as these austerity policies expanded to other regions of the country and the central government tried to implement them at a national level, protests spread (Sánchez Bayle & Fernandez Ruiz, 2014).

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\(^{68}\) Vallecas is a working-class neighbourhood in Madrid that has a culture of community organising.

\(^{69}\) Translation of *escuela publica de todos para todos*.

\(^{70}\) This was to be known as ‘Lasquetty Plan’ given the name of the regional health minister.

\(^{71}\) LOMCE - *Ley Orgánica para la mejora de la calidad educativa* - was a law to reform the educative system statewide.
As such, over time, the main identifiable trend was the predominance of social movements in the claims for social rights. After 2011, not only did the movements become its chief ‘defenders’, but they also collaborated with trade unions. The defence of social rights, which materialised in education and health, provided the main stage for joint actions between social movements and trade unions. Joint actions constituted for approximately 18% protest around social claims during the period under study, while trade unions took alone around 28% of the protests in this field. Moreover, social movements alone were the main organisers of almost 55% of all actions coded regarding social claims. This was partly due to the housing mobilisations, where trade unions were not present, and alternative forms of protest emerged as I show in the following section.

**Figure 6.12 Number of Social Claims by Actors per Three Months in Spain (2009-2015)**

**Figure 6.13 Repertoires in Social Claims by Types of Actors in Spain (2009-2015)**
When considering the repertoires of action, it is important to consider the combination of both conventional actions, both in the streets and in the institutions, and disruptive ones. In the Mareas and in the housing movement there were actions in the courts and in the parliaments, which challenged the institutions directly. More importantly, with regard to disruption and protest, there was a notable difference when trade unions took part in the protests. Figure 6. 13 shows that when social movements were the sole organisers, protests were more disruptive. Nonetheless, protest actions performed by trade unions alone seemed to be more disruptive than protests that included both trade unions and social movements.

Overall, there was an agreement among my interviewees (especially among activists who participated in social movements) that the main trade unions (the CCOO and the UGT) were close to, or part of the, state apparatus and accomplices of the first Zapatero’s austerity measures. The deep delegitimation of trade unions among activists and social movements led trade unionists to integrate alternative mobilisations. Even if they emerged alternatively to the trade unions, the activists and actors in the social movements had a broader constituency and objectives. The Mareas ended up allying with unions as their resources provided mobilisation capacity. Mareas had, in this sense, a para-trade unionist nature, defending simultaneously social and labour rights. This stance was part of a framing strategy to defend the overall institutional building and mobilisation in different sectors, which helped to articulate different groups. Top leadership involvement was scarce, rather it was the rank-and-file militants who carried the mobilisations forward. Moreover, these mobilisations were able to stop some of the austerity measures in the education and health sectors. One such example was the inability of the Community of Madrid to follow the privatisation measures underway in the health sector, after the intervention of the regional courts, which lead to the resignation of Lasquetty who oversaw the policy.

Besides the mobilisations for health and education, the housing movement constituted one the cornerstones of the cycle of protest in Spain, which illuminated a very distinct characteristic of Spain’s crisis. These mobilisations, which were based on civil disobedience, were far more disruptive and lacked, in most cases, the presence or support of the trade unions. In that sense, the mobilisations for housing evolved from locally based grievances to formulate a broader framework diagnosis based on the relationship between housing, crisis and democracy (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Martinez, 2018).

72 While conventional repertoires refers to demonstrations, marches, strikes, manifestos, and petitions, disruptive repertoires refers to escraches, occupations, blockades, and flashmobs.
6.3.2. Housing, Civil Disobedience and Relation with Institutions

As seen in the introduction of this dissertation, a central feature of the Spanish crisis, in contrast with the Portuguese, was the development of a housing bubble (López & Rodríguez, 2011). As the crisis progressed, and unemployment increased, more and more people faced difficulties paying their mortgages. These difficulties coincided with legislation that punished home-owners who defaulted on loans, leading to massive levels of evictions.

Housing issues constituted a central axis of the Spanish mobilisations under the anti-austerity cycle of protest and illuminated a reaction to a form of accumulation by dispossession under the current capitalist dynamics (Della Porta, 2017). In addition, in Spain, movements framed these mobilisations for housing not only as matter of social justice, but above all as a democratic right (Flesher Fominaya, 2015).

With concern to the internal dynamics of the housing movement, as with the Mareas, the formation of mobilisation platforms was not immediate or spontaneous. As shown in chapters four, mobilisations for housing had developed already. Based on these experiences, between 2008 and 2010, new platforms expanded to the national level.

Nevertheless, at this point, the existing platforms still lacked national projection and integration in broader activist networks. Exposure at the national level came with the 15M, which amplified these mobilisations. Even if there were already ongoing mobilisations for housing, it was in the squares occupied by the Indignados and their assemblies that this became visible and triggered a network of support that allowed the groups to expand.

“There was already a movement before the 15M, but being able to tell it in the square, that people would come saying they were not able to pay for their house, took it further. […] it is not something that emerges from the 15M, but the 15M had a lot to do with the expansion of the movement.” (Interviewee 15, Spain)

The housing movement involved different actors, from the groups squatting houses and buildings in the main urban centers, to the emerging centros sociales since the early 2000s, to several different groups that emerged from the outset of the 2008 crisis and onwards, such as V de Vivienda73 (2006) or Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca74 (PAH) (2009). This last group became the most prominent and it is the one that I will focus on from this point onwards. In pursuing their demands, the PAH were more disruptive and confrontational as they were

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73 Translated as H for Housing.
74 Translated as Platform of Affected by the Mortgage.
guided by a clear repertoire of civil disobedience, even if combined with conventional forms of action following legal and institutional channels.

In both V de Vivienda and PAH, individuals in local, non-hierarchical solidarity structures (i.e. ‘chapters’) met weekly to discuss cases, prepare activities, and help each other with regards to eviction processes many of them were suffering. A horizontal structure was at the core of their activities, which empowered lay citizens to deal with problems while simultaneously being supported by the community.

As one of my interviewees remarked (chapter 5, pp. 114-115), the non-hierarchical structure generated a ‘tissue’ or a connective structure (Tarrow, 2011) for the defence of other social rights as well. In the short-term, PAH’s primary objective was to stop people from being evicted. However, as Flesher Fominaya points out, their demands went beyond that. They expected the “retrospective application of assets received in lieu of payment (allowing mortgage debt to be cancelled by bank repossession); (...) the development of social rent regimes (e.g. rent control and council housing)” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, p.7). As argued by Flesher Fominaya (2015), The PAH wanted to ensure that right for decent housing inscribed in the Spanish constitution was guaranteed: in this sense, they equated social rights with democracy.

The actors used a combination of different repertoires, not only in the streets but also in institutions (e.g., municipalities). Between 2011 and 2012, their main campaign was Stop Desahucios 75: framed as a form of civil disobedience and passive resistance in which a group of people would stop evictors, who were attempting to fulfil a judicial mandate, from entering people’s houses. The second campaign was Dacion en Pago 76 (created in 2010), which called for mortgage debt to be cancelled. Finally, the third campaign was Obra Social La PAH, which consisted of the occupation of houses and buildings owned by bailed-out banks or vulture funds. In the campaigners’ view, these buildings were propriety of the people due to the involvement of public money. According to their figures, thus far they have been able to stop more that 2000 evictions from taking place and rehoused about 2500 people. 77

This platform engaged actively with the Congress as well. In March 2011, the PAH allied with the groups and trade unions, and submitted a citizens’ petition to the Congress called Iniciativa Legislativa Popular (por la vivienda Digna) - Popular Legislative Initiative (for dignified housing) (ILP). The dominant political parties in Congress blocked the ILP until

75 Translated as Stop Evictions.
76 Translated as in lieu of payment.
77 Data from their website: http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com
September 2011, in effect, stopping the signature collection needed for the petition to be discussed at the institution. Between September 2012 and February 2013, they collected close to 1.5 million signatures (only 500 thousand were required for the bill to pass). After that, even if the petition was discussed in the Congress, the PP limited the scope of the PAH’s proposal.

As shown in Figure 6.10, there were two peaks in the disruptive actions. The first peak occurred in 2011, shortly after the campaign to stop evictions commenced. The second peak, which was a consequence of the lack of response of the PP politicians to the ILP, whereby a campaign of escraches\textsuperscript{78} began against them (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Martinez, 2018; Romanos, 2016). The escraches were highly symbolic and contentious, and despite the lack of violent radicalism during the contentious cycle (Portos, 2017), a sort of mild radicalism developed and a non-violent disruption was widely activated among citizens.

\textbf{Figure 6.14 Number of Housing Repertoires per Three Months (2009-2015)}

![Graph showing the number of housing repertoires per three months from 2009 to 2015.](image)

Note: In this figure, I have included only the events which pertain to housing issues in Spain.

As Romanos (2016) observes, the housing movement questioned the central argument about the tendency for a lack of interaction between protest movements and institutions present in the literature about Spain. Despite the horizontal movement, cultural and transversal discourse that puts the guarantee of housing as a social right at the heart of democracy, it is possible to see that the PAH’s action targeted institutions directly. The movement combined repertoires ranging from contentious to legal actions that entailed scale-shift mechanisms. If their activities started on a local basis, the activities quickly reached a national scale and, with

\textsuperscript{78} Escrache is a type of demonstration that gathers people next to the homes or workplaces of decision-makers.
the ILP, they moved to the European courts. At the same time, there were pressures over municipalities and regional governments to stop and prevent evictions at the national level.

6.3.3. Recentralization, Platforms and Protest Events: Post-2012 Dynamics
Despite the tendency to emphasise a framework that gives predominance to political claims with the rise of the 15M, what stands out in the cycle of protest is the pre-dominance of austerity and labour related demands (Figure 6. 15) Not only that, but the protests became dominant from mid-2012 onwards as political and social claims decreased. In this way labour issues played an essential role in mobilisations as they were at the forefront of the cycle of contention, standing either on their own or in combination with other issues, despite their delegitimisation and critique by social movements actors. One such example was the 15M: despite the apparent invisibility of economic claims in the movements, there was a critique of labour relations and precarity coming from groups such as Juventud Sin Futuro.79 Furthermore, as seen in one of the sections above, the Mareas had a labour component to it alongside the defence of public services. All these types of mobilisations were new forms of labour resistance where trade unions were mostly invisible.

Nonetheless, with the slow dissolution of social movement mobilisations post-mid-2012, a reconfiguration of protest dynamics followed with a “recentralisation”. As used here, “recentralization” implies the reassembling of smaller groups into larger platforms to organise protest events with broader claims instead of sectoral ones. Despite the conflict between social movement and trade unions, alliance building was central to this process.

There were two phases of recentralization in the post-2012 mobilisations. The first started with initiatives such as the union led platform, Cumbre Social (Social Summit) and an international general strike. Adding to this, in September 2012, the Rodeo al Congreso (Siege to the Congress), a ‘faction’ of the 15M movement mobilised to “Siege the Congress” in what came to be some of the most conflictual and violent protests of the cycle. Still, the majority of the 15M assemblies did not support this protest (Romanos, 2016).

In the summer of 2012, the CCOO created Cumbre Social to bring its allies and social movements together in a single platform. The strategic move of the CCOO was not particularly successful in uniting disparate groups, as the CCOO faced hostility from social movements (de Guzmán, Roca, & Diaz-Parra, 2016). Nevertheless, this platform served as the core of the European General Strike in November of the same year. Social movement groups were also

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79 Translates as Youth without Future.
widely involved. This led to a connection between more classic working-class approaches with social movement dynamics. Despite the initial resistance and systematic critique to trade unions, movements brought innovative repertoires and discourses to this mobilisation, whereby they asked for a strike that would go beyond “the worker” as the main subject. Initiatives like *Toma la Huelga* (Take the Strike) suggested that not only would production be affected as traditionally in strikes, but consumption too, which meant to stop all economic activities. Movement platforms asked for a social strike that involved social movement unionism (Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2015). The restructuring, or even its disappearance, of Fordist labour relations, its precarisation and the emergence of new forms of labour representation and repertoires by social movements lead into what could be deemed an alliance.

The second phase of recentralisation emerged in 2013. If in the first phase, at the turning points of the protest cycle, it opened up, integrated new people, stretched and reshaped the protest dynamics (chapter 5), in the second phase, even if it meant losing some dynamism, the different groups gathered around bigger platforms and unitary initiatives. If in the initial phase the 15M dispersed to the neighbourhoods, while simultaneously creating the *Mareas*, in this phase there were new centralities created around groups such as *Mareas Ciudadanas*80 and *Marchas de la Dignidad*81. As the cycle developed, there was a broader presence, an influence of institutional actors, and large protest events organized by outsider/minority unions such as *Marchas de la Dignidad*.

With regard to the first platform, it started, in the winter of 2012, in a period of reflux for the social movements. Taking inspiration from the *Mareas*, they were initially named *Mareas Unidas* (United Tides) and then eventually renamed *Mareas Ciudadanas*. If the existing *Mareas* initially took the initiative, this was not a sectoral protest, but rather an attempt to converge into a unitary platform that fought against austerity, debt, and privatisation in the footsteps of 15M. For the *Mareas Ciudadanas* initial demonstration (February 2013) (23F - at the anniversary of the failed military coup of 1981), their slogan was ‘against cuts and for a true democracy’ (Pastor, 2014). The platform converged not only the existing *Mareas* but also trade unions, the housing movement, and various political parties.

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80 Translated as Citizens Tides.
81 Translated as Dignity Marches.
In 2014, the Dignity Marches marked the symbolic end of the protest cycle. Following this protest event, demobilisation and institutionalisation followed due to the emerging electoral cycle. Mobilised by the Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SAT), the Dignity Marches had the support of all the anti-austerity field, from 15M, other social movements, and emerging political parties (Romanos, 2016; Pastor, 2014). Using a typical working-class repertoire in Spain of long marches, the protest consisted of assemblies from different areas in the country, which converged in Madrid on the 22nd of March. The convergence of protesters gathered about one million people. More importantly, claims for redistribution were the key demand of the Madrid protest. In this sense, if the cycle of protest initiated with indignation, it closed with claims pertaining to dignity.

As with the platforms here discussed in this section, small labour protests developed after mid-2012.

6.3.4. Labour from Below

While the previous section discussed large protest events and the constitution of platforms where social movement actors and trade unions coalesced around the defence of broad economic and social rights, there was also a labour from below protest dynamic. I define this as ‘labour mobilisations’ that developed as an alternative and were autonomoous from the CCOO and the UGT, primarily in the private sector, in which workers adopted more disruptive repertoires in their local settings. Rather than a unified tendency, labour mobilisations from below were constituted by multiple and dispersed events of protest around Spain. Moreover, if
large trade unions were absent from this type of mobilisation, there was the presence of smaller and alternative trade unions (de Guzmán et al., 2016).

As shown in Figure 6.15, despite work related claims being always significant between 2009 and 2015, from 2011 to mid-2012 austerity claims emerged either on their own or in combination with labour issues. Post mid-2012, both austerity and labour stood separately as, during this period, the private sector laid off or fired a sizable amount of workers. Therefore, after 2013, the bulk of the occurrences that pertained to economic demands related mostly with the factory level type of mobilisations from groups of workers who either risked losing their jobs or found themselves in a precarious situation.

Despite the lack of unity in mobilisation, given the different sectors of activity, there is a clear trend that can be identified. Throughout the whole cycle, there was an impact of the crisis on business, and much of the labour protest occured in factories. There are multiple examples that stand out throughout the protest cycle (and in the protest event analysis) such as the factory workers who were employed by the multinational company Coca-Cola, Panrico, or even coal miners from the region of Asturias. There were also protests related to the public sector, such as cleaners and garbage collectors. Moreover, another group that appeared throughout the protest cycle were communication workers who were employed by several regional TV channels (such as TeleMadrid). Many of these communication workers were also laid off.

To conclude throughout the previous sections I have shown that if while in defence of social rights the top-level trade unions due to their delegitimation had to ally with social movements, from 2013 onwards mobilisations happened at the factory level totally disconnected from top-level trade unions.

6.4. Portugal: from Movement Void to Strategic Alliance Building
In Portugal, the contentious dynamics from 2012 to 2014 differed from Spain. Rather than displaying overlapping dynamics, which involved multiple actors and claims, the Portuguese protest movements were restrained to fewer actors and claims. If, on the one hand, there were constant trade union protests, especially in the public sector, on the other hand, social movements only ‘exploded’ in September 2012 with the QSLT, following a ‘movement void’ (i.e., a period when social movements were absent and rarely participated in protest mobilisations). In this sense, the Portuguese ‘story’ follows an almost sequential and linear process, in which social movements re-emerge for a short period after its disappearance during
the movement void. In the following sections, I provide a detailed description of the process of social movements emerging from an almost inert stance to a re-emergence of collective action.

6.4.1. Trade Unions and Movement Void
Throughout 2011, the emergence of social movements constituted a brief episode in the anti-austerity cycle of contention. As noted in the previous chapter, in 2011 movement protest were sparse, primarily between the GaR and the 15O. While there were small, scattered protests, large performances did not occur beyond the CGTP-launched events. Nonetheless, despite the clash between the different groups, both left-wing parties and autonomous groups supported, with varying degrees of intensity, trade union actions (Soeiro, 2014). Trade unions constituted the dominant actor throughout the whole cycle of protest.

At the end of November 2011, the CGTP and the UGT allied, with the support of the PCP, the BE and the existing social movement platforms, in a General Strike, against the successive austerity measures announced by the right-wing coalition since its election in June 2011. The event constituted the first instance of collaboration between ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors during the cycle, as a variety of social movements joined the protest march and other actions during the day of the General Strike. However, the joint endeavours faded away, especially between the two major trade unions, the CGTP and UGT. As I will show, the following months led to a rearrangement of alliances that lasted until the emergence of the QSLT (Baumgarten, 2016).

In comparison to the Spanish situation, in Portugal the first half of 2012 was unique primarily due to a lack of social movement protests, as well as an overall dominance of economic claims related to austerity and labour (see Figure 6.16). During this period, the CGTP became the quasi-hegemonic actor contending austerity, and, in particular, organising labour protests through the first half of 2012. As Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015) remark, anti-austerity movements stood divided along the long-term rivalry between PCP and BE. The links between 15O platform and the CGTP were damaged as the platform came to be dominated by a specific group, MAS, which was very critical of the union’s stance and strategies. In fact, MAS declined to join the general strike the CGTP-UGT had called, and instead organised a parallel public march. Despite supporting the reasons for the strike, MAS did not back the organisers, nor their strategies.

Furthermore, the fragile alliance between the CGTP and the UGT broke again as the moderate and conciliatory strategy of the latter group, UGT, gained ground. As evidenced in previous sections, in early 2012, the right-wing government passed a labour reform that the
UGT signed, which left the CGTP as the sole contestant of the labour reform, contributing for General Strikes in March spearheaded by this actor. During this period, most groups that integrated the 15O platform abandoned the platform’s mandates due to internal contradictions and tensions.

When looking to social movements, Baumgarten (2016) defines the beginning of 2012 as phase of “experiments with event-based organizations” for social movement groups:

“From the lack of continuity of activism in the first phase activists learned the necessity of working together, while from the second phase they remembered the bad experiences of working together in a platform. So, the new attempt at organizing this time involved creating events without establishing a new platform.” (Baumgarten, 2016, p. 173)

Regardless of the dispersion and divergence in social movement groups, a parallel trend of small ‘autonomous’ groups emerged with a repertoire of occupations of buildings and spaces, for example in Lisbon, and closed schools in Porto, as well as small protest events in other locations (Baumgarten, 2016). These small groups were at the forefront of the ‘Global Spring’, which occurred in May 2012, a movement that attempted to ‘reanimate’ mobilisations but was plagued with divisions and conflicts. My interviewees agreed that this was a moment of movement stasis where there was an incapacity to mobilise continuously, due to conflicts, lack of resources, size, and an inability to establish connections with institutional actors. The mobilisation capacity of social movements decreased dramatically and was restricted to the organisation of small events with an internationalist appeal and limited support to the CGTP protests and initiatives. Nonetheless, Baumgarten (2016) argues that despite the low degree of activity, this period was central to how groups came to act and organise in the following phase.

“I: When moving into the creation of the QSLT, the BE had good intentions. It departs from an analysis that the 15O had destroyed the relations between the various collectives and the possibility of unitarian work. […]
T: There were almost nine months without significant protests….
I: It was despairing…
T: I mean there was the Global Spring…
I: The biggest demonstration had 1000 people […] We were there, but more and more reduced regarding participation and numerically.” (Interviewee 12, Portugal)
However, the intensification of austerity would lead into the emergence of the QSLT and a rearrangement of the contentious field. In the next section of this chapter, I delve into the contextual changes and consider both the actors and their claims.

6.4.2. Constitutional Break and the QSLT - Alliance Building and Exclusions

In the summer of 2012, the political opportunity structures changed, which lead to an intensification of protest both trade unions and social movements. At the heart of the process there was a constitutional debate that sparked a ‘new’ discourse, which led to a new contentious phase. In July 2012, after various left-wing MPs called for a review of several austerity measures related to cuts in the public sector, the Constitutional Court overruled the cuts as unconstitutional. From that period onwards, both social movements and trade unions focused on using the discourse of the revolution and the 25th of April to frame their action (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). Most contentious actors see the Portuguese Constitution as a heritage of the carnation revolution that ensured social rights. An attack on such a symbol led the various contentious actors to rely upon this reference in their mobilisations. The use of this symbolic action entailed both resonance of the frame of social rights and the Constitution with the overall base of mobilisation, as well as strategic modularity (Tarrow, 2013) presented by the Constitutional Court intervention. The actors made use of an open understanding of the revolution to gather support from multiple groups. In the next section, I broaden my considerations on this topic.

As shown by Rodrigues and Silva (2016), a debate over the Constitution between political parties, but also in civil society, marked the years of implementation of the MoU. Despite being contested in many ways, the heritage of the April 25th comes through the Constitution in political debates. Due to the profuse presence of social rights in the Constitution, during this period, leftist actors and other social movements took the Constitution as a legacy to defend, (Rodrigues & Silva, 2016; Silva & Vieira, 2016). There was an understanding that the 25th of April and the Revolutionary period was central to not only political and civil liberties but also social rights that ensured emancipatory equality.

A second and more crucial conjunctural element was the announcement in September 2012 by the prime minister of the reduction of the payroll tax. After more than a year of austerity and giving continuity to measures that reduced labour costs, the announcement of the new measures invigorated protest. The payroll tax was a measure that the Troika had been long insisting on implementing, but the measure unleashed contestation from virtually every sector of society, from social movements to the junior coalition partner, CDS-PP, and also from
workers to employers. For the most part, all of the actors criticised the measure for its iniquity, as this tax would increase workers' tax contribution and decrease the ones made by employers. Furthermore, as Valentim (2018) shows, with regard to the GaR’s actions, the QSLT had a more positive reception among the mass media when protesting against this measure. The payroll tax was contested for two weeks, after which the government ended up withdrawing this measure and proposing alternative ones.

Apart from these contextual factors, the spark in protest mobilisation was also the result of a restructuration process in the contentious arena regarding the interactions between actors. The change in this arena led to the peak of mobilisations that happened between September 2012 and March 2013.

The first QSLT protest was an eventful protest (Della Porta, 2008). It condensed many of the frustrations and grievances with the ongoing austerity politics, but also reconfigured the political environment: the QSTL protest marked the political agenda and changed the trajectory of the cycle of contention by introducing new repertoires and frameworks. This platform, initially formed as a group of people subscribing a manifesto, quickly expanded and brought to the public sphere a new language to contest austerity. Apart from that, the protest was also able to sustain smaller and more symbolic events, keeping their mediatic presence on the internet and in the mass media. This new platform emerged with the support of the BE and, to some extent, ensured the backing of the CGTP and the PCP. According to one of my interviewees:

“Around June, I was contacted to subscribe a manifesto that will be the manifesto of the QSLT that was more or less drafted […] I think it was reasonably unexpected, even taking into account the GaR, no one was expecting the size of the demonstration, because since the beginning no one structured it as a movement. It was just a manifesto, a group of people that subscribed a manifesto and was willing to organise a demonstration. Of course we knew that the resources had to come from somewhere, but it is also true that no one went there to defend the position of a party or trade union […] there was already a draft […] and it was permeated by a political sensibility that we could associate with the BE, that in the sphere of the social movements translates into the PI.” (Interviewee 20, Portugal)

Since its creation, the QSLT was meant to have a unitarian character. It emerged out of the disputes within 15O and came from an initiative of the BE to federate all groups in its sphere of influence and members of the PCP into a unitarian mobilisation. When conceived, the QSLT
departs from two critiques to the previous significant mobilisations: the GaR and the 15O. First, demonstrations should express political grievances, and not merely a plateau for citizens to express their discontent, as it happened with the GaR. Second, for the members of QSLT, the open organisational structures seen at the 15O end up leading to tensions due to the opportunistic take over by small organised groupuscules and that, in their analysis, destroys the possibility of collective work. As a result, the QSLT deliberately decided to close itself to exclude, as new members of the group could only join the platform when agreed by all who were already members of the platform. Therefore, the QSLT’s objective was to mark the political agenda while excluding their ‘opposition’. Their objective was to have a cohesive structure that was not plagued by conflicts. One of my interviewees reports that:

“What happens is that when the QSLT emerges, there was a double critique, one to the GaR and another one to the 15O. The critique to the GaR is the following: it is not worth to do a demonstration if this is not politicized, with few political objectives [...] everyone goes there and you can have people side by side with a skinhead or someone from the PSD that it is unhappy [...] which is unfair because the GaR organizers are not that, it is rather the way it was seen and it led nowhere. Our manifestos were always very political [...] the 15O and its organisation was open, anyone could participate, but in reality, it ends up expelling people. Why? Because small groups end up controlling it and everyone else ends up leaving since no one has the patience for each time that you discuss something they have 20 people defending that same point. Therefore, we create a closed structure as we did not intend to be democratic, we do not represent people. It was a group with connections to the social and political movements. It is a plural group, but a closed one, only those there discuss it.” (Interviewee 19, Portugal)

Many civil society groups that are satellites of the BE, e.g. *Precários Inflexíveis* (PI), constituted the logistic basis of organisation of the QSLT. The PI played a particularly important role as a ‘pivot’ player, i.e., being a group composed mostly by members of the BE and focusing on questions of precarity. Membership overlap of second and third rank militants show that these groups were part of the same network. These spin-off groups were critical as their relationship with civil society actors was very different from the top-down interactions between movement actors and PCP or the unions. Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015) point out the alliances that developed during the cycle of protest, which led to larger and stronger protests by the trade unions. The researchers further contend that, though new movement actors

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82 Fieldwork observation done in 2013: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7dU5-qmT1A](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7dU5-qmT1A)
emerged, the actors seemed to rely largely on trade unions for mobilisation, as the trade unionists appeared capable of sustaining large protests.

6.4.3. Claim-Making and Repertoires in the QSLT

The QSLT sustained their activity from their first demonstration in September 2012 to March 2013 under the banner of O Povo é quem mais ordena - a kind of ‘power to the people’: a direct reference to a symbolic and imaginary period of the revolution. The mobilisation process for the first demonstration in September 2012 was short on resources and events. The QSLT members launched a manifesto to announce the demonstration in late August 2012, with sounding resonance in the mass and social media. They also organized a demonstration of a flash mob to take place in front of the IMF offices in Lisbon. Together, with the announcement of new austerity measures, the demonstrations created a wave of discontent that translated into the mobilisation, according to the organizers’ estimations, of one million people all over the country. Mobilisations proved to be successful and had an impact. As a result of the mobilisations, there was a progressive enlargement of the group. For example, in September 2011, the signatories and organisers of the September demonstration were about 30 people from different quadrants of the left, however, by March 2012, their numbers surpassed 100.

The emergence of the QSLT led to a shift in claim-making and the various repertoires used. The changing discourse involved a reconfiguration in politics, aesthetics, action, and repertoires (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). The name QSLT was highly symbolic and was intended to represent the political division between those who signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika and were favourable to the austerity measures, as well as those situated in the opposite camp. The aim was not only to establish an ideological and political line of demarcation, but also to establish a social one: street protest was the way to express disapproval of ongoing austerity. The name of this groups was not only a question of resonance but also of social movement strategy whereby organizers attempted to fit and adapt to the context of continuous austerity and questioning of social rights (Tarrow, 2013).

As a result, the QSLT, who staged small and disruptive events as well as large protests, strategically adapted the repertoires and frameworks to the political opportunity structure. Their frameworks went beyond a mere critique of precarity. These were open and transversal discourses that resonated due to use of symbols related with the revolution, which, over time, became more performative and mediatic, and reached to a broader audience. The best example, due to its symbolic and historical charge, was the use of the song Grândola, which was used to disrupt cabinet members public appearances. Resembling the escraches performed in Spain
during the ILP housing campaign, the song directly evoked the memory of the 25th of April, 1974. In 1974 Grândola was one of the songs played on public radio stations during the military coup. The use of the song in 2013 assisted in reaching the mass media and, as a result, helped mobilise the March 2013 demonstration. Moreover, the song was evocative of principles of equality and fairness inherited from the revolution and inscribed in the Constitution (Baumgarten, 2017b; Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019). By using these symbols, which have multiple interpretations due to the positive but polysemic meanings of the April 1974 coup (Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto, & Magalhães, 2016), the QSLT allied not only resonance (Benford & Snow, 2000), but also strategic modularity (Tarrow, 2013) the result of which was the articulation of a ‘new’ message.

By uniting so many disparate groups, the QSTL framed themselves as a resistance movement that had a “minimal programme” to “give the voice back to the people”, instead of broader objectives such as renegotiating the debt. Building on this, their objective was, on the one hand, to show the dissatisfaction against the Troika and its policies, while on the other hand demand the government’s resignation. Nonetheless, despite the non-partisan, pacifist, and secular narrative they espoused, repeating the formula used by the GaR, a critique of the party or political system was still absent.

During this phase of protest, there was an upsurge of claims against austerity, as well as for the resignation of the right-wing government (as seen in chapter 5, Figure 5. 7, p. 111). Figure 6. 16 shows that while economic claims varied along the process, broader claims, which were solely about austerity and not combined with work claims, were mostly visible in the period of more intense action from the QSLT.

**Figure 6. 16 Type of Economic Claims: Austerity and Work Claims in Portugal (2009-2015)**
6.4.4. Demobilisation

Demobilisation began after the QSLT March 2013 demonstration and reached lower levels in the summer of that year. Again, as seen in previous moments protest mobilisation in Portugal, the demobilisation appeared to be the result of particular structures of political opportunities that opened up after the summer of 2012. Therefore, the decrease in the number of protests was not only the result of internal disputes over political strategy and organisation, but also a lack of mass media attention. By June 2013, a time that the platform organised an international protest, many of the interviewees referred as a failure. The failure could be measured primarily by the plummeting numbers of participants. The already existing fissures within the group deteriorated further and led to a period of inactivity. However, there still existed tacit and implicit support of trade unions activities. To close this phase, in the same month, the CGTP and the UGT allied again to jointly organize the last general strike of the cycle of protest where many actors converged.

Following this protest, a governmental crisis unfolded whereby following various ministerial resignations and presidential intervention, the coalition was reinstated. Many of my interviewees stated that the crisis had a demobilising effect, as it appeared that nothing could move the government from their positions and from austerity actions. Nevertheless, as can be seen, despite the breakdown in the number of protests, the trade union protests continued. However, with the tense political situation it was not until the new budget was approved that new event actions were taken to the streets. I will explore this further in the next chapter as I deal with the demobilisation, institutionalisation, and party system transformation.

6.5. Conclusion

In this chapter and the previous one, it is possible to perceive that the paths taken in each country were not predetermined, but instead relationally constituted and politically conducted. Cycles of contention developed in an open way, and took into account the interactions between the actors and their environment.

This chapter has closely examined how mobilisations against austerity involved multiple claims and actors. Nonetheless, the differences between Portugal and Spain shows that not only was political process key, but also fundamental was pre-existing actors, repertoires, and claims. These aspects were essential components of the cycles of contention: being dynamic and relational the mobilisations changed and evolved with time. As such,
Portugal and Spain presented distinct anti-austerity cycles of contention that, in many ways, reproduced the traces already identified in the fourth chapter.

Thus, even if novelties existed with regard to the scale of mobilisation, it should not be forgotten that these novelties were situated and contextualised. The period entailed regressive cuts on social rights and liberalisation of public services. The retrenchment of the welfare state and growing unemployment led to contentious mobilisations from various actors which underwent different phases in the two countries.

Two factors combined to produce these different trajectories. On the one hand, there was a sort of ‘equilibrium’ between actors in Spain that was absent in Portugal. As Spanish trade unions were delegitimised due to their collaboration with neoliberal reforms, non-institutional protest movements constituted the main channel through which people voiced grievances. Nevertheless, the trade unions still held organisational resources that led into ‘spaces of confluence’ (i.e. the different platforms in which both social movements and trade unions worked together). On the other hand, the relation of movements and contentious actors vis-à-vis the crisis was different. If in Spain the 15M continuously questioned the democratic regime coming from the transition, in Portugal the protest movements reinforced the status quo of the regime, putting the constitution and its origin at the centre of their demands and discourses. Moreover, another aspect to consider was the configurations between actors and their formation. While in Spain, there was a mechanism of scale-shift whereby local mobilisations expanded and became national, in Portugal mobilisations appeared to be driven institutionally, from top-down rather than from grassroots levels.

Furthermore, in Spain, mobilisations for social and economic rights were always built and framed upon political rights and dissatisfaction in what is usually translated as ‘crisis of democracy’. The inability of political parties to sustain and provide citizenship rights created a problem of effectiveness which led the social movements to build a discourse that criticised the institutions that resulted from the transition to democracy as still partially Francoist. In Portugal, the same social and labour rights were framed differently with regard to its origins. The actors in Portugal acted more corporatively way, and did not form a transversal alliance between movements and unions. This alliance only emerged strategically at a particular intersection of the cycle of contention. In this sense, it is especially important to note that with social and economic rights the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors were different. In Spain, rather than being marked by competition, there existed non-hierarchical and cooperative relations (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). However, in Portugal the relations tended
to be exclusionary, with institutional actors who dominated the field and refused to cooperate with non-institutional actors and non-enabling the constitution of more transversal actors.

But the cycle of protest ended up with a transformation of the political sphere, whereby social movements integrated and came to influence institutions more directly. In the following chapter, I will approach these dynamics of demobilisation and institutionalisation.
7. Fragile Realignments? Reconfiguration of the Left after the Anti-Austerity Protests

The intense and highly contentious phase of anti-austerity protest in Portugal and Spain, taking place between 2010 and 2013, was followed by an electoral and institutional phase that comprised multiple elections. These were local, regional, national, and European, and reshaped the political landscape not only with new actors that followed in the footsteps of the protest movements, but also by leading to a reconfiguration of the party systems.

Portugal and Spain were not the only countries affected by the “crisis of democracy” to which I refer in the introduction of this dissertation. The tension between capitalism and democracy led to the highest volatility ever recorded in postwar Europe (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016) and Portugal and Spain were not exceptions. Nevertheless, even if we are aware of the determinant factors behind volatility, it is still not clear what processes are behind it and how they can account for different outcomes. The 2015 general elections in both countries allow a reading of the institutional transformations, even if with different contours, by the end of the cycle of protest.

In Spain, alongside Podemos a variety of other actors on the Left emerged at the regional and municipal level. Emerging to confront the crisis of representation in different sides of the political spectrum (Vidal, 2018), they challenged the PSOE and PP hegemony. Nonetheless, these dynamics had already been expressed in the initial demise of PSOE in the 2011 elections (Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012) and the slow increase of voting intentions in parties such as UPyD and IU, which in many ways came to occupy a similar political space. Arguably, as they were coming up in polls, these could have been the beneficiaries of the ongoing political and economic crisis, but ended up being surpassed by new political forces. In this sense, the transformation of the left results from the combination of strong social movements discussed in previous chapters, with internal dynamics and elite disputes within IU.

In Portugal, as seen in chapters 5 and 6, claims and cleavages remained grounded in the economic domain despite the climate of political dissatisfaction. The transformation of the party system in this country, rather than involving the creation of new political parties (for which there were attempts), eventually led to a pact between centre-left and the so-called radical-left. The latter parties had always opposed this political solution. As movements remained within the institutional actors’ sphere of influence, their discourse and action had a
less significant role throughout the cycle. Their contestation focused mainly on social rights and austerity, without pushing for further political change. Debate, as I will show throughout this chapter, happens within the space of the institutional Left. In this sense, the reconfiguration of the Left in Portugal was the logical conclusion of a process where movements contested austerity but were not disruptive to the political sphere.

When contrasting the Spanish and the Portuguese cases, two important differences in the political process becomes clear. If in Spain the debate related to the creation of an alternative to PSOE, in Portugal this was about what kind of relationship the ‘radical’ left should have with the PS. The role of the social movements and other contentious actors in this regard was different in Spain and Portugal. In the former country, it came to influence new political formations not only by the creation of parties where these were expressed, but also by the creation of a discourse that was influential and absorbed. In the latter, the non-disruptiveness of the regime discourse made them less relevant in shaping the transformations to the party system. Additionally, it is important to note that throughout this chapter the role of social movements will be less evident: by disappearing from this phase, these actors were no longer the main protagonists.

It is important to note that this approach contrasts with most work done so far, allowing to go beyond merely the structure of opportunities, while emphasising agency and process. Empirical work on Podemos looks to the political and economic opportunity structure that facilitated its creation, success and electoral basis (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016; Sola & Rendueles, 2018). Even if this is relevant, it leads into a black box whereby the political process and agency are dismissed, and where its emergence it is the direct consequence of the crisis. In these studies, there is a lack of focus on the disputes that happen within the left and how these were important in structuring the new actors. When looking to Portugal, it is important to contemplate why no new political parties were successful and why the radical left was not able to take advantage of the crisis in the same way that Podemos and SYRIZA did.

Against this backdrop, in this chapter I focus on the institutionalisation phase as an outcome of the cycle of contention, alongside the dynamics of demobilisation in the ‘electoral period’ of 2014-2015. The objective is twofold: on the one hand to explain the influence of protest waves on the following electoral cycles and their political re-alignments, while on the other to analyse the transformations of the party system, both of the Left and the emergence of new political actors. Following the analytical framework used so far, this approach will further enlighten the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors along the cycle of contention. In this chapter, I ask: what is the reconfiguration of the left after the peak of
austerity and how did movements contribute to it? What were the transformations that these contentious responses provoked in the overall political field? What sorts of outcomes came from the new political movements that emerged? And, finally, what caused the divergence between these two cases?

The transformation of the party system tends to be explained by considering the so-called why questions which focus on structural determinants of political change. To counter these perspectives, Linz and Stepan (Linz & Stepan, 1978) propose a model that, rather than focusing just on structural elements, concentrates on processual, relational and political aspects of political change. In his view, as with Tilly (1978), political change is a culmination of an incremental process. Therefore, Linz acknowledges the importance of the how questions since, as pointed out previously, similar structural conditions might lead to different outcomes. Central to this approach is the notion of reequilibration, which follows the stages of crisis and breakdown and corresponds to the last stage of his model when new regimes consolidate around a new centre of power. Nonetheless, although it takes into consideration broader economic elements and context, this approach is one that tends to focus solely on institutional dynamics, barely looking into the relations between parties and contentious actors.

Even if considering this perspective, there is the need for recognising the impact of economic factors, more recent works deal with party system change in contexts of crisis and austerity. Work on Latin America shows that market reforms led to political transformations that entailed a party brand dilution, a decline of partisanship and, more importantly, a process of dealignment. For example, Roberts (2012) explores the impact of market reforms and liberalisation in party systems in Latin America and contends that the centre-left is fundamental to understanding longer processes of political change. Therefore, when the centre-left political forces are in power and applying liberalisation programmes, this often leads to the emergence of protest, while when in opposition they channel dissent.

Nevertheless, the sequence of events within the political process and agency has a role, making social movements relevant actors in the process of realignment. Considering the objectives of this chapter of reconstituting the process of emergence of new parties, and akin to social movement studies, the literature on institutionalisation should be considered (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; Tarrow, 1989, 2011). In Tarrow’s approach, institutionalisation constitutes the last stage of a cycle of contention that is usually simultaneous with radicalisation. If the latter takes more disruptive and violent forms of street politics, the former takes a more conventional path in engaging directly with institutions, being less disruptive.
As such, overlapping partially with Linz’s perspective, but introducing social movement as important actors, Koopmans points out that the end of the cycle is one where the “contraction of protest waves is best conceptualized as a process of restabilization and reroutinization of patterns of interaction within the polity” (Koopmans, 2004, p. 37). As Tarrow adds:

“As participation is channelled into organization, the parts of the movements that emerge in the early phases of the cycle take on a more political logic – engaging in implicit bargaining with authorities. As the cycle winds down, exhaustion and polarization spread, and the initiative shifts to elites and parties” (Tarrow, 2011, p.212).

One such example of institutionalisation concerns movement-parties that since 2014 became of importance (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017). These are hybrid actors that have features of both non-institutional and institutional actors, being, therefore, closer to social movements in practices and discourses, and important elements to take into consideration at the institutionalisation phase.

All these concepts are part of a toolbox that will allow for further exploration of the relationship between social movements and political parties in the context of contentious cycles. Such an approach permits an investigation of the internal dynamics of the party system which takes into consideration questions of institutionalisation within the cycle of contention. There is the need both to look beyond the political space, and to observe its interactions with the other actors.

On a more speculative note, I will argue that in both countries, at the end of the cycle (i.e., at the 2015 elections), the realignment of the left was fragile, insofar as the outcomes might not be stable or sustainable in the long run. Despite the unfolding changes these are, in many ways, not yet in the final stage of the process. Furthermore, I argue that to fully understand this reconfiguration besides the aspects espoused by Roberts’ work (2012), one must consider a processual, historical and relational approach that looks into the internal dynamics of parties and the party system, together with social movements dynamics. This borrows and combines the ideas of reequilibration by Linz, that focus solely on the process and interaction within elites, with those of Tarrow and Koopmans and the influence of social movements in processes of political change.

This chapter aims at enlarging the already well-established knowledge on party-movement dynamics in these two countries, which allows us to go beyond mere
institutionalisation and understand more broadly how these processes unfold. I will use data that proceeds from interviews and conversations, observations of different political events, documents collected, articles in newspapers and websites. I will sum up the internal political dynamics of these parties and their relationship with the party system (and other left forces). However, as pointed out in the literature (Tarrow, 2011), the dynamics of institutionalisation tend to go hand-in-hand with processes of protest demobilisation. As such, it is to the various elements that contribute to this and develop thoroughly the internal dynamics of the Left which this chapter will initially turn.

7.1. Dynamics of Demobilisation: from “Whatever it Takes” and Repression to Institutionalisation

As discussed above, one of the consequences of institutionalisation dynamics, alongside radicalisation, is protest demobilisation. As many of those actively involved in the process of protest mobilisation start building alternative political parties, protest decreases. Nonetheless, these processes relate not only to movement and party formations but also to more contextual dynamics: in this sense, following the trends identified in the previous chapters, there is a path towards demobilisation that resulted both from economic recovery and institutional processes.

In this section, I argue that this is related to factors usually identified in the literature. Besides a shift in strategy that comes with institutionalisation, it is essential to recognise the role played by the political and economic opportunity structure. As such, I will analyse how these are important components to understanding these dynamics and how they come to shape party re-arrangements. The objective is then to contextualise the following sections.

The first factor has to do with the economic recovery and policy-making originating both from the EU and national governments. Within this political economy opportunity structure (Císař & Navrátil, 2017), after the burst of the economic crisis in which harsher measures were taken to control debt and spending, there was an attempt by European Institutions to absorb and manage the crisis that does not rely solely on countries impositions, but also on monetary policies. Two episodes seem to attest to this. One such example is the famously branded “Draghi Declaration” in July 2012, whereby in a press conference in London, the president of the ECB pledged to do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’. This seems to have contributed to a reduction of the interest rates as shown in Figure 7.1. The main idea was to ensure the ‘markets’ that the European Institutions would not allow any of the countries to default, keeping the Eurozone stable. Following this, and within its mandate, in
2015 the ECB started a strategy of quantitative easing. This allowed the funding of national economies by buying debt or government bonds in the secondary markets, which decreased interest rates and influenced national recovery.

**FIGURE 7.1 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES (MONTHLY DATA) FOR PORTUGAL, GREECE, SPAIN, ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

In line with this, as the international economy improved slightly, and the European institutions seemed to be more collaborative, if slowly, economic recovery re-started, in both Portugal and Spain in the summer of 2013. Not only that, the strict austerity programmes - that had slashed many public services and trimmed labour costs - came to an end around 2014. Furthermore, the strategy of conservative governments in both countries passed through stimulating the economy with an eye on future elections. All these European and national factors led to fewer protests.

Second, there were also demobilisation dynamics that relate to the political events within the cycle of protest. In Portugal, the turning point was the governmental crisis in the summer of 2013. Subsequently, protest actions demobilised and changed character. The resignation of the Finance Minister, Vítor Gaspar who held an important symbolic position as the chief defender and executor of austerity, led to a government crisis as the junior partner (CDS-PP) disagreed with the PM’s choice to replace him. As a result, the leader of CDS-PP and Foreign Minister, Paulo Portas resigned as well leaving the coalition in turmoil. As shown in chapter 5, after the QSLT March 2013 mobilisation the number of protests decreased until the summer of that year and movements disappear afterwards. In an attempt to reanimate street politics, and claiming the loss of governments’ legitimacy due to their austerity agenda, there were calls for protests demanding new elections, coming from sectors close to the BE.
In the following month, as this unfolded, the President of the Republic attempted to ensure a grand coalition between the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP to avoid a climate of political instability that could lead yet again to a rise in interest rates that would damage economic recovery. This was ineffective as the PS, even if participating in the negotiations, refused to participate in government. Nonetheless, the PR ensured that PSD and CDS-PP continued to collaborate until the 2015 general elections. The two parties also considered that it was more beneficial to keep collaborating as early elections would be damaging for both (J. M. Fernandes, 2016; Fernandes & Jalali, 2017). As such, the lack of success of street politics led to an overall demobilisation, as most groups realised that their objectives were not achievable this way.

Moreover, after a succession of ‘failed’ protest mobilisation in which social movements were unable to generate diffusions beyond their core, large protest events slowly faded and were only performed by CGTP. The government crisis seemed to add to this dynamic, as their primary objective was new elections. In fact, after the summer and the resolution of the crisis, the main trend the data shows was the continuation of protest sectorization through small strikes, such as the transport and communication sector.

Nevertheless, there were underground mobilisations and attempts to radicalise. On the latter, during a CGTP protest in November 2013, various groups allied with dockers tried to occupy the Port of Lisbon, but they failed due to the lack of protesters and police intervention. One important event to consider is the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution by social movement groups in April 2014. This event called Rios ao Carmo was an initiative of the more autonomous sectors, to which other social movements sectors joined forces. As many of my interviewees reported, it was the first time since Global Action Day that there was relative peace among the different sectors. Its name was pledge with a metaphor that reflected the fluid organisation, instead of a centralised one, in which everyone would be able to form their march coming from different places (i.e., the different rivers) of Lisbon and converge to Largo do Carmo, where Marcello Caetano (prime-minister at the time) hid and resigned, making the military coup successful in 1974. Its objective was to oppose the institutional celebrations that normalise the event and take all the revolutionary impetus from it. Not only that, it contrasted with the prevailing conception of the revolution that inspired claim-making (“defence of the revolution”) throughout the cycle. Rather, they aimed to explore the potential of the revolutionary imaginary in a more autonomous way (Carvalho & Ramos Pinto, 2019).

83 Translated as Rivers into Carmo.
This could be considered the symbolic end of the cycle of contention and marked the emergence of new groups which are now opposing the consequences of the tourism boom that led to rising prices of housing in Lisbon.

In Spain, the mobilisation process lasted slightly longer. As seen in the data presented in previous chapters, the decrease in the overall number of protests started in the summer of 2013, but it was only from 2014 onwards and especially after the Marches of Dignity that this dynamic became accentuated. Concomitantly, the Catalan nationalist mobilisations started emerging as an essential process from 2013 onwards (Della Porta, O’Connor, et al., 2017; Miley, 2017). Nevertheless, in contrast to Portugal, as demobilisation of social movements groups took place in Spain, two different paths were followed. One followed an institutionalisation route which would lead to the formation of different political parties in the whole country, both at a national, regional and local level. The other tendency was of grassroots, whereby certain sectors of 15M and social movements refused to engage in institutional action (as they did since the beginning). I return to these two divergent paths later in the chapter.

Repression, even if sometimes soft, was an essential part of the demobilisation process. There are similar occurrences the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism or what others have termed as the politics of antipolitics, in which austerity and technocracy were deemed as the only choice and accompanied by a suppression of particular citizenship rights (Roberts, 2008). Three episodes of police violence in Portugal performed during general strikes, although not against trade unions, might have contributed to demobilisation. These occurred in March and November 2012, and finally in June 2013. Even if speculatively, the common feature of these interventions was that they repressed the autonomous sectors of social movements, while simultaneously delegitimising trade unions and General Strikes. It is important to note that the police never directly intervenes in trade unions marches or demonstrations as the CGTP normally has its security service that tries to ensure orderly protests. In Spain, the PP government passed the famous Ley Mordaza or Gag Law that specifically targets many of the repertoires of action developed by 15M, Mareas and PAH (Calvo & Portos, 2018). It emerged therefore as an institutional reaction to the wave of protest in order to shut down street politics. In the same vein of the politics of antipolitics, Pastor (2014) argues that austerity was parallel to a “neoconservative reaffirmation (abortion law, Wert Law), neocentralist and

84 Ley Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la seguridad ciudadana.
authoritarian that intents (…) bureaucratic repression (burorepresion) and now the announced ‘gag law’ (…)”.85

The year 2013 constituted a turning point in the mobilisations strategies. The upcoming electoral cycle ‘forces’ actors to attempt an ‘assault’ on institutions and change politics from within. In this period there were European elections (May 2014), regional elections (May 2015 in Spain), municipal elections (Portugal - October 2013; Spain - May 2015) and finally general elections in October 2015 (Portugal) and December 2015 (Spain). As a result, various political projects emerged to dispute institutions. Nevertheless, taking in to account the previous mobilisation tendencies reported throughout the previous chapters, the processes were different in both countries. In the following section, I focus in detail on these processes.

7.2. Reshaping the Left: between Party Elites and Social Movements

The transformation of the party system as an outcome of the cycle of contention follows a different path in the two countries. First, the starting point was different: while in Portugal there is a one-level party system with five main national parties since the emergence of BE at the beginning of the 21st century (Lisi, 2009), in Spain the party-system is multi-level (Gunther & Montero, 2009; Wilson, 2012) with multiple interactions and influences between regional and national levels. Moreover, if in Portugal, PCP and BE occupy, in different ways, the space to the left of PS, in Spain this role was fulfilled almost solely by IU until 2014.

However, there is also a difference regarding the strategies and relationships that left parties should pursue with the centre-left, which demonstrates the types of relations established. As such, in Portugal the debate surrounding the process of reconfiguration dealt with how trustworthy the PS was, while in Spain the social movements developed an overarching critique not only of the bipartisan duopoly of the PP and PSOE and their austerity measures, but also of the IU. They considered that there was the need to develop a new electoral tool that could question the framework that emerged with the transition.

It is important to note that this stems from the different sorts of involvement between social movements and political parties and the trajectories of contention identified in the previous chapters.

In Portugal, ‘factions’ of the BE had a strong involvement in the protest movements through their satellite groups, constraining the discourse articulated in the public sphere. In Spain, the 15M, and all its branches, by displaying powerful and autonomous mobilisations

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85 Translated from Spanish.
were able to create a ‘new political paradigm’. In this sense, the dominance of institutional actors in Portugal versus the balance between institutional and non-institutional actors in Spain directly influenced how the party-system came to realign. The distinct configurations of the party system came to absorb and deal with protest differently. While in Portugal the ‘crisis of the left’ was managed within party elites and proto-institutional actors on the Left and by controlling the movement, in Spain the movement groups had an important task of leveraging the recomposition of the Left, coming to interfere directly with IU’s political space. In the following two sections I will outline the political process behind each country trajectory.

7.2.1. Breaking the Hegemony: Podemos and the Party-Constellation

After the December 2015 general elections, the Spanish party-system changed. Rather than one of the two hegemonic parties - PP and PSOE - ending up victorious, two new political forces erupted into the Spanish national scene. As much of the research so far shows, *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos* were born out of dissatisfaction with the political system (Vidal, 2018). The 2015 electoral results led to a tie between the so-called ‘old-politics’ of the PP and the PSOE and the ‘new politics’ of the emerging parties, in which no clear majority between the right-wing and left-wing bloc existed. Taking this into consideration, in this section I will look to the recomposition of left forces, taking *Podemos* as the main gravitational centre of this process.

The reconfiguration of the left led to the formation of a party-constellation: various other political actors emerge at the municipal and regional levels that coalesce around *Podemos*. In all these projects it is possible to discern the influence of 15M both regarding discourse or actors involved (Della Porta, Fernández, et al., 2017). Adding to this, I will argue that there is a dispute between elites and social movements, in which the transformation and rebranding of IU were central due to the already existing struggles for the renewal of this latter party.

As demobilisation occurred from 2013 onwards, different trajectories emerge. The 15M was a broad and all-inclusive movement. This heterogeneity led the different ‘factions’ to follow distinct strategies when relating to institutional action. If on the one hand there were groups that wanted to elaborate proposals to be heard by the institutions, on the other hand, some groups thought they needed to work outside the sphere of the state. The latter is composed of autonomous, libertarian groups and direct social action at the local level (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015) that do not adhere to any institutionalisation project since it does not fit their political vision. Rather, they prefer to keep a frontal contestation at the system (and not its integration),
by doing local work in assemblies and by creating self-managed autonomous spaces. These seem to correspond to the two different modes of being anticapitalist proposed by Eric Olin Wright (2015); while the former corresponds to a strategy of taming capitalism, typical of social-democratic parties, the latter points out to the movement towards eroding the basis of capitalism with everyday practices in order to transcend it. In other words, if one undertakes an ‘institutional assault’, the other continues their non-institutional and grassroots activities. I will mainly focus on the former dynamics as they were the ones that produced institutional impact.

However, groups coming from the social movement sector undertook a project of “institutional assault”, while keeping a social movement ethos to autonomy to the institutions. These directed their action mainly towards municipal elections and institutions. However, as I will show in the case of Madrid, these groups ally with institutional actors to run for elections in broader and transversal platforms. At the national level, Podemos resulted from the conjugation of social movement actors and discourses with groups that orbited in the sphere of the traditional left.

Three levels of parties emerged that relate directly to the structure of the state in Spain: local/municipal parties - that have more explicit links and influence from social movements - regional parties, and national parties. Each one of them has very different origins regarding the political space (Martín, 2015), but also connected and formed a party-constellation (a term that I will use to describe the amalgamation of forces in the left).

Municipal projects: The case of Madrid

Municipal candidacies constituted one of the primary paths for institutionalisation. Despite the territorial dispersion of these across the country (Rubio-Pueyo, 2017), two major municipal projects stand out: Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú. The latter was headed by Ada Colau, the spokesperson of PAH until 2014, and as with Ahora Madrid fused existing political forces (e.g., Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - ICV) with social movement actors. In this section, due to the similarities in the process and because I have not collected data directly on Barcelona en Comú, I will focus on the creation of Ahora Madrid.

Ahora Madrid reunited Ganemos, a platform involving mostly social movements groups, and Podemos. It was branded as an instrumental party by the constituting groups, as it served the mere purpose of running in the municipal elections of 2015. The objective was that it would not become an autonomous entity that could compete later on with Podemos at the local level.
Initially, groups at the level of neighbourhood assemblies started discussing the possibility of combining street politics and institutional action, despite the generalised distrust of the latter. Nonetheless, they considered it important in attempting to renew local politics. Some of the initial experiences failed (until Izquierda Anticapitalista (IA), which I will discuss in more detail below), started and led a process with the objective of discussing the mobilisation experiences of the anti-austerity cycle (housing, mareas, neighbourhood assemblies) in an assembly called Alternativas desde Abajo.\(^{86}\) Constituted as a ‘citizenship space’, it did not have a party format but rather the purpose of building a collective dynamic for the municipal elections of 2015. There was a sense that to solve deeper problems there was the need to enter institutions while keeping a collective and participatory process.

Nevertheless, IA was also involved in a parallel process of building up Podemos to run in the European elections (May 2014), and invited the groups forming part of Alternativas desde Abajo to join. However, these groups perceived this as a controlling strategy. Furthermore, they wished to keep their independence, as they thought that local institutions were better suited to independent grassroots activism. As such, the remaining groups decided not to join Podemos and to gather forces to present themselves in the municipal elections a year and a half later. However, as IA left to focus on Podemos, these groups lost their capacity to operate due to the resources and coordination capacity that the IA provided.

At the beginning of 2014, as Podemos was being launched, a new initiative called Colectivo en Rede\(^ {87}\) appear. This group wrote a “letter for democracy” that proposed to “take the institutions” and attempt a constituent process from below. Emanating from Traficante de Sueños\(^ {88}\) and Patio Maravillas\(^ {89}\), the remaining groups of Alternativas desde Abajo join this process. In the summer, they promoted a space of reflection called Municipalía that lasted until January 2015 and to which 15M, Podemos, IU, Equo and other small parties would also converge.

The result was the creation of Ganemos Madrid which involved a heterogeneous collection of groups (IU, Colectivo en Rede, Equo, ecologists, feminists and 15M related groups). However, Podemos did not embark upon this project as they were reticent to run in local elections due to insufficient resources and a lack of local infrastructure to achieve this while organising their own local branch, instead choosing to prioritise the 2015 general election.

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\(^{86}\) Translated as Alternatives from Below.

\(^{87}\) Translated as Networked Collective.

\(^{88}\) A bookshop in Madrid.

\(^{89}\) An important social centre in Madrid.
(as decided at Vistalegre\textsuperscript{90}). Added to this, despite common objectives, there were tensions due to the different organisational models that Ganemos and Podemos espoused. If the former focused on a participatory and assembly type of decision making, reproducing the 15M repertoires, the latter had a much more top-down and centralist approach that wished to control all aspects of mobilisation.

Nonetheless, as Ganemos generated resources and recognition through public campaigning in 2014, Podemos recognized the impact this could have on their party and this enabled the two groups to reach an agreement. Their pact contemplated the creation of a platform or a so-called instrumental party - Ahora Madrid - that would combine the two parties but could not develop to the extent that it could compete with Podemos in its own right. This came to be constituted by a blend of different collectives which mix institutional and non-institutional groups. As pointed out by Martin (2015), the municipal candidatures that emerged in the summer of 2014 had a closer link to the movements and more internal pluralism integrating both movements and political parties.

At the municipal elections Ahora Madrid finished second, but since PP was not able to hold the majority of seats, AM came to govern the municipality with the support of the PSOE. As a similar process happened in Barcelona, a process of change in the relationship between institutions and non-institutional actors at the local level developed. Importantly, this is just part of the story, and there is the need to look to creation of Podemos and the internal disputes within IU.

\textit{Podemos, IU and the recomposition of the left}

At the national level, there was a long process of recomposition of the left beyond PSOE, starting before the creation of Podemos in 2014. Within the cycle of contention, Podemos was not the first attempt to create a new political party that claimed the heritage of the 15M. Previously, in 2012, streaming directly from this movement, Partido X was created based on social networks and no leadership (Martin, 2015). Nevertheless, it never got close to having any of their candidates elected.

Even if Podemos took on the discursive structure of opportunities created by 15M and articulated it within a Latin American populist reasoning (Laclau, 2005), there were nevertheless internal dynamics within the IU which contributed to the recomposition of the left.

\textsuperscript{90} During their first Citizens Assembly in Vistalegre (October 2014), the winning list decided that they would not focus on local elections to privilege the regional and general elections of 2015.
in Spain during this period. These were constituted in the process of defections and internal pressures to reform the IU at play since 2008.

The IU was created in the end of the 1980s out of a crisis of the PCE. Developed initially with the intent of constituting a political and social movement that would aggregate disperse leftist forces, instead of a coalition, it proposed to reform the space to the left of the PSOE into a broader and more open arena of collaboration. However, despite the calls for the dissolution of the PCE, this party drove the process as it kept a vertical organisational structure in the IU. During the 1990s the IU radicalised and broke the ties it kept with CCOO due to its collaboration with PSOE governments. After some positive results in 1990, the party had a steep decrease vote share at the beginning of the 2000 (Ramiro, 2004). Until the emergence of the financial crisis in 2008, IU would maintain itself as a marginal force despite aggregating various dissidents that ranged from Marxist-Leninists to autonomist groups.

Multiple attempts to reform the IU emerged since the eruption of the financial crisis. In 2007, *Espacio Alternativo* 91 abandoned IU and created a new party called *Izquierda Anticapitalista* 92. They left due to the heavy bureaucratic and institutional apparatus, lack of internal pluralism and contact with activities from below. As such, this new party envisaged occupying a political space brought by the crisis and that in their view IU was not fit to fill. Despite their unsuccessful candidacy to the 2009 European elections, in which they did not elect an MEP, the party came to play a role during the anti-austerity cycle of mobilisations.

Parallel to this, and with the same mindset, a process of internal recomposition started with *Refundación de la Izquierda* 93 in which the whole of the IU implied itself, but that pleases mainly younger members closer to social movements. The purpose was to begin a convergence process beyond the party, materialised in a more open and transversal platform theorised in the various events. Nonetheless, two elements reportedly stopped this: on the one hand, these changes were met with internal resistances within the IU and, on the other, the 15M created a set of political opportunities for new political parties to emerge.

By 2013, the evaluation made by groups on the left over the possibility of renewal was not auspicious. Despite the crescendo in the polls, the IU was involved in several corruption scandals (especially in Madrid) and barely had any contact with mobilisations from below that erupted from the anti-austerity cycle of contention. The apparent inability to go beyond the party structures and institutions repeated the argument made in 2008 at the beginning of the

91 Translated as Alternative Space.
92 Translated as Anti-Capitalist Left.
93 Translated as Refoundation of the Left.
Great Recession by groups such as IA or projects such as *Refundación de la Izquierda*. The context seemed more favourable to the aspirations of a younger generation within the party due to the crisis of *bipartidismo* and particularly the PSOE results in the 2011 general election (Martín & Urquizu-Sancho, 2012), 15M and strong grassroots movements, and the emergence of SYRIZA the previous year in Greece.

As a result, besides the emerging municipal and regional projects discussed previously, there were projects of national character. In 2013, alongside their involvement in local projects (see the previous section), IA initiated contacts to establish an electoral tool for the 2014 European elections that could congregate a variety of different groups. They established contact with Pablo Iglesias, as he enjoyed media exposure but also close ties with IU. It is important to note that previously, Iglesias and Inigo Errejón, his close friend, had been involved in experiences in Galicia as advisors of the *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda* (a coalition between IU and Anova). They rehearsed the Latin American populist repertoire of action and discourse for the first time with good results (Iglesias, 2015a, 2015b; Torreblanca, 2015). This constituted an essential experience as it showed that a different form of political campaigns could be conducted.

Despite their criticisms, the primary objective of the groups that come to constitute Podemos later was the renewal of this political space, through breaking the generational gap and the bureaucratic stagnation of IU. Their view was

“That such a project could only be carried out in collaboration with the existing left. The proposal we made to the left parties for joint open primaries signalled this orientation. We thought that opening the choice of candidates to the citizens would help to tilt the balance of forces on the political board in our favour: the left would look more like the people.” (Iglesias, 2015a, p. 15)

IA and Iglesias’ objective was to create platforms like those later created for the municipal elections. This implied not a big and broad coalition but rather a new and reformed political formation that IU could be part of and would lend their resources. Their main purpose was to test this at the European elections as these were, in their view, an opportunity to open a breach in the political field. These elections combine a national circumscription and the tendency for protest votes in new candidacies that lead to a higher share of votes. However, this process faced the resistance of the IU, despite the previous attempts of renewal within the

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94 This party finished 3rd in the regional elections with 13.91% of the votes and electing 9 regional MPs.
party. This party refused to create a new political platform to the European elections in which they would not be the core and leading actors: all the other forces would have to join under their terms.

Therefore, when faced with this decision, IA and the group around Universidade Complutense (composed by professors and groups already in their universe like Contrapoder, Juventud Sin Futuro, Promotora), decided to create a new political party that strategically combined two dynamics. The first one being the already existing IA party structures and a second one based on the construction of an alternative discourse, a mediatic leadership and a program that could translate and channel the 15M political shift into the electoral arena. The mass media exposure that Iglesias received throughout 2012 and 2013 in local TV and talk shows associated with the right-wing gave him the needed mediatic leadership. The alternative discourse and program translated into the initial manifesto (Mover Ficha) that is signed by multiple public figures and launched in a public event in January 2014 in Madrid. Being signed (and written) by people from different sectors of the Left outside the sphere of the IU, it had the intent of displaying an image of plurality and renewal (contrasting with the IU). it gave expression to the transversal popular discontent and democratic renewal. This meant that establishing hegemony on the left necessitated focusing on a different type of political project outside the left-right continuum: a broader and transversal discourse that could occupy the political centre that resonated with the ideas of 15M.

In May 2014, Podemos elected 5 European MEPs with about 8% of the national vote (see table below). Even if staying behind IU whose share of the vote was around 10%, Podemos created an important momentum. Therefore, if initially, their objective was to pressure IU, this result shows that it was possible to go beyond the IU and therefore change the relationship between both parts.

After this initial breakthrough, as Podemos rose in the polls, IU fell. It is possible to argue that until then, IU was the main party benefitting from the crisis and if it was not for the emergence of Podemos they could have been the main party on the left. As the future leader of IU Alberto Garzón said: “If IU had done its work, Podemos would not exist today”95. From this point onwards, the tensions that had been building up between IA and the Complutense team became more visible. The latter group embarks on a project of centralisation and plebiscitary democracy inspired by the Latin American ‘experiences’ building up an ‘electoral

war machine’, that gives less importance to the circles and the participation on the ground they initially aimed. Their first Citizens Assembly (or party congress) concluded the initial process of party creation. The circles created at the foundational moment of Podemos barely received any power, and the party got centralised around the general secretary core and the Consejo Estatal (State Council).

**FIGURE 7.2 VOTING INTENTIONS IN SPAIN (2010-2016)**

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas;

Furthermore, they forbade double militancy with the intent of constraining IA militancy. Throughout their first year, they conducted a process of political articulation (De Leon et al., 2009), through which they redefined their populist discourse, opposing those from below and those from above by using floating signifiers (Laclau, 2005; Sola & Rendueles, 2018). The clearest example was the articulation of the division and opposition between the “caste” and the “people” (i.e., between economic and political elites and the regular population).

If this was the initial process of creation of Podemos, its development would pass through the upcoming elections at different levels. This sees the creation of multiple alliances with regional parties. I will discuss this in the following sub-section.

*The Road to General Elections and the Party-Constellation*

After the European elections, the relations between IU and Podemos changed. Not only did the new party attract multiple groups from a more ‘reformist faction’ of social movements, but also
various young cadres from IU started joining. The latter group was prominent in the redefinition of the party through the addition of their political project and experience.

Participation in multiple elections marked the initial history of Podemos. In the municipal and the autonomic elections, the question of building a party and the tensions on the left around allying with IU emerged again, as the young middle-rank cadres once more pressured the party. For example, in Madrid Mauricio Valiente (municipal candidate) and Tania Sánchez (candidate for the autonomous region) won the primary elections of IU and started negotiating a unitarian candidacy with Ganemos. However, facing resistance from the IU top leadership they decided to leave the party to form alternative projects. Tania Sánchez formed Convocatoria por Madrid96 with the objective of facilitating the process of leaving IU to other militants and building a unitary candidacy from below that would aggregate multiple forces such as the IU, Podemos and social movements.97

After Podemos and its partners’ successes in local and regional elections, in which they achieved better results than the IU and competed close with the PSOE, there was an attempt to bring IU, Podemos and other parties (such as Equo and independent activists) together. The idea was to replicate the model from Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú for the general elections of December 2015. Nonetheless, as Podemos refused to participate, this project changed its name from Ahora en Común98 to Unidad Popular99, effectively led by the IU. This followed a process of primary elections to choose their candidates, run by the younger generation that remained in the party. Established around Alberto Garzon (who participated in 15M and was the youngest MP elected in 2011 and later elected leader of IU in May 2016), they tried to emulate the success of Podemos. Nevertheless, this failed as more groups and individuals left IU to join Podemos.

In the end, the two ran separately, with Podemos (and the confluences) being able to elect more than 60 MPs, while the IU elected only two. In December 2015, Podemos was the third force behind PSOE and PP. As Podemos established itself as the strongest party on the left behind the PSOE, it could then reintegrate the IU in its own terms.

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96 Translated as Call for Madrid.
97 In 2016, after the December 2015 general elections, this group joins Podemos.
98 Translated as Now in Common.
99 Translated as Popular Unity.
By the end of this cycle, it is possible to understand the convergence of the multiple existing lefts. Driven by a wide generational gap and opposing strategies, Podemos initially emerged as a vehicle to pressure the IU to reformulate its action. However, as they electorally surpassed IU, Podemos became the national gravitational force around which a variety of actors coalesced at multiple levels: (1) municipal projects that congregated social movement groups, IU, Podemos and other smaller parties; (2) IU which came to be controlled by a younger generation that remained in the party and that allied with Podemos in 2016; (3) confluences - regional parties (Valencia, Galiza and Catalonia) that while running together with Podemos, kept their independence and lead at regional levels. Finally Podemos would split into three factions: (1) Anticapitalistas (former IA) which kept their autonomy, controlled the party in Andalucia, were strong in Madrid, and present in the European Institutions where they allied with Varoufakis’ ‘Plan B’; (2) Pablistas: in which Pablo Iglesias was the central pillar, uniting various tendencies departed from the IU, were Eurocommunist, and took a more critical stance towards PSOE, refusing to ally with this latter party; (3) Errejonistas that connected more clearly with the Latin American experiences, defending transversal populism and the reconstruction of the left outside the “old symbols of the left”, being more belligerent against the alliance with the IU and more prone to deals with the PSOE. These last two factions ended

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100 The authors make the following note to the data: “Regional elections do not include four regions (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia). Local elections only collect the results of the ten largest cities in Spain. In the local elections of May 2015, Podemos and IU ran as part of citizen platforms in many places; and in the general elections of Jun 2016 both formed the coalition ‘Unidos Podemos’”.
up fighting for the control of the party, with the one under the control of Iglesias coming to dominate the party. This story came full circle during the elections of June 2016, since the IU/UP and Podemos finally allied in Unidos Podemos and ran together in elections.

7.2.2. Resilience and the Recomposition of the Left in Portugal

The transformations of the Left in Portugal led to a realignment of the party system, at least for the time being. For the first time, various parties on the left combined efforts in support of a Socialist government. My argument is that the lack of a new political party in Portugal derives not only from the lack of impact of social movements in the reconfiguration of political sphere as in Spain, but also from an existing tension in the party system between the radical left (BE and PCP) and the PS. From my interviews and observations, the main question that emerged throughout the cycle of contention was what type of relationship these parties, and particularly among the various tendencies of the BE, wanted to establish with the PS in order to defeat austerity?

Furthermore, analysis of the BE internal dynamics is vital to understand why this party came to occupy the centre of the leftist political turmoil since 2011. First, there were multiple splits from the BE and new parties were emerging whose objective was to replace and occupy this space to reach an agreement with the socialists and fight back against austerity. Secondly, this materialises in the constitution of Congresso Democrático das Alternativas\(^1\), a political initiative that intended to federate the left around a programme with minimum a set of common objectives. Paradoxically, despite the BE’s constant refusal to move in this direction, they end up allying with PS after the elections. This can only be explained by the internal party dynamics after eliminating both internal and external competition, which allowed them to concentrate power around specific figures.

As discussed in chapter four, the BE results from the confluence between small left parties (PSR, Política XXI and UDP) and social movement groups in a particular political structure of opportunities reminiscent of the anti-globalisation struggles, the national mobilisations for East-Timor and the referendum for abortion in 1999. This party was implicated in a double dynamic which involved both actions through institutional channels and engagement in the streets. The objective was to achieve, in their own words, a ‘social majority’ that could transform Portuguese society. Taking as examples some of the Eurocommunist’s experiences, they try to introduce new elements and issues into Portuguese politics. Upon their

\(^1\) Translated as the Democratic Congress for the Alternatives.
foundation and the first few years, their organisational structure and decision-making process were of a polyarchic executive, (i.e., the party would function through horizontal links and decentralisation) (Lisi, 2009, 2013; Noronha, 2014; Soeiro, 2009).

Nevertheless, in 2005 it started a process that involved centralisation, verticalization and mediatization, through which the party-elite ensured more power and ended up transforming their engagement with civil society groups. From this point onwards, a more careful approach develops in order to instrumentalise movements, and their satellite organisations started to play a more prominent role in conditioning the renewal of the social movement arena. In a way, the formation of an alternative left in Portugal went from the dream of a movement-party to its centralisation.

Between 2005 and 2011 there was an electoral reinforcement of the BE in which the party moved from two (2.44%) to 16 MPs (9.82%). Their main purpose throughout this period was to pressure the PS and affirm themselves as alternatives to the latter party. This was attempted both through an attempt to broaden their political space and influence by supporting the alternative and challenging socialist candidate Manuel Alegre (both in 2005 and 2011) for the presidency, and through their articulation of issues in political movements and protests. However, as the Eurozone crisis progressed, political tensions rose in Portugal throughout 2010-11. The BE played a significant role by supporting a no-confidence vote in 2011 in the socialist government, and by refusing to talk with the Troika during the negotiations of the Memorandum of Understanding (alongside with the PCP). This impacted in their electoral results of 2011 and the new political scenario the party had to deal with. Not only did they lose half of their MPs, but also a conservative majority now controlled the parliament, changing their relative and strategic position towards the socialists. As such, in this context, despite the socialists having signed the MoU, multiple groups started to pressure the party to leadership to collaborate and influence the party.

Bloco de Esquerda from 2011 to 2015: crisis, internal dynamics and re-shaping of the left in Portugal

The period between 2011 and 2015 was of internal crisis for the BE. This ends up in a recomposition at the end of the cycle involving interrelated internal and external dynamics. On the one hand, the former encompasses conflicts between different factions of the party, leadership problems, but also defections from core groups such as Política XXI. On the other hand, the latter comprises strategic options regarding the relationship with the Socialist Party,
with social movements and with other pressure groups from the left that intended a full-front unity against austerity.

Francisco Louçã, who was the uncontested leader of the party since its foundation (and especially after 2005), abandoned parliament and leadership in 2012. He was replaced by two spokespersons (Catarina Martins and João Semedo) from the same internal group. This meant that the Socialist tendency, a newly formed group that conjugated the former PSR and parts of the PXXI tendencies, came to dominate the party, while the *Esquerda Alternativa*\(^{102}\) was pushed aside and decided to fight back.

This conflict was caused by, on the one hand, the loss of half of their MPs in 2011 (some of them prominent figures like José Soeiro or José Manuel Pureza) which meant losing resources that were important for the party. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it was because of the competing conceptions on what strategy they should follow towards the socialists.\(^{103}\) In many ways, this process was the consequence of the failure to take over of the PS as strategised in previous years.

Regarding external dynamics, the central strategic question was the position of the party towards the Socialists. With a right-wing coalition in government and the socialists in a fragile position, what should their strategy be towards the Socialist Party? Should they invest in a long-term strategy to bring all the forces of the left together? As I have been arguing, the relationship to the centre-left is core to understanding the formation and evolution of the BE, and even more so during the austerity years.

As a result, two camps started to form or coalesce: one defending the entrenchment of the party in their position, and another defending a broader coalition or pact with the socialists and other forces of the left to challenge austerity. As discussed above, at its foundation, the BE was projected to aggregate social and political forces as an alternative project to both communists and socialists. Nevertheless, in the period between 2011 and 2015 their disputes revolved around the tactical aggregation of forces. As a result, different groups emerged out of the BE during this period eventually leaving and forming new parties or groups.

\(^{102}\) Alternative Left - previously UDP, a Maoist tendency.

\(^{103}\) It is in part this conflict that is present in the 2014 convention between the two main lists, which seems to be a result of an internal crisis due to their decline in the last elections. The 2014 convention is where the dispute was more intense in what seems to be a struggle within a weakened party apparatus to ensure positions and resources between them. The convention resulted in a draw that led to a balance of power between the majoritarian factions and a formation of a new internal minority closer to the movement circles, less institutionalised and more radical in their position towards Europe. This took place after all the groups had already fled.
The first one was MAS (Movimento Alternativa Socialista) formed by one of their internal tendencies (Ruptura-FER) that left the BE in December 2011. They followed a more radical trajectory and did not ally with anyone. Their strategy was to control the movements and ‘agitare’ street politics (which they ended up doing with the platform that emerged out the Global Day of Action - 15O - as seen in previous chapters). Being present in every demonstration with their banners, they tried to constitute an alternative that was never successful due to their entrist tactics (which led many other groups to block them or not to collaborate with them). Eventually, they became a fringe party. Later, they tried to control an alternative movement that tried to replicate Podemos (calling it Juntos Podemos104) in Portugal, which led to its disbandment and to the party AGIR. They failed to achieve any electoral success.

Additionally, a different set of groups emerged to defend an alliance of the whole left. Most of these groups came together, in one way or another, in the 2015 general elections. They formed an electoral platform called Tempo de Avançar105 constituted of Livre, Fórum Manifesto, Renovação Comunista and Manifesto 3D (these groups are described in more detail below). The process was mediated by Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, and preceded by political initiatives that prepared the ground for the emergence of more organised political forces. As these platform and groups came to put forward the idea of forming a Left pact that was able to defend the welfare state against austerity, I will turn to explain this trajectory more thoroughly in the following section.

From Congresso Democrático das Alternativas to a Recomposition of the Left
From 2012 onwards, various initiatives for a project of ‘left unity’ began to emerge leading to Congresso Democrático das Alternativas (CDA).106 This was an integral part of the of the contentious cycle and is essential to understanding the various answers given to austerity and the formation of new political entities. The group stemmed from three small groups: Communist Renewal, independents and finally people connected to Forum Manifesto (part of BE’s PXXI). As reported in some of the interviews, and chapter four, there were already initiatives that attempted this project since RC left PCP in 2002.

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104 Translated as Together We Can.
105 Translated as Time to Move on.
106 http://www.congressoalternativas.org/
The CDA diagnosis was that with the Troika and the right-wing coalition government there was a paradigmatic shift in Portuguese society, in which the welfare retrenchment constituted an attack on the core idea of the regime.

This demanded the left to unite under programmatic minimum denominators, and converge under a unitary platform and space of reflection. As reported in one interview, the objective was to pressure the BE to go beyond their institutional borders and reconvene in a larger political space by going back to its roots. Still, as I will show, this space was blocked over the cycle as the BE was involved in internal disputes.

Coming from a similar political area and with similar objectives, the *Manifesto para uma Esquerda Livre* was launched in May 2012 by a group of people headed by Rui Tavares. They criticised the whole left for their lack of political solutions against austerity. Notably, they censured the competition between parties, rather than the possibilities for cooperation and compromise between the different parts. In noticing the overlapping objectives, the CDA decided to invite this group to collaborate.

“There was a critique to the left using two expression that were talked at the time. One the soft left (the PS), and does not become autonomous in relation to particular interests and that when gets into power has a much more right-wing agenda than a lefty one. The other one was the inconsequent left, regarding the BE and the PCP, always in a position of not wanting to be part of a govern solution, always with an outsider strategy, but always very critique […] it is almost a bipolar left, between the softness of the PS and the inconsequence of the BE and the PCP […] it was not sustainable to keep the left like this as the country was facing the abyss.” (Interviewee 2, Portugal)

The first meeting of the CDA happened immediately after the first demonstration organized by the QSLT and on a highly symbolic date (October 5th). It is important to notice that there was barely any relationship between the two groups, apart from at the height of contestation to austerity. Other than the groups already referred, different tendencies from Socialists, CGTP, social movements and independent left were also present. As such, it worked as a convergence point of different groups and a bridge between groups that favoured a common left programme and joint action. As such, this became the starting point for a process of realignment that would lead to the left pact, as it was the group that first articulates this idea.

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107 Translated as Manifest for a Free Left.
108 Holiday that celebrates the instauration of a Republic in Portugal.
They kept meeting throughout the next year to discuss the welfare state, resulting in multiple books and reflections.

Apart from being a vehicle of reflection, there was always a question regarding the next step (i.e., if they should form a new political party). Nonetheless, this ended up being an unsolvable question and resulted in some demobilisation as there were different political ‘ambitions’ and interests at play, and the BE was not happy to lose relevance by integrating a broader political structure. As such, new and more concrete political initiatives emerged from the CDA in order to solve the ‘immobilism’ of the BE. As in Spain, their main objective was to present themselves to the European elections of 2014.

The first initiative to attempt to federate the various groups on the left was Manifesto 3D. The manifesto gathered former members of the communist party, members from BE from Fórum Manifesto (that would meanwhile leave the party in 2014), as well as independents that launched a manifesto. Another initiative stemming directly from the CDA was the creation of a new political party by the group that gathered around Manifesto para uma Esquerda Livre to form LIVRE. If Manifesto 3D originated mainly from the ‘old left’ and already established groups and which tried to find an alternative political solution, LIVRE gathered many people who were new to politics; those who had never been involved with political parties and came from mainly from cultural and intellectual circles.

In an attempt to enlarge and create a new political entity, the Manifesto 3D proposed to the BE the creation of what they called an “envelope party” in which the Manifesto 3D, the BE and the LIVRE would run together for the European Elections supporting new and independent figures. The BE refused this attempt to renew the left since, as part of the deal, their members could not be candidates (due to their refusal to work with Livre due to past but still-ongoing conflicts).

As a result, at the European elections, BE and Livre ran separately while Manifesto 3D did not integrate any of the lists. As shown in the table below, from 2009 to 2014 both the PS and the PCP improved their electoral results, while BE lost votes and MPs and Livre was not able to elect anyone. Nevertheless, an outsider party (MPT) decided to centre their campaign around Marinho Pinto, a lawyer and a popular media figure whose discourse focused on the political elite and corruption. This party came to elect two MEPs. Nevertheless, in the following

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109 At the time it was voted to the best way forward was for the already existing structures to converge.
110 http://manifesto3d.blogspot.co.uk/
111 http://livrept.net/ - Their “leader” was Rui Tavares who was elected as MEP by Bloco in 2009 and meanwhile left due to conflicts with Bloco, continuing to be a MEP.
months, as Marinho Pinto tried to create a new party it quickly faded away, disappearing into irrelevance.

**TABLE 7.1 ELECTORAL RESULTS - EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (%) AND NUMBER OF MP IN PORTUGAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>43.07 (12)</td>
<td>38.60 (12)</td>
<td>26.58 (7)</td>
<td>31.46 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>31.11 (9)</td>
<td>33.27 (9)  (PSD+CDS-PP)</td>
<td>31.71 (8)</td>
<td>27.71 (7) (PSD+CDS-PP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU (PCP)</td>
<td>10.32 (2)</td>
<td>9.09 (2)</td>
<td>10.66 (2)</td>
<td>12.68 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS/PP</td>
<td>8.16 (2)</td>
<td>8.37 (2)</td>
<td>10.73 (3)</td>
<td>4.56 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>1.79 (0)</td>
<td>4.91 (1)</td>
<td>7.14 (2)</td>
<td>2.18 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições

This would result in another defection from the party. *Fórum Manifesto* (previously *Política XXI*)\(^{112}\) abandoned the party in the summer of 2014 after the European elections due to the continuous refusal of the BE, even in the face of bad results, to compromise and open to new political projects. The group left not because of a programmatic divergence, but because of a strategic one.\(^{113}\) In their view, there was a need for a platform of dialogue with socialists, communists and independents that could face a scenario of prolonged austerity. Furthermore, in their perspective, the party was entrenched and had lost their movimentist vocation and openness to a social majority.

In this sense, the radical left seemed to be in disarray. In November 2014 Convention, the remaining tendencies in the BE (Socialism and the Alternative Left) disputed the control of the party. As their prognosis of future electoral results was not promising, each tendency wanted to ensure part of the resources and positions in a minor party until their eventual comeback. Therefore, instead of running in joint lists as in previous conventions, their dispute was centred around what political strategy to follow and which group would come to control the party structure. Nevertheless, by the end of the convention, the voting ended up in a tie between these tendencies, leading them to negotiate every single aspect of party control and resources.

The result was two political projects on the left running to the 2015 general elections that espoused different strategies. One that wanted to commit to a broader alliance of the left:

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\(^{112}\) Forum Manifesto, to which many members of 3D end up joining later, was previously known as *Política XXI*. This group was led by Miguel Portas and reunited old PCP and MDP members, being the smaller tendency of BE at his formation, the one with less impact, closer to social democracy. The de facto lider of the group after the death of Miguel Portas, Ana Drago stays in the party and as an MP until July 2014.

a united front against austerity, and another that consistently points out the impossibility of reaching agreements with the Socialists. In this way, the various political projects that emerged from the CDA and the BE defending the former converge in an electoral platform called *Tempo de Avançar* (Time to Move On). These brought together LIVRE, Fórum Manifesto, Manifesto 3D and independents.

However, despite all the predictions, in the 2015 general elections BE had its best result ever, while their direct competitors (*Tempo de Avançar*) were not able to elect a single MP, leading the BE and the PCP to support the socialist minority through a parliamentary agreement. This seemed to result from the good electoral campaign, the overall internal cohesion despite the tensions within the party, a leadership effect around Catarina Martins, but also some renewal with new generations assuming responsibilities.115

**Table 7.2 Electoral Results - General Elections (%) and Number of MP in Portugal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>44.06 (115)</td>
<td>37.79 (96)</td>
<td>45.03 (121)</td>
<td>36.55 (97)</td>
<td>28.06 (74)</td>
<td>32.31 (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>32.32 (81)</td>
<td>40.21 (105)</td>
<td>28.77 (75)</td>
<td>29.11 (81)</td>
<td>38.65 (108)</td>
<td>38.36 (107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU (PCP)</td>
<td>8.99 (17)</td>
<td>6.94 (12)</td>
<td>7.54 (14)</td>
<td>7.82 (15)</td>
<td>7.91 (16)</td>
<td>8.25 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS/PP</td>
<td>8.34 (15)</td>
<td>8.72 (14)</td>
<td>7.24 (12)</td>
<td>10.43 (21)</td>
<td>11.7 (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>2.44 (2)</td>
<td>2.74 (3)</td>
<td>3.61 (8)</td>
<td>9.82 (16)</td>
<td>5.17 (8)</td>
<td>10.19 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.39 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVRE/Tempo de Avançar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições

We still lack an explanation for the emergence of a new and unexpected ‘coalition’. This pact results, first, from the desire to repeal the right-wing coalition from power together with their austerity measures. Nevertheless, this was conjunctural, as it was the first time that there was a left majority despite the PS minority. In a political situation that could eventually get stalled in case the PS supported a right-wing government, this avoided PS leader resignation and the eventual demise of the party, as it happened in Greece with PASOK. In this way, the effects of the cycle of contention, with new cleavages and discourses together with an internal clarification/depuration of BE, in which they were able to defeat competing new parties, afforded them a negotiable position.

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115 One such example was Mariana Mortágua, a young MP, that gained visibility during a parliamentary commission that investigated the corruption scandal associated with one of the biggest private banks - *Banco Espírito Santo* - in the country.
7.3. Conclusion and the Politics of Alliances post-2015

In this chapter, I have dealt with the last stage of the cycle of contention in which, as suggested by Tarrow (1989, 2011), after a highly contentious period, new actors, repertoires and frameworks enter the institutions of democratic politics. In the same way, apart from social movements and following a Linzian approach (Linz & Stepan, 1978), I have shown that existing elites and political parties also play a central role in how the process unfolds. Rather than just considering the ways social movements impact the recomposition of the political system, I have shown that internal party dynamics were also crucial.

In this way, institutionalisation took different paths in the cases under analysis here. If in Spain a set of new political parties and alliances were able to reach institutions throughout the electoral period of 2014/15, in Portugal these attempts failed and instead a shift in the party system occurred with the radical and centre-left allying in government for the first time in history. In the Portuguese case, the process of realignment was led by the internal dynamics of the left mediated by intermediary platforms. The debate was at the elite level with an attempt to federate the left with the most pressing issue being what position to take towards the Socialist Party. Therefore, social movements played a lesser role in the recomposition of the left since their action was one that wanted to conserve the status-quo of the welfare state resulting from the close links with political parties. This meant that rather than operating a radical shift in the political sphere, social movements did not emerge as an alternative to institutional action but instead reinforced it. In this sense, as movements never transformed into political parties demobilisation is concurrent to non-institutionalisation.

The Spanish case was more complex as it involved two political dynamics that account for the emergence of new left-wing parties. On the one hand, social movements groups came to establish a vital dynamic that led into the creation of alternative political parties; on the other hand, there were multiple defections from the traditional left to launch new political projects that would break through the existing generational gap. These two dynamics came to synthesise in what I called party-constellation, where local, regional and national parties coalesced around Podemos (the national gravitational centre) creating a distinct political dynamic to the one that existed previously.

This was not the logical or natural conclusion of the cycle. There were already similar forces, namely UPyD and IU, that occupied the political spaces that could have taken the structure of opportunities brought by the crisis. Instead, Podemos and Ciudadanos established themselves as the new players in the political field. The transformation of the left resulted from
the combination of strong social movements discussed previously with the internal dynamics, and elite disputes within IU described in this chapter. Their debate was about the best strategy to create an alternative that could take over the PSOE in a situation of crisis. Contrasting with this, in Portugal, the discussion centred on how to establish a fruitful relationship with the PS.

As such, the conjugation of different analytical tools here makes clear not only the different paths that the cycle takes but also the importance of actors and their relationships along the cycle of protest. If the Spanish social movements were of crucial elements in the emergence of the ‘party-constellation’, in Portugal the recomposition came from disputes within the left. Nevertheless, this was not absent from the emergence of Podemos as well, and there is a case to be made that to a certain extent Podemos is part of a process of rebranding of IU (even if not intentionally).

I contend that this is a fragile realignment of the political system at the end of the cycle of contention. Even though ‘new’ repertories and frameworks are slowly incorporated, its bases are fragile, and they can be merely circumstantial adaptations/co-optations to/of EU austeritarian rule. In this way, in Portugal, the so-called Gerigonça, or Contraption, that reunited BE, PCP, Greens and PS in a parliamentary pact, was initially received with enthusiasm as it could turn around more than four years of austerity. It is important to note that in the beginning, few people believed that such an agreement could endure for the whole legislature. Nevertheless, the agreement ensured a position of influence for the PS minority in government, as their votes were needed to ensure laws and the yearly budget was approved. Plus, austerity was to a certain extent reduced, and some redistributive measures ensured by this pact (benefiting from the improvement of the overall international economic situation). However, this constituted a sort of trap to the left-wing parties: if they broke this alliance they would be blamed for political instability, when a government is ensuring some redistribution and political stability. Therefore, they would lose votes.

Furthermore, the EU managed to control the so-called success case by nominating the current Portuguese finance minister to be president of the Eurogroup: a position that requires following and imposing budgetary prescriptions. This means that rather than going against and beyond austerity, Portugal is still locked into this sort of political economy, meaning that the party in government can control their more radical partners. Plus, the pools seemed to show that the PS is the main party benefiting from the current situation, which might lead in future elections to breaking the pact.

In Spain, the political alliances post-2015 were marked by the potency of the new parties and a hung parliament in which no clear majorities existed. The nationalist cleavage
and ongoing Catalan crisis play an important role. After the general elections of December 2015, in which the PP gets more votes but not a majority, Mariano Rajoy, the leader of this party, refused the King’s offer to form government due to the lack of enough parliamentary support. This left the second most voted-for party, the PSOE, to attempt to form a government. The initial idea was to attempt a political pact, following the Portuguese example, with *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos*. However, these two parties were not available to work together as their support was not sufficient and nationalist cleavage played an important role. The PSOE would need the support from the nationalist which *Ciudadanos* refused, while *Podemos* was open to the idea of a referendum in Catalonia. Plus, having ensured a significant part of the votes, Podemos wanted to be part of the government, something to which the socialists resisted. With this scenario, Pedro Sánchez was unable to get elected, leading to new elections. PP again won, even if not with a majority, and *Ciudadanos* offered its support in parliament. As this happened, the elite of PSOE forced Sánchez to resign, leading this party to abstain, making Rajoy president of government.

Nonetheless, Sánchez was able to make his comeback a year later, winning the party elections. Already in 2018, after a court decision in a corruption case against PP, the PSOE under his leadership proposed a no-confidence vote that counted with the support of *Podemos* and the regional parties, overturning the previous attempt two years before. In this, Sánchez became president, replacing Rajoy. However, the new government has to manage a fragmented group of interests and support in Parliament as it was hard to conciliate *Podemos* demands with some of the right-wing regional parties. Therefore, the difficulty in pursuing a more redistributive agenda has led the current government to focus on issues such as the refugee crisis or the exhumation of Franco from *Vale de los Caídos*. As such, the PSOE has been able to renew its image by ensuring the use of symbols and discourses coming from the 15M and civil society. As such, despite the influence it has in the current government, *Podemos* could lose influence in upcoming elections if PSOE recovers part of its electorate. In this sense, the current scenario might recede into a pre-crisis political landscape where *Podemos* occupies the space previously occupied by IU.

In many ways, these were latent tensions that the crisis and the cycle of contention only brought to the surface. This reequilibration, even if fragile, stems from regimes and parties and the way they were built. The question now is how long this will persist for and if these reconfigurations will crystalise in the future. Only time will tell.
8. Conclusions

In this dissertation, I have compared the contentious responses to austerity between 2009 and 2015 in Portugal and Spain in the context of the Great Recession. I have conducted a detailed analysis of the anti-austerity cycle of protest, from the initial mobilisations at the beginning of the crisis, to the transformation of the party system in 2015. This entailed examining (1) relations between institutional and non-institutional actors and (2) the range of repertoires and claim-making used throughout the cycle.

It is important to observe that although economic factors led to the emergence of the so-called movements of the crisis, the political responses around the world were heterogeneous and involved a plurality of actors and claims. Rather than treating the cases in this wave of contention as similar, I viewed them as being embedded within national dynamics. As such, more than focusing on the transversal and transnational features of protest, in this thesis I have instead aimed to look in detail to the particularities of each country in their responses to austerity.

In this way, I have pursued two main ideas concerning political processes in Spain and Portugal. Firstly, even if the movements of the crisis were a consequence of the Great Recession, the collective reactions to the financial collapse were more complex and were not restricted to social movements. Secondly, to fully grasp the spectrum of reactions and the contentious assemblages against austerity, the entire cycle of contention must be examined. Instead of analysing one-off events and protest actors, I undertook an integrated analysis of the sequence of events, the opportunity structures, the interactions between actors, both institutional and non-institutional, and their multiple claims (economic, social and political). This entailed a processual and relational analysis, one that brings to the fore a very different picture from those provided by other researchers: social movements were not the only actors to contest austerity and market liberalisation, and the nature of the political field in which they act is crucial to understanding how change was brought about.

Finally, with regard to the connections between capitalism and contention, it is important to realise that different temporalities help us to situate the different aspects of mobilisation into the broader cycle. On this point, Della Porta (2015, 2017) posits the existence of three temporalities to which we should pay attention, namely, short, middle and long term. My analytical framework has made possible a granular analysis and comparison of two
episodes of contention that result from short-term changes in capitalism and the development of the crisis.

8.1. Contesting Austerity: A Summary
In this thesis, three initial chapters outlined the context, framework, and methods that underpinned the subsequent four empirical chapters. Even though these chapters followed a chronological order and processual logic, their organisation was also to a certain extent thematic. This is because each phase brought its own sets of issues, repertoires and actors. In this sense, the chapters translate the idea of the cycle of protest, broken down into its different stages, from the initial mobilisations, through to peak protests and institutionalisation.

With regard to the background of the cycle, viewed in terms of previous mobilisations and the wider political landscape since the transition to democracy in Portugal and Spain this was reconstituted on the basis of secondary data, the relevant research literature, interviews. The objective was two-fold: on the one hand, I wanted to contextualise the cases historically, but on the other, there was a need to test claims that movements of the crisis are spontaneous or novel. And indeed, the findings of this study show that many of the characteristics of the contentious actors involved in the mobilisations in the period studied were not new. They had existed for some time. Even if the turning points (GaR and 15M) constituted an explosive moment “coming out of nowhere”, they incorporated many of the features of previous mobilisations.

To some extent, the key findings of the chapter - Preludes to Mobilisation - show that the political dynamics that came to define the anti-austerity cycle of protest were established in the early 2000s. In Portugal, the emergence of the BE transformed the party system, and it also influenced movements. Due to its initial movement-party nature, it came to influence and shape the protest field. This was especially relevant in the case of the grievances regarding labour precarity: groups associated with the BE formed platforms against precarity that were central in the anti-austerity cycle of protest. In Spain the decentralised and autonomous network of movements, which was detached from institutional actors, would later form the core of the anti-austerity actions. The network espoused a discursive repertoire, critical of the regime and favourable to participatory democracy – which, again, was already in place in the mid-2000s. As such, it is possible to detect the development of actions and relationships between actors before the cycle of protest that help to explain many features of protest mobilisations between
2010 to 2014. These results are clearly opposed to any idea of spontaneity and novelty in the social movements.

As for the following phases, at the turning points of the cycle of protest in each country, I compare the emergence of social movements in 2011. I show how these came to redefine the protest field, and explore why the cases followed different paths. While in Spain the 15M produced mobilisations consistently for almost three years, in Portugal such protest movements that existed never recurred with comparable frequency. The main difference at the turning points was the diverging capacity of the movements to involve people beyond their core activists – to extend their mobilisations beyond their usual activist networks. In Spain the 15M expanded their actions to those who were not typically engaged in such activities, whilst in Portugal – and despite multiple attempts – the movements recruited few new people.

While in Spain the discursive repertoire and organisational practices were open and part a variety of different groups that fiercely critiqued the existing political parties, trade unions and institutions, in Portugal this type of claim-making and organisation never gained ground with protest instead focused on labour precarity. In addition, the connective structure – the network and links between different individuals and groups – also mattered. In Spain 15M’s decentralisation of activities to neighbourhoods appeared to increase their mobilisation capacity due to a pre-existing network of groups and activists at the local level who were able to mobilise their resources in new directions. The opposite transpired in Portugal. Even though there were efforts, the assemblies created around Lisbon remained insular, not being able to win over new members.

As the cycle of protest progressed, between 2012–2013, claims evolved from representation to redistribution. I argue that as austerity persisted, protest dynamics changed and evolved. Claims on representation increasingly gave way to claims about redistribution, concerning labour, education, healthcare and housing. This was particularly evident in Spain where overlapping dynamics were led by a coalition of actors that involved social movements and trade unions. Movements were not subjugated by institutional actors and reflected a bottom-up type of mobilisation. The protest dynamics spurred by the 15M lasted for three years and entailed the collaboration of several types of actor at different phases of the cycle of contention. Since most institutional actors were delegitimised due to their previous support/advocacy of austerity policies, they were not able to mobilise as strongly as social movements. In a second stage, this compelled trade unions to collaborate with movements after the turning point (2011). If the movements provided legitimacy, the trade unions would provide the resources to sustain them.
Nothing comparable happened in Portugal. After a period of movement void at the beginning of 2012 – a moment in which social movement actors disappear – a strategic alliance between parties, trade unions and some movement groups connected to institutional actors, came to dominate the field and advocate focused redistribution. Claims for democratic representation were never dominant in Portugal, and by 2012 it was only visible amongst fringe groups of marginal significance to the anti-austerity dynamics. In this sense, after 2012, Portugal was dominated by institutional actors: trade unions disputed austerity in the streets, and political parties, particularly the BE, through groups associated with them, influenced the social movements’ mobilisations. Even if social movement actors were relevant in specific moments of the cycle, it was institutional actors – in the form of trade unions and political parties – who were the protagonists. Social movement actors were never able to sustain mobilisation in a continuous way, emerging only at particular moments within the structure of opportunities.

In analysing these two phases, I developed a critique of the “excessive” focus in the literature upon social movements as such. The cycle of contention was more complex, with the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors at its core. Furthermore, claim-making went beyond the merely economic to include demands for a more transparent and fully participatory democracy, with various conceptions of democracy and citizenship rights deployed throughout the cycle of contention by its constituent actors.

Lastly, I dealt with the outcomes of the cycles of protest and the emergence of new political forces. It is important to stress here that the dynamics observed throughout 2010–2014 were central to the transformations that emerged in the party system, and especially on the left during the electoral cycle of 2014–2015. Nevertheless, in both countries, the transformations in the party system did not result solely from social movement actions but from ongoing dynamics within the existing left-wing parties. In Spain, Podemos benefited not only from an opening in the opportunity structures and discourses created by social movements throughout the cycle, but also from the dynamics within the IU. For several years, a younger generation had pressed for renewal of the party. If only the IU had resolved its internal disputes and given voice to this younger generation, it could have benefited from the general and widespread discontentment with the mainstream parties. In Portugal, the weakness of the emerging movements was related to the lack of success of new parties. Instead, the project of transforming the left involved a broader alliance between already existing parties rather than the creation of new ones. This comparison reinforces the idea that different models of
mobilisation and of the transformation of the party system operated in the two countries. In Spain, movements led to its change, whilst in Portugal these were absorbed by the already existing institutions.

Throughout this investigation, I have endeavoured to show that the anti-austerity dynamics of contention in each country reflect two different and contrasting models concerning the relationship between actors and their discursive repertoires. In Portugal it is centralised and top-down. In Spain there is greater autonomy between institutional actors and mobilisations from below.

So why did the cycle of protest and outcomes differ? Returning to the debates I outlined at the outset, a first answer has to do with the different impacts of the crisis in both countries – primarily, the crisis leading to more unemployment and emigration in Spain than in Portugal. Nonetheless, the political conditions were similar: in the context of the Eurozone crisis, austerity was started in 2010 by the ruling socialist parties in each country. These parties lost the general elections and were supplanted by right-wing majorities that continued down the path of austerity. Therefore, the main difference between these countries’ responses to austerity has to do with the configurations of contentious actors. In this sense, the trajectory of protest followed in each country was not pre-determined but rather based on the relations in the field. This has an important implication: that the political field mediates contentious responses to austerity. This goes some way towards explaining why in Portugal we find no new political party but rather a reconfiguration of the field. It is to the details of this novel contribution to the field of protest studies that we now turn.

8.2. Contributions and Future Research

This study deep analysis of the political processes in Spain and Portugal also speaks to further issues about the relationships between austerity, political crises, social mobilisation and change. It also suggests avenues for future research.

In Spain and Portugal, it is important to notice that the crisis in the “reanimated” the SEC field of studies. Given the commonalities and differences between the countries during the crisis, it brought back discussions regarding the impact of the transition in shaping institutions, democracy and the answers to the crisis. In this sense, this dissertation provides empirical evidence to inform the ongoing debates, continuities and changes in the political sphere and democracy in the southern European countries are opening up avenues to understand the non-institutional side of democracy and how these came to transform
institutions. In contrast to many past analyses that have tended to focus on institution building after the transition to democracy, this study highlights the important role played by civil society in relation to the State.

In these two cases, the findings show that political transformations were not driven solely by the economic and financial crises, but also stemmed from the actions of political agents on the ground. The contrast between the two countries seems to point to two different models (or ideal types) of mobilisation, each treating the political sphere as an arena where movements and institutional actors interact. The first may be termed top-down, and the second bottom-up. This enlightens us not only about how cycles of protest unfold, but also about how the different configurations and arrangements in the two countries led/produced different outcomes.

This research began from a Polanyian interpretation of the crisis and of austerity as reflecting a planned liberalisation movement whereby spontaneous counter-movements of protection appear. Nonetheless, if the Polanyian framework aids understanding of the triggers of protest, it cannot explain fully the shape and nature of the counter-movements. To chart how these developed, I therefore proposed an updated version of contentious politics that emphasises the plurality of actors and claim-making throughout the cycle, in order to contrast it with approaches that focus on a single event or group.

From this, I proposed viewing the interactions between different types of actor as the principal factor shaping the evolution of cycles of contestation. These two case studies show that we need to reconsider the relations between social movements and institutional actors. These relations are not one-directional, such as from movements to parties, but instead go both ways and involve different types of relations: the control of social movements by political parties through satellite actors, or the formation of hybrid actors such as the Mareas in Spain. Actors are not stable or fixed, but instead are embedded in a field of action. It follows that in addition to a cyclical model that considers the sequence of events, the researcher must also consider how both sets of actor influence how the cycle unfolds.

This idea has yet to be fully developed in the discipline of political sociology. In the future, I hence intend to explore and develop this line of work alongside a consideration of current developments in social movement theory, of which a dominant strand pursues the relational turn that was established with the contentious politics approach – and hence makes use of terms such as field or arena. The power relations between actors, their historical underpinnings and trajectory, and regime building is a potentially productive way to bring together the literatures on social movements, political parties, and institutions into an coherent
theory – what might be termed *regimes of contention*. Whilst not unrelated to the concept of political regimes, it is substantially different. Its potential usefulness lies in the due emphasis it gives to the role that contention plays within particular institutions, while being sensitive simultaneously to the reality that these institutions frame protests in terms of relations between actors, symbols and resources. Furthermore, contentious politics tends to be based on the premise that different types of political regimes lead to different forms of contention. In so doing, this approach often fails to acknowledge the range of conditions that can emerge within democratic or authoritarian regimes, such as the different models of contestation that exist in Portugal and Spain, despite both being democracies. Research on these lines would be directed mainly towards elucidating the ways contention develops in particular political regimes and in what way the position of actors vis-à-vis each other and the state express different discursive repertoires and interests.

With respect to future research, this dissertation can be thought to contribute to the foundation for further work on the post-2015 reconfiguration in these two countries. The period during which mobilisations against austerity occurred might constitute a critical juncture and could illuminate how political dynamics will come to develop in the future as it sets the tone for what comes after. In both countries, this means a weakened Socialist Party reliant on support from stronger left-wing parties, fighting over the meaning of austerity and how far budgets can be stretched while remaining within the constraints of the Eurozone.

One interesting question is to what extent the cycle of protest came to change the relations between non-institutional and institutional actors. Was the creation of *Podemos* detrimental to social movements? In what way did the involvement of left-wing parties with a parliamentary pact in Portugal open the way for alternative movements to contest the current government in Portugal? Or are the same types of relationship still in place in both countries, even whilst the protagonists have changed?

Another important consideration is the extent to which this model of the relationship between actors and political change pertains beyond the European periphery. Even though the crisis was more intense in the periphery, it was also felt in the core countries of the EU. In what ways were movements accommodated by the institutions in such countries? How are southern and northern countries comparable? An unusual and potentially illuminating case of the relations between institutional and non-institutional actors would be the transformation of the Labour Party in the UK under Jeremy Corbyn. A long-time backbencher with the support of a wider grassroots movement, Corbyn was able to bring change from within. This case would
appear to reflect a different model that should be added to our approach, and perhaps especially after 2015.

Finally, as with all research, this work too has its limitations. First of these is the absence of an analysis of the nationalist dynamics regarding Catalonia and how these interacted with the anti-austerity mobilisations in Spain. This is worthy of its own detailed analysis, which is absent here only because it would have expanded the project far beyond the capabilities of this researcher. A second limitation relates to the discursive dimension of this investigation. Even though I have tried to develop a perspective in which claim-making was central, this position was still dependent on the configurations found between actors and relatively scarce attention was paid to an analysis of the frames developed. Third, focusing strictly on the national level has meant neglecting the potential transnational diffusion of frames: how the frames travelled from one country to the other. These are not closed cases and one can observe a degree of interaction that future work in this area might be well-advised to take into account.

In this dissertation, I therefore hope to have shown that protest is more than merely an expression of disarray and dissatisfaction, and instead has significant institutional roots that have important consequences for the political process. Protests illuminate wider political power arrangements, making them a perfect observation point from which the structures of modern democratic politics can be apprehended. They drive political change, because they generate discourses and associations that influence institutional politics. These contributions will be of interest not only to the growing field of contentious politics and social movements, but also to the study of democracy’s non-institutional aspects, and the impact of crises, helping us to better understand contemporary political life.
References


Movements in Global Perspective: A Survey (pp. 647-676). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.


Appendix I - Chronology

In this chronology I have systematized important political, economic and protest events between 2007 to 2015. This timeline allows to go beyond mere quantification and understand more broadly the structure of political opportunities and threats at a given moment comprising institutional episodes (e.g. government resignation or crisis), austerity measures (e.g. Memoranda of Understanding in Portugal) and international events such as Monti’s ‘whatever it takes’ declaration in July 2012. In addition, I have identified both small episodes and campaigns of contention and eventful and transformative protest events. On the former, it is important to consider a qualitative interpretation of the data that goes beyond the quantitative reading of the PEA. Moreover, due to its symbolic character, large protest events constitute critical moments of contention that influence and shape institutional action. To build this timeline I have mobilized multiple resources from research being done on the topic, newspapers, but also interviews and data collected during fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Europe/World</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Demonstration against ETA in Madrid (150000); 80000 in Bilbao January to March - Campaign of Demonstrations against the Zapatero Government for the negotiations with ETA supported by PP and AVT (from 60.000 to 340.000)</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>General Strike (CGTP) against the ongoing labour reform</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Week of protests by Rompamos el Silencio</td>
<td>Subprime Mortgage burst starting a period of recession in the USA that would lead to financial instability and bank bailouts in the following year (Great recession)</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>UPyD is created (Rosa Díez as leader)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Housing protest in Madrid with the slogan No Vas a tener casa en la puta vida</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>State Budget for 2008 approved; General Strike in the Public Sector (both from CGTP and UGT) against the Government’s unwillingness to negotiate wage increases.</td>
<td>Gürtel Case investigation starts (corruption case involving the PP)</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Espacio Alternativo leaves IU and forms Anticapitalistas; Housing and banking crisis starts</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>FENPROF, teachers demonstration against new regulations (100000 in Lisbon)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>PSOE wins elections; Zapatero as President of the Government for a 2nd term; PSOE wins elections in Andalucía</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Students strike and demonstration against the Bologna Treaty (that kept going throughout the year)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Demonstration by CGTP against the Labour reform (200000); Truck Drivers strike almost paralyses the country</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Beginning of the Great Recession, after bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. USA government bailouts several banks and the financial system to avoid the crisis to spread.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>German, Dutch, Belgian and British governments give support to banks in an approach that in Europe followed public investment.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Labour Reform is approved; Bankruptcy of BPP and bailout by the Government; FENPROF, teachers demonstration against new regulations (125000 in Lisbon); Bankruptcy of BPN and nationalisation by the Government</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Refundación de la Izquierda - project approved by IU to renew the left project in Spain to which other forces came to join</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Fusion of regional savings banks, which created Bankia</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>German Government presents a new plan to support banks.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Creation of the PAH in Catalonia</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>After months of protest of the ‘Pots and Pans Revolution’ in Iceland against the banks and governmental managements of the financial crisis, the country elects a new left-wing government.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Teachers protest in Lisbon (between 55-70000 protestors)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Week of protests by Rompamos el Silencio</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>National Elections, the PS wins but loses majority previously held</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Municipal/Local Elections - Socialist Party gets ahead regarding the number of municipalities controlled Demonstrations against the Abortion law reform (250000) PASOK wins early elections in Greece.</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Financial rating cut by agencies Budget for 2010 incorporates first austerity measures; Manifesto with 50.000 signatures against Sinde Law Greek plan to cut deficit after discovering a higher deficit than expected; rating agencies pressure both Greece and Portugal.</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Privatisation of one of the bailout banks (BPN); government launches investment plan; first signs that the government wants to reduce deficit; CDS helps PS approving the budget for 2010 Spain launches an austerity package; Compromís is created in Community of Valencia as a political coalition between Bloc Nacionalista Valencià, Iniciativa del Poble Valencià and Greens to run in the upcoming elections of 2011; Demonstration Galicia (Contra o Decretazo do Galego - 40000; Queremos Galego, parties and trade unions) Greece announces a ‘Stability and Growth’ plan backed by the EU, unleashing strong protests in the following months.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Suspension of infrastructures investment is announced</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1st austerity package for 2010-2013 approved in Parliament with abstention of the PSD (main opposition party); General Strike by both Trade Unions in the public sector (UGT and CGTP); pressure from rating agencies continues; new leadership in the PSD (Pedro Passos Coelho); Budget revised and with more austerity measures (Abstention of PSD and CDS) Negotiations for Greece’s Bailout plan start, being approved a month after.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>European Commission says that ongoing austerity is not enough; interest rates rise; new austerity package negotiated between the PS and the PSD. Spanish Government approves an austerity plan with 5% wage cuts to public workers - extraordinary measures to reduce public spending; Plataforma Queremos Galego protests in Galicia; General Strike in the Basque Country;</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2nd austerity Package (PEC II) - approved the following month; PCP proposes a vote of no confidence to the government, which was rejected with abstention of the PSD and the Emergency fund created by the EU; Austerity plan in Italy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS-PP: Demonstration by the Public Sector Unions (CGTP + UGT) (300000)</td>
<td>Last week of protests by Rompamos el Silencio</td>
<td>Labour Reform; Constitutional Court revokes the Statute of Autonomy approved in 2006; General Strike in the whole country; General Strike in the Basque Country</td>
<td>EU demands structural reforms to Portugal and Spain.</td>
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<td>Demonstration in Barcelona against the decision of the Constitutional Court about the Statute of Autonomy (1 million)</td>
<td>Rating agencies pressure Ireland</td>
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<td>New austerity package announced (approved in November) - PEC3; Government announces cuts in public sector wages</td>
<td>General strike (CCOO, UGT, CGT) in Spain to protest against cuts, retirement age, pension freezes and Labour Reform (1st in 8 years); ETA announces the end of their attacks</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Strike by both Trade Unions (UGT and CGTP) against the wage cuts to public sector workers announced by the government; Budget approved with abstention of the main opposition party (PSD)</td>
<td>PAH launches their campaign <em>Stop Desahucios</em>; Elections in Catalonia (CiU wins); Ireland asks for external intervention (Bailout).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December - budget for 2011 approved;</td>
<td>Beggining of the ‘Arab Spring’ with Tunisia revolt, which spreads quickly to other countries in the Mediterranean basin. Argelia follows the same path by the end of the month.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>2011</strong> |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Cavaco Silva reelected as President; European pressures for a Bailout | General Strike against the pensions reform organized by the ELA, LAB, CIG, CGT and the CNT in Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country and Navarra. | Protests start in Jordan, Oman, Egypt, Yemen |
| 2 | Creation of Juventud Sin Futuro and Democracia Real, Ya! | | Protests in Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, |
| 3 | Vote of no confidence by the BE to the government (abstention of PSD and CDS); 4th austerity package is presented by the government not having enough support in Parliament to be approved; Government resigns; Geração à Rasca Protest all over the country against precarity (500000); José Sócrates re-elected as leader of PS | | |
| 4 | External intervention is asked by the government and negotiations with Troika begin - PSD and CDS participate, but BE and PCP refuse | Zapatero announces that he will not stand for re-election; Juventud Sin Futuro organizes their first protest | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bailout approved and signed; Acampada do Rossio in solidarity with 15M in Spain (lasts 3 weeks); CGTP demo (65000)</td>
<td>15M emerges in Spain lasting for several months camped in several squares across the country, large demonstrations; PSOE loses local elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>National Elections, new government (coalition between the PSD and the CDS-PP); Rui Tavares breaks with the BE and joins the Greens in European Parliament</td>
<td>Protest blocks Catalan Parliament; Demonstration against the Euroagreement (global action)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Additional measures of austerity announced; António José Seguro elected as new Leader of the PS</td>
<td>Haircut' in Greece; Mario Draghi is nominated out as President of the European Central Bank.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1st evaluation changes the MoU - additional measures of austerity announced; Constitutional Court approves measures after some MPs asked for those to be revised</td>
<td>Comunidad de Madrid announces cuts in the Education leading to the begin of mobilisation in the sector (Marea Verde)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Global Action Day Demonstration; ETA declares the official end of their activities.</td>
<td>European Stability Mechanism (ESM) created by the EU; New bailout to Greece.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PM announces more cuts on the Christmas and Holidays allowance for public workers; Global Demonstration (100000); Big demonstration CGTP (130000)</td>
<td>Summer: decentralization and formation of the 15M local assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>General Strike by both Trade Unions (UGT and CGTP) against the measures announced by the PM in the previous month; Demonstration by Public Workers Trade Unions (190000); Budget for 2012 approved</td>
<td>Global Action Day Demonstration; ETA declares the official end of their activities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The PP wins national elections in Spain (biggest majority in 25 years)</td>
<td>Government of National Unity in Greece.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>PM suggests that the Golden Rule to block deficits should be inscribed in the Constitution; Ruptura/Fer leaves the BE and later forms Movimento Alternativa Socialista (MAS)</td>
<td>2012 Social Concertation Agreement between UGT and Patronal Confederation reducing unemployment benefits, holidays and collective negotiation rights; Troika insists on the TSU measure that would the private sector contribution to social security while increasing the workers; 15O Protest - confronts with far-right.</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Social Concertation Agreement, Deal for employment and collective negotiation signed by the CEOE, UGT and CCOO</td>
<td>Deal for employment and collective negotiation signed by the CEOE, UGT and CCOO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CGTP Demonstration</td>
<td>Government announces Labour Reform; Valencian Spring (students’ protest); Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba becomes PSOE leader; Greece gets a 2nd bailout.</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>General Strike and demonstration (100000) by CGTP in response to the January social concertation agreement, confrontations between the protesters and the PSP in Largo do Chiado; Amending budget is approved; General Strike + Demonstrations against the Labour reform; Elections in Andalucia, PP wins with relative majority, but PSOE and IU pact to get into government; Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Portugal is the 1st country to ratify the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union; Fontinha School in Oporto is occupied; Schism in DRY</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Global Spring ‘Manifesto para uma Esquerda Livre’ is launched (this group would later join CDA and found a new party LIVRE); A building in São Lazaro (Lisbon) is occupied; Anniversary of 15M; Global Spring; General Strike of the Education sector; Miners’ protests;</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Vote of No Confidence by PCP to the right-wing coalition government; Constitutional Court considers cuts on the Christmas and Holidays allowances proposed by the government unconstitutional (OE 2012); Nationalization of Bankia; Bankia starts to be investigated; 200000 demonstrate in Madrid against the cuts in social right by the government; New Democracy (center-right) wins elections in Greece; Mario Draghi announces that the ECB will do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’</td>
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<td>Vote of No Confidence by PCP to the right-wing coalition government; Constitutional Court considers cuts on the Christmas and Holidays allowances proposed by the government unconstitutional (OE 2012); Nationalization of Bankia; Bankia starts to be investigated; 200000 demonstrate in Madrid against the cuts in social right by the government; New Democracy (center-right) wins elections in Greece; Mario Draghi announces that the ECB will do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Additional measures announced (TSU) but retreat after a national demonstration, governmental crisis and presidential intervention through a State Council; 1st demonstration by QSLT (1 million people); Demonstration at Conselho de Estado (100000); Demonstration by Trade Union (CGTP) (300000) - Terreiro do Povo; September-December has been called Hot Autumn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Additional measures announced (TSU) but retreat after a national demonstration, governmental crisis and presidential intervention through a State Council; 1st demonstration by QSLT (1 million people); Demonstration at Conselho de Estado (100000); Demonstration by Trade Union (CGTP) (300000) - Terreiro do Povo; September-December has been called Hot Autumn; Diada (Catalonia); 1st and 2nd Rodeo al Congresso in Madrid with violence and arrested people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vote of no confidence by PCP; Demonstration for Culture in Lisbon (QSLT) (100000); ‘Siege’ to the Parliament is called by more autonomist groups; CDA meets for the first time; Plan Lasquetty is announced (cuts in the health sector in Madrid); Regional elections in Galicia and Basque Country - Pablo Iglesias and Inigo Errejón as advisors in the campaign in Galicia; PNV wins; 3rd Rodeo al Congreso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>European General Strike (in Portugal against the new budget) - ends with a police charge; PS votes against the budget for 2013; Francisco Louça leaves the coordination of the BE; European General Strike; Elections in Catalonia (CiU - Artur Mas elected president); Marea Blanca emerges to contest the Madrid health policies (petitions, occupations, demonstrations, strikes); European General Strike: coordinated action between Spain, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Return to the bond market; Caso Barcenas starts to be judged; Party X is created</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**2013**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marea Blanca protests in all country; Demonstrations against austerity and Rajoy; Demonstration Marea Ciudadana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Demonstration against austerity (QSLT) which is preceded by a campaign of 'Grandoladas' (500000); Economic Growth Restarts</td>
<td>PAH at the Congress - ILP (1.5 million signatures collected); escraches are carried against the politicians that refuse the ILP; Extension of adjustment programmes approved for Portugal, Ireland and Greece; Crisis and bailout to Cyprus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vote of no confidence by the PS; Constitutional Court declares measures proposed at the OE2013 unconstitutional (one of the measures was the suspension of the holidays subsidies in the private sector)</td>
<td>Demonstration by JSF - No nos vamos, nos echan First General Strike in Public Education against LOMCE (100000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>General strike/Demonstration by Trade Union (CGTP and UGT) against austerity measures and cuts in the public sector; Demonstration against austerity (QSLT) - People's Spring - Povos unidos contra a Troika; Amending budget;</td>
<td>Alternativas desde Abajo meets in Madrid, convened and led by Izquierda Anticapitalista, to run 2015 local elections; at the same time IA would participate in the construction of Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Governmental crisis (resignation of coalition partner) which is solved in the end of the month with the coalition being redesigned after PR pushed for a Grand Coalition (PS, PSD, CDS); Vote of no confidence by the Greens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Constitutional Court considers cuts proposed by the government unconstitutional; PM threats with a new bailout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mariana Mortágua replaces Ana Drago in Parliament</td>
<td>Diada (Catalonia); Demonstration in Madrid defending public health systems; Demonstrations in Baleares against the ongoing education reform (110000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Local elections with PS winning more Municipalities; CGTP demonstration in Lisbon;</td>
<td>2nd General Strike in the Education sector against LOMCE; Strike at Panrico (conflict lasts for more than a year); Demonstration against ETA by AVT (100000);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Budget for 2014 approved; Public sector general strike (support from both trade unions) and demonstration (50000)</td>
<td>1.7 million signatures are collected against LOMCE; Pro-life groups pressure government to change the abortion law; Cumbre Social demonstrates to defend the public services/goods; LOMCE approved; Ley Mordaza (Gag Law) approved; End of the bailout programme without additional assistance required in Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Manifesto 3D for a convergence of the Left in the European Parliament elections is launched; Constitutional Court considers</td>
<td>Protests against the new abortion law (Reforma Gallardon); Economic growth restarts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Standard and Poor's takes Portugal out of observation; BE, Greens and PCP ask for supervision of 2014 Budget; Convergence on the left fails; Strike at 'Linha de Saúde 24' (precarious health workers)</td>
<td>Podemos is launched/created - it brings together a lot of people from the left say who (IA); IA leaves Alternativas desde Abajo and Colectivo en Rede is created by activists as an alternative; Plan Lasquetty is defeated (he resigns after Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid paralyzed the process); Protest in Burgos (Gamonal) against the redesign of street and public spaces - it spreads to other cities in the country; Strike at Coca-Cola in Madrid starts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LIVRE, new Left-Wing Party is created to run to the European Parliament Elections; 'Manifesto dos 74' for the restructuration of debt is launched</td>
<td>A student strike starts with demonstrations in 50 cities. They protested against budget cuts in education, the LOMCE law, low quality of education and the dismissal of thousands of teachers: about 50 people were detained by police; Marchas por la Dignidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Separate celebrations of the 25th of April; Rios ao Carmo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>European Parliament Elections; End of the Bailout programme without additional assistance required; Constitutional Court declares measures proposed at the OE2014 unconstitutional</td>
<td>European Elections; Podemos elects 5 EMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>End of the Bailout programme without additional assistance required; Constitutional Court declares measures proposed at the OE2014 unconstitutional</td>
<td>European Parliament Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Manifesto Guayem Barcelona appealing to build up a transversal candidacy to Barcelona (later they would change their name to Barcelona en Comú); Jornadas Municipalia in Madrid, that would change their name to Ganemos Madrid; King Juan Carlos I abdicate to his son Filipe - republican protests emerge as a result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fórum Manifesto leaves the BE; Constitutional Court approve CES (extraordinary contribution of solidarity)</td>
<td>PSOE new leadership (Pedro Sanchez)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intervention in one of the main banks of Portugal (BES) (crisis started the months before) - as a consequence Novo Banco is created</td>
<td>Reforma Gallardon Stops - he resigns and Rajoy takes the bill out; Diada (Catalonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>New leadership in the PS (António Costa)</td>
<td>Operación Punica starts; Podemos holds their first and constitutive Citizens Assembly - VistaAlegre; Barcelona en</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minimum wage rises; Inquiry Comission do the BES starts and lasts until May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**2015**

<p>| 1 | Ciudadanos starts emerging at national level; Ganemos and Podemos reach an agreement to create <strong>Ahora Madrid</strong> to run to municipal election; <em>Marcha del Cambio</em> (Podemos) (100000) | <strong>Comú</strong> makes an open day (<em>jornadas</em>) to produce an ethical code by consensus, all the parties from the left participate; corruption scandal <em>Tarjetas Black</em> comes to light |
| 2 | After celebrating deals between the whole left in Catalonia (excluding PSC and CUP) Ada Colau presents her candidacy to Barcelona (<em>Barcelona en Comú</em>); Tania Sanchez leaves IU (Madrid) and launches <em>Convocatoria Por Madrid</em>; Alberto Garzon is chosen as IU’s candidate to the general election | <strong>Referendum Catalonia</strong>: <em>Ganemos Madrid</em> makes their presentation |
| 3 | A new left-wing party called <strong>AGIR</strong> founded | Congress approves <em>Ley Mordaza</em> (starts in 2015); Tania Sanchez and Mauricio Valente win the primary elections in IU Madrid; |
| 4 | | <strong>Syriza</strong> wins the legislative elections in Greece and forms government. ECB starts Quantitative easing. |
| 5 | <strong>Barcelona en Comú</strong> wins elections; <strong>Ahora Madrid</strong> is 2nd, but is elected with support of PSOE; | |
| 6 | <strong>Ahora en Común</strong> is created (later to the name is added <em>Unidad Popular</em>); IU (federal) decides to expel IUCM for corruption and obstacles to candidates (which leads to the creation of a new party at the regional level) | |
| 7 | <strong>Catalunya Sí que es Pot</strong> it is created to run to the upcoming regional elections in Catalonia integrating <em>Equo, EUiA, ICS</em> and <em>Podem</em> | Bailout referendum in Greece: it was rejected by 61% |
| 8 | <strong>Diada</strong> (Catalonia); Elections in Catalonia - JxSi wins elections; | New MoU is agreed in Greece; Tsipras’ resigns and calls for snap elections in Greece. |
| 9 | | Syriza wins the legislative elections in Greece and forms Government |
| 10 | General Elections - right-wing coalition gets more votes, but left wing parties hold the majority in | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>En Marea (Galicia) is formed as an electoral coalition of Anova, Podemos and Esquerda Unida to run to the General elections in Galicia. Protest against gender violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>General elections - no clear majority in Parliament and after months of impasse new elections are held in June 2016.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Observatório sobre Crisis e Alternativas (https://ces.uc.pt/observatorios/crisalt/); 15Mpedia (https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Portada); El País; Diário de Notícias; Miley (2017); Portos (2016, 2017); Cruz (2013); Salmon (2017); Interviews and fieldwork observations;
### Appendix II - Interviews

#### Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manifesto por Uma Esquerda Livre, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Livre, Tempo de Avançar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Manifesto 3D, Fórum Manifesto, Tempo de Avançar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Fórum Manifesto, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Tempo de Avançar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Fórum Manifesto, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Tempo de Avançar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Manifesto por Uma Esquerda Livre, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Livre, Tempo de Avançar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Congresso Democrático das Alternativas, Fórum Manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 (Raquel Freire)*</td>
<td>Geração à Rasca, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Português</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Congresso Democrático das Alternativas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Precários Inflexíveis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Autonomist Groups, Acampada, Geração à Rasca, Rios ao Carmo, 15 de Outubro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Autonomist Groups, Acampada, 15 de Outubro, Rios ao Carmo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Autonomist Groups, Acampada, 15 de Outubro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Português, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>CGTP, Partido Comunista Português</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Português, Que se Lixe a Troika, Juntos Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Que se Lixe a Troika, Juntos Podemos, Agir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Que se Lixe a Troika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Que se Lixe a Troika, Bloco de Esquerda, Acampada, 15O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Autonomists, Police Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Partido Socialista</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The interviewee asked to be identified.
Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15M, Autonomist and Ecologist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15M, Mareas Ciudadanas, Asembleas de Barrio, Alternativas desde Abajo-Ganemos-Ahora Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>15M, Izquierda Unida, Feminists, Asembleas de Barrio, Ganemos-Ahora Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>15M, Internet based action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Marea Verde, Mareas Ciudadanas, Comisiones Obreras, Izquierda Unida, 15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comisiones Obreras, Izquierda Unida, Anticapitalistas, Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida, Convocatoria por Madrid, Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unidad Popular/Izquierda Unida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Español, 15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida, Anticapitalistas, Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Marea Blanca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>15M, PAH, Feminist groups, Alternativas desde Abajo-Ganemos-Ahora Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>15M, Marea Blanca, Autonomist Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15M, Autonomist Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ecologistas en Accion, 15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Podemos, Complutense Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III - Protest Event Analysis Codebook

Introduction

In this appendix I will define the main guidelines of the codebook of the protest event analysis I have conducted for this research. Despite being inspired in previous research, I have adapted the codebook to the objectives at hand.

What constitutes an event? Procedures and delimitation

One of the main issues that emerged during the coding process was the delimitation of what constitutes an event. The main question that arose was if particular events constituted multiple or single events. The following questions emerged:

1. If a protest event extents across time without gaps, does that constitute an event or several? In the same vein, if there are gaps, but they are coordinated is it one or several events?
2. A protest happening in different locations simultaneously with one organizers constitute an event or several?
3. What if there is a protest that is coordinated across time, but in different locations?

It is possible to observe three variables that are pivotally and involved in this delimitation: actor, time and space. The first logical consequence of this is that whenever a different actor organises an event this constitutes a different event. As such, the real question here is how space and time change for the same organization. I took into account the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Actor</th>
<th>Time continuity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space continuity</td>
<td>Different events, e.g.: strike or demonstrations that happen in the same place, but across time in a coordinated way</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Collection and Coding Process

Regarding the data collection no sampling was done: instead of selecting various days per week, I have collected all the data concerning protest events taking into consideration the
definition of event, claims, actors and period. This involved going through the online daily archives of each newspapers to collide all of the articles concerning protest events into a single document to code them into the database. The coding followed a codebook (next section) with clear definition of the variables, but that was refined and improved throughout the coding process. The coding process followed two stages: (1) reading each article, summing up all the information to a excel spreadsheet with the terms used by the newspapers; (2) this information was standardised following the codebook and transferred to SPSS.

**Codebook**

The codebook was organised considering the four dimensions defined in the methods chapter: (1) time and space; (2) actors; (3) claims and issues; (4) modes of protest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origins of the Information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event code</td>
<td>Code of each event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sources</td>
<td>Number of newspaper articles reporting the protest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time and Space</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Portugal; (2) Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year, Half-Year, Three Months and Month</td>
<td>Different variables that allow for the measurement of when the event happened</td>
<td>Year - 2009 to 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Half-Year - 2009(1) to 2015(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three Months - 2009(1) to 2015(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Month - 2009(1) to 2015(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Portugal</td>
<td>Location of the Event in Portugal</td>
<td>(1) National; (2) Disperse; (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lisbon Area; (4) North; (5) Center;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Algarve; (7) Alentejo; (8)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Madeira &amp; Açores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Spain</td>
<td>Location of the Event in Spain</td>
<td>(1) Andalucia; (2) Aragon; (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asturias; (4) Baleares; (5) Canarias; (6) Cantabria; (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Castilla y Leon; (8) Castilla-La Mancha; (9) Catalonia; (10) Comunidad Madrid; (11) Comunidad Valenciana; (12) Disperse; (13) Extremadura; (14) Galicia; (15) La Rioja; (16) Melilla; (17) Navarra; (18) Pais Vasco; (19) Region de Murcia; (20) National;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Three variables that indicate who was involved in the organisation of the protest</td>
<td>(1) Organiser; (2) Not an organiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actors support</td>
<td>Three variables that indicate who was supported the protest</td>
<td>(1) Supporter; (2) Not a supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social Movements and civil society</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Labour and Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Political Parties</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claims and Issues</th>
<th>Variables that indicate the presence of these claims and issues in the protest</th>
<th>(1) Present; (2) Not Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Austerity</td>
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<td>- Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Consumers</td>
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<td>- Producer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Representation and Participation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- State and Inclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>- International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Education</td>
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<td>- Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Identity Politics</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Neihorhood, Urban Issues and Environment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Protest</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire</td>
<td>Type of Action (1) Demonstration/march; (2) Strikes (3) Disruptive (e.g. Occupation, Boycott); (4) Written Demands (e.g. Manifesto, Petition)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Portugal</th>
<th>To who are the protests directed</th>
<th>(1) Government; (2) Parliament; (3) Prime Minister; (4) Minister/Ministeries; (5) Local Authorities; (6) Banks/Company/Business; (7) Society; (8) International Actors; (9) President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Spain</td>
<td>To who are the protests directed</td>
<td>(1) Government; (2) Parliament; (3) Prime Minister; (4) Minister/Ministeries; (5) Local Authorities; (6) Banks/Company/Business; (7) Society; (8) International Actors; (9) King; (10) Regional Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Place              | Place where the protest happened | (1) NA; (2) Public Space; (3) Official building/public infrastructure (inside or in front of); (4) Private company/location (inside or in front of); (5) Other |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Length</strong></th>
<th><strong>Number of days the event lasted</strong></th>
<th>(1) 1 day or less; (2) 2-5 days; (3) &gt;5 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence</strong></td>
<td><strong>If there was violence during the event</strong></td>
<td>(1) Yes; (2) No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>